Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

Citations: 219 Cal. App. 3d 1265; 268 Cal. Rptr. 699; 55 Cal. Comp. Cases 107; 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 410Docket: A047411

Court: California Court of Appeal; April 27, 1990; California; State Appellate Court

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The California Court of Appeals ruled that distinct occupational disease processes resulting from a single asbestos exposure period can have different injury dates for death benefits calculations under Labor Code section 5412. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. contested the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's decision, which determined that Harvey Steele's death from mesothelioma was a separate pathology from his earlier diagnosis of asbestosis. The Board found that Steele's disability from mesothelioma first manifested on August 12, 1987, establishing that as the correct date of injury for calculating death benefits, rather than the previous date of September 28, 1976, associated with asbestosis. The court affirmed the Board's decision, stating that Chevron misinterpreted the relationship between exposure and the onset of distinct injuries. Steele had worked for Chevron from 1951 to 1975, was diagnosed with asbestosis in 1976, and died from mesothelioma in 1987. His widow filed for death benefits shortly after his death, which led to the Board's hearings and subsequent rulings on the proper date of injury for the claim.

Mr. Steele was exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant, resulting in two distinct injuries: asbestosis and mesothelioma of the stomach lining, each with different dates of disability. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) concluded that separate diseases necessitate distinct dates of injury. The Workers' Compensation Act defines 'injury' to include diseases arising from employment, with the date of injury generally being the date of the incident or exposure. For occupational diseases, the date of injury is when the employee first experienced disability and realized or should have realized that it was work-related. Relevant case law, including Argonaut Mining Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. and Dickow v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., clarifies that a compensable injury only exists once there is disability, which establishes the right to seek compensation. Additionally, in latent occupational disease cases, the date of injury for determining statute limitations and indemnity benefits corresponds to the onset of disability and knowledge. The law allows for multiple 'injuries' or 'diseases' from a single exposure, as demonstrated by Dr. Piero Mustacchi's identification of four disease processes associated with asbestos exposure.

Mesothelioma was first diagnosed and manifested disabling symptoms in Steele on August 12, 1987. Dr. John R. Balmes testified that mesothelioma and asbestosis are separate diseases, although they can coexist, and confirmed that Steele's mesothelioma did not result from his prior pulmonary asbestosis. According to statutory definitions, Steele's 'date of injury' for mesothelioma is tied to when he first suffered disability, which was on the aforementioned date. Chevron argues that the case General Foundry Service v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. mandates a singular date of injury due to the nature of progressive occupational diseases. However, the court disagrees, stating that it is not bound by the Supreme Court's non-binding comments in General Foundry. The Supreme Court did not clarify whether mesothelioma or lung cancer is a direct consequence of asbestosis, and implied that asbestos exposure can lead to various diseases, not just a single continuum. Chevron's argument that the Board should award permanent disability while reserving jurisdiction for future modifications conflates exposure with actual injury. The court concludes that even under General Foundry principles, Steele's mesothelioma constitutes a distinct injury separate from any prior asbestosis, thus establishing a different date of injury.

Respondents sought a remand for supplemental attorney fees under section 5801, which aims to shift attorney fee burdens to employers when a petition lacks a reasonable basis. They argued that Chevron's petition, contesting the Board's decision on the grounds of insufficient evidence, should be deemed unreasonable. However, the court disagreed, noting that Chevron raised a legal question not previously addressed, and affirmed that the Board's decision was not automatically without reasonable basis just because it was upheld. The court concluded that the petition did not represent the type of frivolous challenge the Legislature intended to discourage with section 5801, thus denying the request for supplemental attorney fees. The court also affirmed that Steele’s injury date regarding mesothelioma was August 12, 1987, and upheld the Board's decision denying reconsideration on August 21, 1987. The application for review by the Supreme Court was denied on July 10, 1990.