Phelps-Roper v. CITY OF ST. CHARLES, MO.

Citations: 782 F. Supp. 2d 789; 2011 WL 749750Docket: Case No. 4:11-CV-111 (CEJ)

Court: District Court, E.D. Missouri; February 23, 2011; Federal District Court

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Shirley L. Phelps-Roper and Megan Phelps-Roper, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the City of St. Charles, Missouri, following the enactment of Ordinance 131.50, which prohibits picketing within 300 feet of funerals. The ordinance was enacted on January 18, 2011, in response to concerns that picketing at funerals infringes on families' rights to mourn peacefully. It acknowledges the constitutional right to free speech while balancing it against the need to protect the privacy of grieving families and maintain the sanctity of funeral settings.

The ordinance defines "funeral" as ceremonies related to burial or cremation, excluding processions on public streets and wakes. It specifies that unlawful picketing occurs when individuals protest within 300 feet of a funeral during a defined timeframe surrounding the event. Violators may incur a misdemeanor charge and a fine of up to $500. The plaintiffs assert that they would continue to picket in the city if not for the ordinance. The issues surrounding the motion are fully briefed, and the court is set to consider the matter.

On January 19, 2011, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Missouri statute 131.50 infringes upon their First Amendment rights and violates the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act. They seek a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of the statute, nominal damages, and attorney's fees. A temporary injunction against 131.50 was agreed upon by both parties on January 27, 2011, pending a ruling on the preliminary injunction motion. 

To grant a preliminary injunction, a court evaluates four factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant, (2) the balance of harm between the movant and the other party, (3) the likelihood of the movant's success on the merits, and (4) the public interest. The question at hand is whether the balance of equities favors the movant sufficiently to warrant intervention to maintain the status quo until the case's merits are resolved.

Plaintiff Shirley Phelps-Roper has contested funeral protest restrictions in multiple states, including Missouri, and has ongoing appeals concerning the constitutionality of these laws. The Eighth Circuit has previously addressed similar issues in Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, which reversed a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against Missouri's ban on funeral picketing. The City of St. Charles aims to impose restrictions on peaceful picketing, which is protected under the First Amendment. In First Amendment cases, the likelihood of success on the merits is often a critical factor in granting a preliminary injunction. 

The Eighth Circuit has noted that even minor infringements on First Amendment freedoms constitute irreparable harm, reinforcing the public interest in safeguarding constitutional rights. The balance of equities typically favors freedom of expression. For injunctions against enacted state statutes, a threshold determination of the party's likelihood of prevailing on the merits is required. The applicable standard for municipal ordinances depends on the extent to which the challenged action reflects democratic processes and merits greater deference.

The City of St. Charles' ordinance in question lacks documented evidence on its passage process. For this motion, it is assumed that the plaintiffs must meet a heightened standard of demonstrating a likely success on their First Amendment claim. Generally, the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting speech based on its content, and content-based regulations are presumed invalid. However, the ordinance is characterized as content-neutral, which allows for intermediate scrutiny. Such regulations are permissible if they serve significant government interests, are narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative communication channels.

The defendant claims that the ordinance serves two significant interests: protecting the dignity of memorial services and the privacy of families during burials. However, plaintiffs argue that these interests do not outweigh First Amendment protections, a position supported by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Nixon, which rejected similar government interests in a funeral picketing statute. The court emphasized that while certain locations like residences may warrant privacy protections, churches do not receive the same level of constitutional shielding. The Eighth Circuit's ruling indicates that the right to free speech, especially in public forums, must be preserved as much as possible, reinforcing that the government cannot impose undue restrictions based on the interests of unwilling listeners outside residential contexts. This precedent binds lower courts in similar cases, reaffirming that the government's interest in protecting mourners is insufficient to justify restrictions on speech.

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their argument against Ordinance 131.50, which does not serve a legitimate government interest and fails to be narrowly tailored, lacking ample alternatives for expression. The ordinance's 300-foot buffer zone for funeral protests is deemed excessive, supported by case law. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that protesters at military funerals aim to communicate specific messages to a targeted audience present at such events. As a result, plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on First Amendment grounds, establishing that they would face irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction. The injunction does not impose substantial harm on others, and the public interest is best served by upholding constitutional rights. The Court grants the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance 131.50, prohibiting the City of St. Charles and its affiliates from enforcing the ordinance during the ongoing proceedings. No bond is required from the plaintiffs, and the argument regarding the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act is deemed unnecessary. Documentation submitted by the plaintiffs has been reviewed, and no hearing was requested by either party.

In Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, the court denied a preliminary injunction against a Nebraska statute that prohibits picketing near funerals. In contrast, Phelps v. Hamilton found that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act, with the decision affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Tenth Circuit. McQueary v. Stumbo granted a preliminary injunction against a Kentucky funeral-protest ban for a Westboro Baptist Church member. 

Additionally, Phelps-Roper v. County of St. Charles granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff, while Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester ruled that a city ordinance violated the First Amendment, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Phelps-Roper v. City of Gladstone also issued a preliminary injunction against a city ordinance. 

The court assumes plaintiffs must meet a heightened standard of likely success on their First Amendment claims. The First Amendment prevents governmental restrictions on speech due to disapproval of expressed ideas, with content-based regulations being presumptively invalid. The ordinance in question is deemed content-neutral, subject to intermediate scrutiny, and must serve a significant government interest, be narrowly tailored, and allow alternative communication channels. 

The defendant argued that the ordinance preserves the dignity of funerals and protects family privacy, but the plaintiffs contended these interests do not outweigh First Amendment protections. The Eighth Circuit previously rejected similar arguments, emphasizing that the sanctity of funerals does not provide enough justification for restricting speech, drawing comparisons to prior cases involving picketing near residences versus public spaces like churches.

Allowing various locations, including churches, to assert the same level of constitutional privacy could lead to excessive government restrictions on speech. The Eighth Circuit, referencing Olmer, determined in Nixon that a plaintiff's First Amendment rights likely surpass any governmental interest in protecting mourners, influencing district courts facing similar legislation. Notably, distinctions made by St. Charles County regarding mourners did not suffice to bypass Nixon's precedent. The Eighth Circuit has consistently rejected the government's purported interest in shielding unwilling listeners, except in specific contexts like the Heineman case, which recognized a legitimate interest in protecting grieving families at funerals.

Based on Nixon, the Court believes the plaintiff is likely to succeed in arguing that Ordinance 131.50 does not promote a legitimate government interest. The plaintiffs also contend that the ordinance fails to meet the criteria of being narrowly tailored and providing adequate alternative means of expression. The Court finds that the ordinance's 300-foot buffer zone is excessive concerning funeral protests, supported by precedents from Manchester, St. Charles County, and McQueary. The defendant did not provide persuasive reasons for a different outcome.

Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that protesters at military funerals intend to communicate their message to a specific audience present at those events. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success regarding their claim that Ordinance 131.50 unjustly limits their First Amendment rights. Consequently, plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction, which would not significantly harm others and would serve the public by upholding constitutional rights. Therefore, the balance of harms favors granting the preliminary injunction, rendering further discussion of the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act unnecessary.

Defendant has not requested any security to safeguard its interests regarding a potential wrongful injunction, leading the Court to decide against requiring plaintiffs to post a bond. Consequently, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of the City of St. Charles, Missouri Code of Ordinances 131.50 is granted. The City of St. Charles, along with its agents and any collaborating parties, is prohibited from enforcing this ordinance while the case is ongoing. Neither party has sought a hearing, but plaintiffs have provided affidavits which the Court has reviewed. The excerpt also references several related cases concerning the constitutionality of laws regarding funeral protests, highlighting a pattern of judicial decisions related to First Amendment rights.