People v. Seda

Citations: 712 N.E.2d 682; 93 N.Y.2d 307; 690 N.Y.S.2d 517; 1999 N.Y. LEXIS 1143

Court: New York Court of Appeals; May 11, 1999; New York; State Supreme Court

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In the case of *People v. Heriberto Seda*, the Court of Appeals of New York addressed the application of the tolling provision under CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(ii) concerning the Statute of Limitations for multiple attempted murder charges against Seda, who was initially known only as 'The Zodiac.' The prosecution argued that the statute was tolled due to the defendant’s whereabouts being continuously unknown despite extensive police efforts to locate him from 1990 until his arrest in 1996. Seda was indicted for three counts of attempted murder and related charges stemming from two shootings in March 1990.

Seda moved to dismiss the charges, claiming they were time-barred as the prosecution occurred over six years after the alleged crimes, exceeding the five-year limitations period. The lower Supreme Court agreed with Seda, concluding that the tolling provision only applies when the perpetrator’s identity is known but their location is not. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the statute does not require knowledge of the defendant's identity to apply the tolling provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, holding that the tolling provision applies to situations where the identity of the defendant is unknown, thereby allowing the prosecution to proceed with the charges.

CPL 30.10 (2)(b) mandates that felony prosecutions, excluding class A felonies, must begin within five years of the offense. However, certain periods can toll this limitation, as outlined in CPL 30.10 (4)(a), which states that time is not counted if the defendant was continuously outside the state or their whereabouts were unknown and unascertainable despite reasonable diligence. The prosecution for the March 1990 shootings began after approximately six years and five months, exceeding the five-year limit unless the tolling provisions apply.

The key issue is the interpretation of "whereabouts of the defendant" in CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(ii). The defendant argues that "whereabouts" refers solely to location, not identity, implying the statute applies only when a known perpetrator cannot be located. The court rejects this narrow interpretation, affirming that "whereabouts" encompasses both situations: when the identity of a perpetrator is known but their location is not, and when neither is known. This interpretation aligns with the statute's intent to protect defendants from delayed prosecutions while recognizing law enforcement's challenges in locating individuals. The court emphasizes the importance of the statute of limitations in safeguarding against the prosecution of events from the distant past and promoting timely investigations.

CPL 30.10 (4)(a) reflects a legislative balance between avoiding prosecution of stale cases and allowing law enforcement adequate time to pursue suspects. The tolling exception applies only during periods when a defendant's whereabouts are unknown and unascertainable despite reasonable diligence, with a maximum extension of five years for the limitations period. The statute emphasizes the challenges in locating a defendant, irrespective of the police's knowledge of their identity, and does not automatically toll the statute of limitations. Historical context shows that the predecessor statute focused on the defendant's conduct regarding residence, but the current law centers on the difficulty of apprehending defendants who are absent or whose locations are unknown, without needing proof of intent to evade prosecution. In the case of the defendant associated with the March 1990 shootings, the Appellate Division found that his whereabouts were unknown for over six years, justifying the tolling of the Statute of Limitations under CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(ii), thus the indictment is not time-barred. The Appellate Division's order is affirmed. The defendant is currently incarcerated for other homicide convictions.