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Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Citations: 810 F. Supp. 2d 402; 2011 WL 4100949Docket: Civil Action No. 06-11053-GAO
Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; September 15, 2011; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran and sought to attach antiquities held by the Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University, claiming these items belong to Iran. The Museums contended that the antiquities are not subject to attachment and moved to dissolve the attachments. The court previously ruled that these items are immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) but acknowledged that the plaintiffs could potentially reach them as "blocked assets" under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA § 201(a) allows for execution or attachment of a terrorist party's blocked assets to satisfy judgments based on terrorist acts. Although TRIA lacks a specific execution mechanism, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 permits reliance on state law, which the plaintiffs invoked through Massachusetts procedures for attachment by trustee process. Under Massachusetts law, a creditor must demonstrate that the trustee possesses the defendant's goods to justify attachment. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and they must substantiate their claim that the trustee holds assets belonging to the defendant; this burden is not shifted by TRIA. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the "goods, effects, or credits" in question are property belonging to Iran, as required for the trustee process aimed at attaching and selling a defendant's property held by another party. The term "of the defendant" clearly implies ownership. The trustee process is designed to enable creditors to attach their debtor's goods or credits in the possession of a third party. Despite extensive discovery, the plaintiffs have not substantiated their claim that any items held by the Museums are Iran's property eligible for execution through the trustee process. Merely showing that antiquities originated from Iran is insufficient. Their reliance on Iranian law, particularly the "1930 Law," is unconvincing, as it does not automatically confer ownership of excavated antiquities to the Iranian government and acknowledges the possibility of private ownership. Other courts have interpreted the 1930 Law as not supporting automatic government ownership. Additionally, Article 26 of the 1928 Civil Code does not classify the antiquities at issue as government property, as it pertains to property used for public service or state profit, a classification that the plaintiffs have not established for the antiquities in question. The plaintiffs' assertion that items from the ancient city of Persepolis cannot be privately owned is also unsupported by Article 26, which does not imply that all excavated items belong to the government. Historical claims of unlawful excavation do not substantiate their legal argument. Establishing that an item was unlawfully exported from Iran does not equate to proving its status as property of Iran eligible for levy and execution. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any items in the Museums' possession, whether from Persepolis or other locations, are legitimately considered the property of Iran. Consequently, the plaintiffs' Motion for Order of Attachment by Trustee Process is denied, while Harvard's and the Museum of Fine Arts' motions to dissolve the attachment are granted, resulting in the dissolution of the trustee attachments. Two points regarding the 1930 Law are notable: Article 17 requires a government permit for exporting antiquities, but lack of such a permit does not automatically indicate unlawful exportation, particularly after many years. Furthermore, Article 26 specifies that government property for public service cannot be privately owned, but this does not imply ownership of antiquities by Iran. Notably, while the plaintiffs claim ownership of the antiquities, Iran has not asserted such a claim itself.