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Wylie v. Gresch
Citations: 191 Cal. App. 3d 412; 236 Cal. Rptr. 552; 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1615Docket: A017402
Court: California Court of Appeal; April 27, 1987; California; State Appellate Court
A California Court of Appeals case (191 Cal.App.3d 412, 1987) involves the Wylie family appealing a judgment dismissing their action against their landlords, the Gresches, for damages related to a dog attack on their daughter by a neighbor's dog. The court held that landlords have no duty to warn prospective tenants about the presence of a vicious dog in the vicinity. The Wylies' complaint included various causes of action against both the Gresches and the neighbors, but only the claims against the landlords were under appeal. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, which the Wylies argued was an error. The court clarified that the purpose of a demurrer is to assess the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, admitting only the material facts and not any legal conclusions. The judgment was affirmed, indicating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying amendment opportunities, as it was determined that there was no reasonable possibility of curing the complaint's defects. The facts outlined indicate that the Gresches owned and managed the property where the Wylies resided at the time of the incident, but the court maintained that this relationship did not create a duty to warn about external dangers posed by neighboring properties. The Buzzells owned a pit bull known for aggressive behavior, including attempts to attack people and other animals, as well as property damage. The dog had previously breached a fence, prompting repairs by the Gresches, the previous landlords, who were aware of the dog's vicious tendencies but did not inform the Wylies, the new tenants. On the day of the incident, while Teresa Wylie was near her home, the dog, initially on a leash, was allowed by Michael Buzzell to be petted by Teresa, after which it bit off her ear and caused severe injuries. The Wylies’ family members also suffered trauma from witnessing the attack. The legal discussion centers on the elements of negligence, specifically the existence of a legal duty. A legal duty arises from the need for due care, and its determination is a question of law. California law (Civil Code section 1714) generally imposes liability for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care. The assessment of duty involves public policy considerations, including foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, connection between conduct and injury, moral blame, prevention of future harm, burden on the defendant, and community consequences of imposing liability. The appellants contend that a duty exists based on these factors, noting that historically, landlords out of possession had limited obligations to maintain safety on the premises. Landlords are generally not liable for injuries to tenants or their invitees caused by defective premises unless exceptions apply. Key exceptions include cases where landlords are aware of latent defects and fail to warn tenants, or when they retain control over common areas and neglect safety. This duty has been expanded to include protection against third-party criminal acts under certain conditions. In *Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co.*, a tenant was assaulted in a poorly lit lobby with a known defective lock in a high-crime area; the court held the landlord liable due to foreseeability of such incidents. Similarly, in *Penner v. Falk*, the court reversed a trial court decision because the landlord had prior knowledge of crimes and failed to rectify unsafe conditions. However, liability is not absolute; in *Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc.*, a landlord was not held liable for a sudden gunfight, as it was unpredictable. Additionally, mere knowledge of crime in the area does not equate to liability, as seen in *7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court*. The foreseeability of harm is a critical factor, with *Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital* indicating that a landowner's knowledge of prior crimes is not a prerequisite for liability, emphasizing that foreseeability pertains to the general nature of potential harm rather than specific incidents. A telephone company was found liable for negligence due to the improper placement of a phone booth that was struck by a drunk driver. The precedent set in Rowland v. Christian has broadened the duty of care for property owners, extending liability to those who are out of possession of the land, such as landlords. Consequently, landlords can now be held responsible for dangerous latent conditions on their properties, even if they are unaware of them, due to a duty to inspect or strict liability for defects. Additionally, landlords may face liability for misrepresentation, as seen in O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., where landlords failed to inform a tenant of prior violent crimes and assured her of the safety of the premises, leading to her being assaulted. The court upheld the tenant's claims of negligence and deceit, emphasizing that landlords must take reasonable precautions for the safety of common areas and inform tenants of known dangers. However, landlords are not responsible for dangerous conditions outside their premises or for criminal acts by individuals they cannot control. Cases like Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. illustrate this limitation, as landlords were not held liable for an incident involving a streetlight outside their control. A former property owner was found not liable for a child's near-drowning incident in a pond because they no longer had possession or control of the premises, and there was no claim of negligent maintenance or defect that caused the injury. The case of Uccello v. Laudenslayer is distinguished, as it involved a landlord with control over the premises and actual knowledge of a dangerous dog, leading to a duty of care to prevent injury. In the current case, the dog was owned by strangers, over whom the landlords had no control, negating liability under Civil Code section 1714. The trial court noted that the landlords could not have foreseen or prevented the injury through property maintenance. Additionally, while there are circumstances where a common law duty to disclose dangers created by third parties exists, the appellants did not demonstrate that the landlords failed to fulfill this duty. Liability typically arises only when a defendant has a special relationship with either the dangerous person or the potential victim. Although the landlord-tenant relationship is increasingly scrutinized, it has not been universally recognized as creating a duty to warn of third-party conduct, and no relevant case law has been found addressing this specific issue in the jurisdiction. A shift is occurring in the application of the caveat emptor doctrine for lessees, as noted by Prosser and Keeton. Modern social policy has introduced several exceptions to the lessor's general nonliability, diminishing the no-duty rule. Key cases illustrate this trend regarding special relationships and the duty to warn. In **Tarasoff**, the Supreme Court recognized a duty to warn due to a special relationship between a therapist and both the patient and a known potential victim. **Johnson v. State of California** established a duty to warn foster parents about a juvenile with known homicidal tendencies. In **Mann v. State of California**, a highway patrol officer's actions created a special relationship, imposing a duty to protect stranded motorists from danger when he abandoned them. The court in both **Johnson** and **Mann** identified a duty to warn or protect due to the defendants placing plaintiffs in peril. Conversely, in **Thompson v. County of Alameda**, the court ruled that the county had no duty to warn after releasing a dangerous juvenile, as it lacked a special relationship with the victims. The court emphasized that there was no foreseeability of harm directed specifically to the victims. It noted that while a special relationship might create duties for third parties, it was not applicable in this case due to the absence of specific threats. Similarly, in **Davidson v. City of Westminster**, the court found no special relationship between police monitoring a laundromat and a potential victim, highlighting the lack of danger creation by the defendant and the victim's reliance on the defendant. The court contended that requiring police to warn potential victims would imply an overly broad duty to warn all potential victims in the vicinity. In Thompson v. County of Alameda, the court established that police do not have an absolute duty to act in ways that could inhibit community safety due to potential tort liability. The case highlighted that the Gresches did not create a dangerous situation, and the Wylies did not depend on their landlords for warnings about danger, differentiating it from O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. A landlord is not an insurer of tenant safety, even concerning dangers that arise on the property, as supported by various citations, including 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court and Tarle v. Park Drive Realty. The document emphasizes that while a special relationship exists between landlord and tenant, the landlord's duty is limited to disclosing defective conditions that are not obvious to the tenant. A landlord is not required to warn tenants about conditions they should reasonably discover. In the case of Hanson v. Luft, the court ruled in favor of the landlords, noting that the danger was apparent to the tenant-parents, thus maintaining that responsibility for safety does not shift from parents to landlords. The ruling aligns with the principles outlined by Prosser and Keeton, which assert that there is no duty to disclose known conditions or those that are open and obvious to tenants. Landlords are not required to disclose known dangers, such as a vicious dog, when they believe tenants can discover such risks themselves. The court found that the landlord-tenant relationship does not extend to neighborhood dangers, which tenants should be aware of as general public members. Imposing a duty on landlords to warn tenants of all possible neighborhood dangers would lead to excessive warnings that could be ineffective and reduce their significance. The ruling affirms that landlords, like the Gresches in this case, are not liable under Civil Code section 1714 for injuries caused by third-party animals or activities outside their control. The majority opinion concluded that no special relationship existed that would necessitate a warning about dangers not directly associated with the property. A dissenting opinion argues against these conclusions, emphasizing the landlord's responsibility for maintaining safety on their property. An exception to the principle established in section 1714 should only be made when clearly justified by public policy. Evaluating whether public policy necessitates a departure from this section requires balancing several factors: the foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, the connection between the defendant's actions and the injury, moral blame associated with the defendant's conduct, the aim of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, community consequences of imposing a duty of care, and the availability and cost of insurance for the risk involved. The court in Rowland determined that the liability of a property owner should be based on whether they acted as a reasonable person would, considering the likelihood of injury, regardless of the plaintiff's status (trespasser, licensee, invitee). In landlord-tenant relationships, the California Supreme Court indicated that a landlord must act reasonably towards tenants, taking into account the risk of injury and their control over the hazard. Control and possession of the danger are relevant to negligence determinations but do not prevent consideration of a landlord's negligence. In Rowland, the defendant, aware of a defective faucet that could harm a guest, failed to remedy or warn about the danger. The court stated that a summary judgment for the defendant is only appropriate if, after examining the facts, the law mandates a judgment in their favor. A jury could reasonably find that the failure to warn or repair constituted negligence. Guests should be able to rely on warnings regarding dangerous conditions to take necessary precautions. The rulings in Rowland are applicable to landlord-tenant cases as affirmed in Becker and Brennan. The majority opinion acknowledges that the Rowland factors can establish a landlord's duty to protect tenants from third-party criminal acts in specific situations. However, it appears to confine liability to incidents occurring in common areas under the landlord's control or where security measures could have been implemented. The dissent argues against this limitation, citing *O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.*, where a tenant was raped in her apartment by a repeat offender. The landlords had falsely assured the tenant of safety and security measures that were not in place, failing to disclose prior assaults. The tenant's complaint included allegations of negligence for inadequate security, misrepresentation of safety, and failure to warn of potential danger. The court affirmed that misrepresentations were not essential to the negligence claim, emphasizing the landlords' duty to warn due to their superior knowledge of the risks. The argument that the landlords were not liable because the assault occurred in the tenant’s apartment was rejected, as liability was based on their failure to warn, rather than control over common areas. The court concluded that the respondents' inaction created a foreseeable risk of injury to the tenant. Negligence may occur if an actor recognizes or should recognize an unreasonable risk of harm to another, even involving third-party criminal conduct. Respondents were aware of conditions that made sexual assaults probable and could have mitigated the risk through information disclosure. A landlord's liability for criminal acts by a third party exists only if the act occurred on premises under the landlord's control or where the landlord could enhance security affecting a tenant's safety. Liability can also arise if a landlord fails to warn tenants about known dangers, even in areas outside their control, such as a tenant's apartment. In the context of a dog attack, appellants claimed respondents knew the dog had aggressive tendencies and caused disturbances in the neighborhood. Respondents argued that liability could not be established since the dog had never bitten anyone. However, foreseeability of general harm, not the specific incident, is essential for establishing negligence. The court referenced past rulings indicating that landlords may have a duty to protect tenants from dangers, including a tenant's vicious dog, provided they have knowledge of the hazard and the ability to control the situation. The majority opinion differentiated this case from precedent by noting the dog was kept by individuals over whom the landlords had no control. Appellants’ claim centered on the respondents' failure to warn of the dog's aggressiveness, which is based on superior knowledge rather than control. The determination of whether a duty of care exists is a legal question, while the foreseeability of risk is factual, requiring jury consideration. The degree of foreseeability necessary to establish a duty varies by case, depending on the burden of preventing harm. In situations where strong policy considerations exist to prevent harm, or where harm can be easily avoided, a lower degree of foreseeability may be sufficient. Foreseeability can be established through evidence of prior incidents and the conditions of the defendant's property. In this case, foreseeability is less stringent because the harm could have been averted with a simple warning about the dog's aggressive nature. Although the appellants' complaint lacks finesse, it must be assessed based on whether they could possibly amend their allegations to state a cause of action. The complaint claims that the respondents were aware of the dog's vicious tendencies, noting that the dog had previously attempted to access the property by damaging the fence. Evidence suggests that the fence was repeatedly repaired due to the dog’s attempts to breach it. These circumstances may allow the appellants to argue that the respondents should have warned them about the dog's aggressive behavior, which would constitute a failure to warn of a dangerous condition. The necessary foreseeability pertains to the general nature of the potential harm, not its specific occurrence. Additionally, there are sufficient grounds to question whether the dog could access the property through means other than the fence. The trial court found no allegations indicating that the respondents could foresee or prevent the injury, highlighting that liability under Civil Code section 1714 can arise from a failure to warn rather than maintenance issues. This liability does not depend on the defendants' control of the premises but rather on their superior knowledge of the danger. The majority opinion does not adequately address the duty to warn in its discussion of statutory duty under section 1714. The dissent critiques the majority's interpretation of the decision in O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., arguing that it misrepresents the nature of the statutory duty of ordinary care under Civil Code section 1714. The dissent emphasizes that this duty encompasses a landlord's obligation to warn tenants of foreseeable dangers, not just to prevent injuries through maintenance. It asserts that the majority incorrectly differentiates between statutory and common law duties, suggesting that the duty to warn, recognized in Rowland v. Christian, applies to landlord-tenant relationships. The dissent argues that failure to warn can constitute a breach of statutory duty, regardless of the landlord's control over the premises. It references Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California to illustrate that a special relationship, akin to that between a landlord and tenant, can establish a duty to warn based on superior knowledge of a danger. The dissent concludes that even under common law, a duty to warn exists, reinforcing the argument that appellants could pursue a cause of action if allowed to amend their complaint. The court's ruling in Tarasoff highlights that a therapist's duty to warn a potential victim arises from their awareness of a specific danger posed by a patient, rather than from control over the patient. The court acknowledged the challenges therapists face in predicting violent behavior but emphasized the importance of taking protective measures for the victim, such as issuing a warning, which does not carry the same severe consequences as patient incarceration. The discussion extends to public policy considerations regarding liability, particularly in relation to a case involving a vicious dog on adjacent property. The court noted that the respondents had a duty to warn tenants about the known dangers associated with the dog, especially given its history of aggression and the likelihood of an attack. The court believes that failing to inform tenants about such risks carries moral culpability and that imposing a duty to warn about known dangers is not a significant burden on property owners. The ruling suggests that landlords should be responsible for alerting tenants to known hazards rather than having to investigate all potential neighborhood dangers. Imposing a duty on therapists to protect third parties from potential harm caused by their patients is consistent with established legal principles, as seen in the Tarasoff case, which recognizes the therapist's responsibility to warn foreseeable victims. The legal precedent suggests that entering into a doctor-patient relationship entails a duty to ensure the safety of both the patient and any third parties known to be at risk. Additionally, landlords are generally able to obtain insurance for liabilities related to tenant safety. The case Uccello v. Laudenslayer illustrates that pet owners may struggle to assess their animals' dangerous tendencies, necessitating a potential duty of care from landlords, particularly in cases where dangerous animals are present on adjacent properties. In instances where a landlord has knowledge of a dangerous dog, public policy supports the landlord's obligation to warn tenants to prevent harm. This duty arises before tenants occupy the premises and could influence their leasing decisions. A late warning may be ineffective due to the complexities involved in moving. The majority opinion notes that establishing a duty to warn involves either the defendant creating a danger or the victim relying on the defendant, although these elements were not present in Tarasoff. Respondents may have placed appellants in a position of danger by renting them premises with a known risk of a vicious dog. Because of this foreseeable peril, respondents had a duty to warn appellants. The dissent disputes the majority's assertion that no dangerous situation was created by respondents, arguing that a special relationship existed between the parties as landlord and tenant, which inherently imposes a duty to warn regardless of additional factors typically required to establish such a relationship. The majority contends that there was no need for a warning regarding the dog since the danger was not latent. They reference legal principles stating that landlords have no duty to disclose risks that tenants are expected to recognize themselves. However, the dissent emphasizes that the classification of the dog as a latent or patent danger should be a question of fact rather than a legal determination. The dissent cites case law affirming that while landlords must warn tenants of hidden dangers, there is no duty for obvious ones. Nevertheless, it notes that recent rulings have blurred the distinction between patent and latent dangers, indicating that a landlord's liability should not be dismissed solely based on this classification without consideration of public policy or the duty of reasonable care. The dissent concludes that the absence of statutory exceptions to the general liability principle means that the duty to warn should be upheld unless there is a clear public policy rationale for exemption. A jury must determine whether a reasonable landlord would have warned prospective tenants about the aggressive nature of a dog on the property, despite its obvious presence. Even if the tenants could have been aware of the dog's vicious tendencies, this consideration pertains to comparative negligence and does not justify dismissing the case without allowing amendments. The opinion suggests that while a landlord-tenant relationship exists, it should not extend beyond the property itself, implying that tenants face the same risks as the general public regarding neighborhood dangers. However, it fails to recognize that conditions on adjacent properties can render a landlord's premises dangerous, potentially exposing tenants to risks. The trial court's dismissal of the respondents' demurrer without allowing amendments was improper, as the appellants could have revised their complaint to assert a cause of action under Civil Code section 1714, Rowland, and common law duties to warn. The judgment should be reversed. Additionally, the appellants' allegations include details about the dog involved in the attack and the condition of the fence at the property. The incident's location remains disputed, with claims that the bite occurred either on the premises or the sidewalk, which is city property. The excerpt highlights the significance of foreseeability in determining liability, referencing legal precedents while noting that status may be relevant in certain circumstances. The document references the case Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, highlighting a trend in jurisdictions to apply standard negligence rules to landowner and occupier tort cases. It emphasizes that possession and control will only matter concerning basic tort issues like foreseeability and unreasonableness of harm risk. The law is shifting toward imposing a general duty of reasonable care on landowners. It examines the Brennan case, asserting it involves more than just a "failure to warn" and includes misrepresentation related to prior crimes in a common area. The third cause of action in the complaint alleges that landlords failed to properly manage the premises, particularly regarding a dangerous dog, but the claim of a duty to remove the dog has been abandoned. The Restatement Second of Torts, section 315, is cited, indicating that a duty to control a third person's conduct exists only under specific relationships. Appellants sought permission to amend their complaint to include claims of landlords’ constructive knowledge of the dog, but the court denied this request. Foreseeability is discussed as typically a factual question for the jury, yet the court must assess it to determine the potential negation of liability based on public policy. The dissent addresses foreseeability specifically concerning the landlords' negligence in warning about the dog's dangerous nature, clarifying that it respects the jury's role in determining actual foreseeability from the trial evidence. Lastly, the document notes that an exception to the rule of no landlord duty after transferring possession exists if the landlord knows of a latent defect. Appellants claim ignorance regarding the dangerous nature of the dog, asserting that while its presence was evident, the threat it posed was not. This situation parallels Couch v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., where a landlord was held liable for a tenant's child's electrocution due to uninsulated wires, which were visibly hanging but not energized, representing a latent defect. The distinction between latent and patent dangers is evolving in liability considerations. The case Uccello v. Laudenslayer highlights that pet owners might struggle to assess their animals' dangerous tendencies, suggesting that liability may extend to property owners under certain conditions. Furthermore, determining whether a danger is latent or patent is a factual matter for the jury, as supported by Merrill v. Buck and Couch v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.