Sheridan Shores, Inc. v. City of Chicago

Citations: 141 N.E.2d 739; 13 Ill. App. 2d 377Docket: Gen. 46,989

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 8, 1957; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Defendant City of Chicago appeals a declaratory judgment favoring plaintiffs Sheridan Shores, Inc. and Esther Michaels. The plaintiffs claim ownership of real estate on Sheridan Road, featuring a 13-story apartment building with a garage for tenant parking. Michaels, the lessee of the garage, has maintained it since January 1, 1953, where underground gasoline storage tanks were present for tenant use. Following charges from the city regarding operating a public garage in a residential zone and selling gasoline without a license, Michaels obtained written consent from neighboring property owners as required by municipal ordinances. Despite this, her application for a garage maintenance license and permission to sell gasoline was denied by the city clerk, citing zoning restrictions against such operations in an apartment district. The case highlights issues of zoning compliance and licensing for commercial activities in residential areas.

The Zoning Ordinance of Chicago establishes ten use districts and four volume districts, with fifty use district maps; map No. 10 places the premises in an apartment house, volume 3 district. The complaint references Off-Street Parking and Loading provisions of the ordinance as amended on July 28, 1954. Plaintiff Michaels does not advertise her garage or gasoline sales, and there are no visible signs to the public. Services related to automobile storage and gasoline sales are only extended to tenants and their guests, complying with zoning requirements. Michaels expresses willingness to apply for necessary licenses if the court finds the garage operation and gasoline sales licensable under the municipal code, arguing that any prohibition would violate due process rights. 

The defendant's answer, which lacks a plaintiff's reply, asserts that the garage serves non-tenants and operates as a business, violating zoning and municipal provisions. It contends that when Michaels acquired the premises, she found unauthorized gasoline storage tanks and dispensing pumps installed. The defendant claims that the garage's operations exceed what is permissible for a private garage according to municipal law. Michaels previously applied for permits to install gasoline tanks and sell fuel to tenants, but her applications were denied by the Building Department and Zoning Commission, the latter recommending against her appeal.

Defendant filed complaints against plaintiff Michaels and an officer of the plaintiff corporation in the Municipal Court of Chicago, alleging violations related to garage maintenance and gasoline sales, leading to a guilty verdict and fines. A declaratory judgment confirmed that plaintiffs had the legal right to operate the garage for tenants and authorized guests, including maintaining underground gasoline tanks for sale exclusively to garage occupants, without external advertising. The court maintained jurisdiction for enforcement of this judgment. Section 73-6.01 of the Cities and Villages Act allows for judicial review of final administrative decisions by the board of appeals under the Administrative Review Act, which defines "administrative decision" as any ruling affecting legal rights, duties, or privileges that concludes proceedings before the agency. Section 57.1 permits declaratory judgments to clarify rights in cases of actual controversy, which is the basis for the plaintiffs' claim. Illinois law dictates that specific statutory provisions take precedence over general ones. The core issue is whether the defendant's denial of the plaintiffs' permit application was justified, and whether the Zoning Appeal Board was correct in determining that the plaintiffs' business activities violated the Zoning Ordinance. The Administrative Review Act provides a mechanism for appealing the board's decision. The case of Bright v. City of Evanston established that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before challenging the ordinance's validity as it applies to their property, with the board of appeals having the authority to recommend variations in zoning classifications under specific circumstances.

The plaintiff and his predecessor failed to apply for relief concerning the enforcement of a zoning classification that they claim unlawfully restricts their property rights. Judicial relief is only available after exhausting administrative remedies, which in this case involves applying for a variation to the zoning ordinance through the board of appeals. The plaintiff's issue pertains solely to the classification of his lot as residential instead of commercial, rather than contesting the entire ordinance. Since the plaintiff did not seek this variation, he cannot pursue a declaratory judgment. The defendant's argument regarding the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies is valid, despite being raised on appeal. The facts presented in the defendant's answer established the need for the court to determine if the complaint was properly entertained. Following precedent from the Bright case, the court concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment without first utilizing the available administrative remedies. Consequently, the previous judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. Judge Kiley concurs, while Judge Lewe did not participate.