Valdez v. City of Los Angeles

Citations: 231 Cal. App. 3d 1043; 282 Cal. Rptr. 726; 91 Daily Journal DAR 7890; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5191; 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 735; 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 592Docket: B048372

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 27, 1991; California; State Appellate Court

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Ernest F. Valdez, a former police officer, initiated an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los Angeles after the trial court granted a summary judgment favoring the defendants. Valdez, who joined the police force in December 1980 and advanced to Police Officer II in April 1982, alleged discrimination based on his Hispanic ancestry due to repeated failures to advance to Police Officer III. The promotion process involved written and oral examinations, with candidates rated across four categories. Valdez passed the written exam in 1985 and achieved an "excellent" rating after the oral exam, but he resigned from the department later that year. He claimed constructive discharge in December 1986 based on discriminatory practices that hindered his advancement and led to his resignation. The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing found insufficient evidence to support his claims. Valdez subsequently filed a civil action for discrimination in May 1988, alleging that the promotion examinations and lack of training opportunities were discriminatory, resulting in his constructive discharge. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment for all defendants except the City of Los Angeles, reversing the decision concerning the city.

Defendants responded to Valdez's complaint by denying the material allegations and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment based on four primary arguments: 1) Timeliness issues regarding Valdez's discrimination claims related to the police department's promotion practices; 2) Valdez's failure to state a valid claim for constructive discharge; 3) Claims against individual defendants being barred since they were not named in the charges filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing; and 4) The Los Angeles Police Department's immunity from damages claims. Notably, defendants did not present evidence to counter Valdez's allegations regarding discriminatory promotion practices or his working conditions. The only supporting declaration came from an officer in the employee relations division, stating a lack of awareness of any discriminatory intent in the promotions for Police Officer III.

In contrast, Valdez's declaration opposing the summary judgment included additional information, alleging he lacked necessary backup during emergencies and felt unsafe in his position. He suggested that non-minority officers perceived him as a troublemaker and believed minorities were unfairly promoted. Valdez had previously lodged complaints regarding the promotion process and the handling of examination results. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, which Valdez appealed. The court noted that triable issues of fact existed concerning the ongoing nature of the defendants' alleged discrimination against Hispanic officers, emphasizing that summary judgment is only appropriate if the moving party can negate essential elements of the opposing party’s case or provide a complete defense. The burden to demonstrate the lack of evidence for continuing violations lies with the defendants, who misinterpreted the summary judgment process.

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must provide sufficient evidence to establish each necessary element for a favorable judgment; failing this, summary judgment should be denied, even if the opposing party does not submit any evidence. This principle applies to employment discrimination cases. In University of Southern California v. Superior Court, the court ruled that the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the reasons given by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination.

Importantly, in a motion for summary judgment, the defendant cannot solely rely on the plaintiff’s lack of evidence for a prima facie case; they must also provide undisputed evidence that negates the claim of discrimination or establishes a legitimate basis for the employment decision. In the current case, the defendants failed to show that their promotional system was nondiscriminatory and only argued that the discrimination claims were time-barred due to the one-year filing requirement under Government Code section 12960. Discrimination claims not filed within this timeframe cannot support a civil action against the employer.

Defendants contend that Valdez's discrimination complaint is untimely since the last alleged discriminatory act regarding his promotion occurred in November 1985, while he filed his complaint on December 4, 1986. Valdez counters that his claim is timely due to the "continuing violations" doctrine, which allows such claims if the discriminatory practices persist within the limitations period. The doctrine is particularly relevant in cases involving discriminatory promotional systems. 

The excerpt references the case of *City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment Housing Com.*, where a complaint was deemed timely despite the promotional examination occurring well before the complaint was filed, as the discriminatory promotional system remained in effect during the year preceding the claim. The court emphasized that systematic discrimination is actionable even if some acts occurred outside the limitations period, as established in *Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, which illustrates that an employee can file a timely claim if subjected to ongoing discriminatory policies.

Valdez, having passed the written and oral examinations in 1985, was placed on a promotion eligibility list with a two-year lifespan, which extended beyond his complaint filing. He argues that if the oral exam was discriminatory, the violation continued until the eligibility list expired in May 1987, shortly after his complaint. Defendants, citing *United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans*, argue that a charge is not timely if based solely on the effects of past discriminatory acts. However, they fail to recognize that Valdez's claim challenges ongoing practices within the limitations period, distinguishing it from cases like Evans.

In Evans, the plaintiff resigned from an airline in 1968 due to a no-marriage policy for female flight attendants, which was repealed shortly after her departure. Upon being rehired in 1972, she was not credited for her previous service. The court found that while the airline's seniority system reflected past discrimination, it did not constitute a present violation under Title VII, as the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the system discriminated against former female employees in any ongoing manner. This case was distinguished from promotion cases where ongoing discrimination was evident, as the plaintiff in Evans faced the consequences of past discriminatory actions rather than an active violation.

In the 1985 case concerning Valdez, the defendants argued that his claim regarding the March 1985 written examination was invalid since he passed it, but Valdez contended that the subsequent oral examination was discriminatory. The defendants also claimed Valdez could not challenge the oral examination due to his promotion eligibility, which extended until May 1987 despite his resignation in December 1985. Valdez asserted that being placed in the second tier of promotion-eligible employees due to his Hispanic ancestry was discriminatory, creating a continuous injury throughout his employment. The court supported the notion that resignation did not negate his cause of action for discrimination, as it would unfairly compel employees to endure ongoing unfair treatment or relinquish their rights to seek redress. 

Furthermore, while the defendants conceded that Valdez's constructive discharge claim was timely, they argued it lacked merit since it did not allege intolerable working conditions or their knowledge of such conditions.

A defendant's motion for summary judgment tests the sufficiency of the complaint, applying demurrer rules where allegations are accepted as true. To prove constructive discharge, an employee must demonstrate: 1) actions or conditions that violate public policy; 2) those conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would resign; and 3) the employer had knowledge of these intolerable conditions and could have remedied them. The defendants argue that Valdez's complaint lacks sufficient allegations of intolerable working conditions and the employer's knowledge. However, the court finds that the complaint presents facts that could lead a trier of fact to conclude the conditions were intolerable, making this a question of fact. A single isolated incident of discrimination is generally insufficient to establish constructive discharge. The requirement of "aggravating factors" in constructive discharge claims may be satisfied by showing a continuous pattern of discrimination. In relevant case law, such as Nolan v. Cleland, the appellate court found sufficient evidence of systemic discrimination that justified a finding of constructive discharge, leading to a reversal of the lower court's summary judgment. Similarly, in Clark v. Marsh, the court upheld a finding of constructive discharge based on a pattern of discriminatory treatment affecting promotions and training opportunities over several years.

Valdez claims a continuous pattern of discrimination starting in 1982, citing discriminatory promotional exams, lack of training opportunities, higher performance standards compared to non-Hispanics, and denial of advancement-related assignments. These allegations suggest that a reasonable employee could feel justified in resigning. Defendants contend that Valdez's continued employment for over a year after the alleged intolerable conditions indicates those conditions were not, in fact, intolerable. They reference Panopulos v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., which implies a one-year limit for maintaining a wrongful constructive discharge claim after intolerable conditions begin. However, the court rejects this premise, stating that there is no legal basis for an arbitrary time limit on an employee's right to claim intolerable working conditions. It emphasizes that the duration of employment under such conditions is just one factor in assessing the totality of circumstances. Citing various case precedents, the court notes that claims have succeeded even when intolerable conditions persisted for more than a year before resignation, and the length of time an employee remains in a difficult situation does not, as a matter of law, bar them from pursuing a wrongful discharge claim. Employees may endure challenging conditions due to financial constraints, which could prevent them from resigning sooner.

Circumstances that prevented an employee from resigning do not diminish the employer's burden in wrongful discharge cases. The determination of a reasonable person's actions in the employee's position is critical, as established in Brady v. Elixir Industries. Applying rigid limits risks overlooking a reasonable basis for an employee's continued employment despite intolerable conditions. The policy against discrimination encourages employees to address issues while still employed. Valdez attempted to challenge the promotional system during his tenure by filing grievances, which suggests he sought to improve conditions. 

To prove tortious constructive discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of intolerable conditions and their effects on the employee, as noted in Brady. Valdez met these requirements, as high-level managers within the police department can be presumed to have knowledge of discriminatory practices affecting promotions and training opportunities for Hispanics, including Valdez. The prevailing view under Title VII indicates that employers can be held liable if they create intolerable working conditions, regardless of intent to force resignation. 

The defendants' claim that Valdez needed to notify them of his belief in discriminatory practices is unsupported; systematic discrimination implies employer awareness. Additionally, Daryl Gates, Chester Spencer, and Robert Taylor, as agents of the City of Los Angeles, are considered "employers" under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. However, since these individuals were not named in Valdez's charge to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the legality of including them in the civil suit remains unaddressed in California case law.

Testimony regarding harassment not specified in a plaintiff's charges to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing is not considered reversible error, as the defendant could have discovered such acts through discovery processes. The court found a waiver of the alleged error due to the plaintiff's failure to address it at trial. An administrative complaint serves as a basis for investigating discrimination claims and should not be viewed as a limiting device. There is a distinction between failing to specify all discrimination charges and failing to name defendants who are known or could be identified with reasonable diligence. The Fair Employment and Housing Act supports a liberal interpretation of general allegations while also requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies to ensure prompt resolution of claims. Failure to name defendants at the administrative level compromises fairness and the right of those individuals to participate in the process. Federal courts differ on whether unnamed defendants can be included in civil suits; the Ninth Circuit allows it if their involvement could have been revealed during the administrative investigation, whereas the Fourth Circuit requires them to be named in the administrative complaint, and the Seventh Circuit balances equitable considerations. The court concluded that not naming defendants Gates, Spencer, and Taylor in the administrative complaint is detrimental to bringing action against them in court. The judgment is affirmed for all defendants except the City of Los Angeles, for which it is reversed, and costs on appeal are awarded to the appellant against the City of Los Angeles.

Johnson, J. concurs in parts I and II of the majority opinion and partly in III regarding the dismissal of the Los Angeles Police Department as a defendant but dissents on the issue of Gates, Spencer, and Taylor being improperly named as defendants. He argues that no California case has definitively addressed the permissibility of civil suits against parties not named in a complaint filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). Johnson cites *Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation* (1989), asserting that Government Code section 12960 should be broadly interpreted concerning its pleading requirements, allowing evidence of harassment beyond the administrative complaint.

Johnson highlights that the complaint form used by the DFEH does not require the naming of individuals who may have committed discrimination, only the employer or relevant organization. This ambiguity raises questions about who is considered Valdez's employer—whether it is the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, or specific individuals like Chief Gates and Commander Taylor. He emphasizes that it is unreasonable to expect a non-lawyer claimant to navigate such complexities without legal assistance, contradicting the legislative intent.

Additionally, he points out that the DFEH complaint form lacks a directive to name individuals alleged to have committed discriminatory acts, suggesting that had it included such guidance, Valdez might have identified Gates, Spencer, and Taylor. Johnson argues that California courts should adopt the Ninth Circuit's stance which allows claims against unnamed parties if their involvement could likely have been uncovered during the administrative investigation, referencing *Chung v. Pomona Valley Community Hospital* as a precedent where the court permitted claims against unnamed defendants based on anticipated involvement in the discrimination alleged.

The case being analyzed aligns more closely with Chung than with White v. North Louisiana Corp. The individual defendants include the chief of police, the director of the employee relations unit, and the commander of the division where Valdez worked prior to his resignation. These defendants were connected to the police department's alleged discriminatory practices regarding promotions, training, and assignments impacting Hispanic officers, particularly Valdez. Their involvement was likely uncovered during the investigation of Valdez's administrative complaint, and they should have anticipated being named in his lawsuit. Unlike the board president in White, Gates, Spencer, and Taylor did not submit declarations demonstrating their lack of involvement in the discriminatory practices or how they were prejudiced by not being named in the administrative complaint. However, they are allowed to submit such declarations in future motions for summary judgment. The court emphasizes that a rigid rule prohibiting the naming of parties not included in an administrative complaint is inappropriate, as it contradicts the liberal construction principles applied in Title VII cases and recognized by California courts in Fair Employment and Housing Act matters.

Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation establishes that strict rules may disadvantage discrimination victims without offering meaningful protection to unnamed parties, contrasting it with the more flexible approach in cases like Chung. Valdez's civil action is not restricted to the May 1985 oral examination; he also claims discrimination in a written examination from March 1984. If he can substantiate this claim and demonstrate that the eligibility list from the March 1984 exam remained valid past December 4, 1985, his administrative complaint filed on December 4, 1986, would be considered timely. Valdez has testified about experiencing resentment from colleagues due to his ancestry, which manifested in a lack of support during critical situations, potentially constituting an intolerable work condition. He may request to amend his complaint accordingly. The case differs from those involving sexual harassment, where employer liability hinges on whether notice was given to officials, as noted in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. The Los Angeles Police Department was appropriately dismissed from the action, as it does not qualify as an employer under the law. Government Code section 12960 mandates that complaints must specify the accused party's name and details of the alleged unlawful practices. Key individuals relevant to the case include Daryl Gates (Chief of Police), Chester Spencer (Director of Employee Relations), and Robert Taylor (Commanding Officer). The Fair Employment and Housing Act aims to ensure employment opportunities free from discrimination, allowing the Department of Fair Employment and Housing to pursue accusations without requiring claimants to hire legal representation.