Duran v. Duran

Citations: 150 Cal. App. 3d 176; 197 Cal. Rptr. 497; 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2543Docket: Civ. 7376

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 23, 1983; California; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, disapproved the use of nonstatutory speaking motions to enforce alleged settlement agreements, overruling its prior decision in Ford v. State of California. The court established that a motion for summary judgment is the appropriate procedural mechanism for enforcing such agreements. In the case at hand, Joseph Duran and others sought to establish a trust involving real property owned by Clotilde Duran. The case centered on whether an agreement was reached during a telephone conversation on February 26, 1982. On March 1, the day before trial, Clotilde Duran indicated she did not wish to settle, leading to a motion by the plaintiffs to enforce the alleged settlement. The trial court granted this motion, which was then appealed by the defendant.

The court noted that its previous reliance on Gregory v. Hamilton in the Ford case was misplaced, as later cases like Hastings v. Matlock established that summary judgment is the proper procedure for settlement enforcement. The court highlighted that no nonstatutory motions exist in California law, reinforcing this with references to earlier cases such as Pianka v. State of California and Vesely v. Sager. Ultimately, the court treated the plaintiffs' motion as one for summary judgment and found a disputed issue of fact, necessitating the reversal of the judgment.

Defendant's attorney filed a declaration opposing the motion to enforce a settlement, indicating that after discussing a potential settlement with the plaintiffs' attorney, the defendant agreed in principle to receive a one-third interest, contingent upon drafting a written trust agreement. However, before any formal agreement was made, the defendant decided against proceeding with the settlement. She contended that a successor trustee was never appointed, which was a necessary step in their agreement. The plaintiffs claimed that they would accept any successor trustee, arguing that the written agreement was merely a formality and should not impede the enforcement of the settlement. In contrast, the defendant maintained that a final settlement had not been achieved due to the lack of a successor trustee and the requirement for her approval of a written agreement. The court noted a factual dispute regarding whether the defendant's obligation was contingent upon the approval of a written agreement. It reiterated the general rule that if parties agree that a contract's terms must be formalized in writing, such written assent is necessary for the contract to be binding. The excerpt referenced previous case law supporting this principle and concluded that if a triable issue of fact exists regarding the enforcement of a settlement, motions to enforce should be denied.

A factual dispute exists regarding whether a final settlement agreement was reached and its terms. The Appellant stated she would not enter a final settlement without reviewing the written terms, and it is acknowledged that no written agreement was made. Her attorney corroborated that a final oral settlement was not achieved. The opposing attorney's declaration indicated that the client tentatively agreed to a proposal regarding a one-third interest, contingent upon the approval of a written trust agreement. This indicates a need for fact determination regarding whether an agreement was made before documentation. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied, leading to a reversal of the judgment. Additionally, while the Appellant claims further terms of the trust were unresolved before finalization, it was noted that these terms had been previously agreed upon as part of the tentative settlement.