Nelson v. Denkins

Citations: 598 N.E.2d 558; 1992 Ind. App. LEXIS 1357; 1992 WL 208519Docket: 76A03-9204-CV-121

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; August 24, 1992; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Wesley E. and Marianne Nelson appeal the trial court's summary judgment favoring Gregory Denkins. The appeal raises three key issues: 1) Whether Wesley Nelson’s claim against Denkins is barred by the Worker’s Compensation Act; 2) Whether Marianne Nelson’s loss of consortium claim is also barred if Wesley's claim is barred; and 3) Whether the trial court erred in striking the Nelsons' verified statement opposing Denkins’ motion for summary judgment.

The court must determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact and if the law was correctly applied. The trial court's judgment may be upheld if supported by any theory in the record. The relevant facts detail an incident on February 23, 1989, when Wesley Nelson, after completing his shift as a dispatcher, interacted with Denkins, an assistant terminal manager. Denkins pushed Nelson into a room and later shoved him again, resulting in severe pain the following day. Nelson reported the incident and sought worker's compensation benefits, which are currently under appeal. The Nelsons filed a complaint against Denkins on February 22, 1991, leading to Denkins' motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court.

The Worker’s Compensation Act applies to injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. An accident is defined as an unexpected injury, with "arising out of" relating to the injury’s cause and "in the course of" concerning the time, place, and circumstances of the accident. A precedent case, Skinner v. Martin, illustrates these principles in a similar workplace context.

Skinner's response to Martin's request for assistance escalated into a verbal altercation, culminating in Martin physically assaulting Skinner. Skinner sought damages in court, but the trial court dismissed his claim, citing that the incident occurred during Skinner's employment, specifically during a coffee break, and was therefore covered by the Worker's Compensation Act. The court referenced precedents indicating that disputes and physical confrontations can arise in work-related contexts, inferring that injuries resulting from such disputes occur in the course of employment. 

Similarly, Nelson's case was analyzed, where he was injured by Denkins while still engaged in work-related activities. Evidence suggested that the altercation was work-related, despite Nelson's speculation about Denkins’ motives lacking substantiation. Nelson failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial as required under Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). The court affirmed that the rationale from the Skinner case applied, emphasizing that the specifics of the altercation need not be identical for the legal principles to hold. 

Under the Worker's Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision, Nelson could not pursue a tort claim against Denkins and was limited to compensation under the Act. Nelson attempted to argue that an exception to this exclusivity applied, allowing claims against third parties not in the same employ. However, the court maintained that since Denkins was an employee, Nelson's remedy was confined to the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act.

In Ward v. Tillman, the Indiana Court of Appeals established that determining whether parties are 'in the same employ' hinges on whether a defendant could receive compensation benefits under similar circumstances. Merely sharing an employer does not grant immunity from common-law tort suits; it must be shown that the defendant acted within the course of their employment and that the incident arose from that employment. In this case, if Denkins had been pushed by Nelson, he would have qualified for worker's compensation since both were employees of Consolidated, and the incident was work-related. 

The court distinguished this case from Martin v. Powell, where an orderly's horseplay was deemed outside the scope of employment, and Fields v. Cummins, where sexual harassment was found to not benefit the employer, thus not arising from employment. Work-related disputes, however, can be seen as part of the employment relationship, as illustrated in the Skinner case.

In Seiler v. Grow, a factual dispute arose over whether Grow was acting within the course of his employment when he inadvertently injured Seiler while demonstrating a pistol. The conclusion in the current case aligns with the accepted facts indicating that the incident was indeed work-related. Lastly, Nelson's reference to Armstead v. Sommer, which states that an aggressor in a fight may not claim worker's compensation, is irrelevant as Denkins, the supposed aggressor, is not seeking such benefits.

Summary judgment was granted against both Wesley and Marianne Nelson. The Nelsons contend that Marianne's loss of consortium claim is an independent cause of action and should not be dismissed based solely on the failure of her husband's claim. However, loss of consortium claims are derivative; they depend on the injured spouse's valid claim against the wrongdoer. If the injured spouse’s claim is barred by statute, as established in Arthur v. Arthur, the loss of consortium claim is also invalid. The Bender and Greene cases affirm that if the injured spouse's claim is abrogated, the loss of consortium claim cannot stand. The Nelsons reference Rosander v. Copco Steel Engineering Co. to argue that Marianne’s claim should continue despite Wesley's judgment; however, Rosander is distinguishable as it involved a settlement where the spouse was not a party. The exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act prevents Wesley's claim against Denkins, thus invalidating Marianne's loss of consortium claim. Additionally, the Nelsons argue that the trial court erred by striking their verified statement opposing the motion for summary judgment. They state that if the court was correct in its action, then it should have also struck Denkins’ reply memorandum. The timeline of motions and filings, including the dates of the summary judgment motion, responses, and the eventual ruling, is detailed, culminating in the trial court granting Denkins' motion for summary judgment on January 6, 1992.

The trial court properly granted Denkins' motion to strike the Nelsons' verified statement, which was filed over two months late and after the hearing on the summary judgment motion. Under Ind.Trial Rule 56(C), an adverse party has thirty days from the service of the summary judgment motion to file a response and any opposing affidavits. The Nelsons incorrectly claimed they had thirty days after Denkins’ reply memorandum, which contradicts the rule. Although T.R. 56 does not address reply memoranda, the court found no prejudice, as it only considers legal propositions, not new facts, in summary judgment motions. The reply memorandum provided additional legal authority without introducing new facts, and the Nelsons did not raise any objections until after Denkins' motion to strike. The burden was on the Nelsons to show a material issue of fact to avoid summary judgment, and the reply memorandum did not affect this obligation. The trial court's decision to deny the motion to strike the reply memorandum was affirmed. Judges Garrard and Staton concurred.