Matarese v. ARCHSTONE PENTAGON CITY

Citations: 795 F. Supp. 2d 402; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59585; 2011 WL 2144533Docket: 1:09-mj-00857

Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; May 31, 2011; Federal District Court

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In the case of Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia addressed housing discrimination claims brought by Linda and Domenic Matarese against multiple defendants, including Smith Property Holdings and Archstone Communities. The lawsuit, filed under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL), alleges discrimination based on Ms. Matarese's handicap. The Matareses' original complaint, filed on July 31, 2009, underwent two amendments, leading to a Second Amended Complaint outlining several claims, including refusal to rent, discrimination in rental terms, failure to make reasonable accommodations, and retaliation.

At the summary judgment stage, the court narrowed the claims, allowing Counts I-VIII, XI, and XII to proceed to trial. These included refusal to rent (Counts I, II), discrimination in rental terms (Counts III, IV), discrimination statements (Counts VII, VIII), and retaliation (Count XII). The court's prior orders granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. A key issue was whether Ms. Matarese qualified as an individual with a handicap under the FHA. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated her qualification, as the defendants regarded her as having a condition that significantly limited her breathing.

Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs based on Ms. Matarese's handicap by not renewing their lease and refusing to allow them to rent at another Archstone location, actions taken with discriminatory intent. The Court found violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL) regarding the terms of rental, as Defendants denied Plaintiffs benefits like rental discounts and imposed an excessive rent increase while converting their tenancy to month-to-month. Additionally, Defendants McGregor and Mann made discriminatory statements indicating a preference against Ms. Matarese's handicap during the decision-making process. Retaliation was also established for actions taken against Plaintiffs following their exercise of protected rights, including lease nonrenewal and exorbitant rent increases. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief to address ongoing discrimination. The Court emphasized the standard of review in non-jury cases, noting the trial judge’s role in fact-finding and evaluating witness credibility.

Factfinders are better positioned to assess the reliability of evidence and witness credibility, with trial judges responsible for evaluating testimony and demeanor. Courts must adhere to Rule 52(a) by providing not just ultimate facts but also the subordinate facts supporting their rulings. Findings must be comprehensive enough to support decisions without needing to address every factual issue or make negative assertions regarding each contested fact. The adequacy of findings varies by case specifics.

In this case, Plaintiffs Linda and Domenic Matarese have resided at APC in Arlington, Virginia, for over 18 years, living in unit 1405 since 1997. Ms. Matarese’s 95-year-old mother, Hilda Bauman, lives in unit 1411 directly across from the Matarese's apartment. Ms. Matarese, who is responsible for her mother's needs and communication with APC, has consistently reported her severe sensitivities to paint fumes, tobacco smoke, and mold to Archstone managers. Her reactions to these chemicals include dizziness, coughing, debilitating headaches, sore throats, and respiratory infections, making her extremely fearful of exposure. She has not spent a night away from home in 15 years, only leaving for essential errands, and has taken measures to sanitize her apartment to avoid chemical exposure, while also requesting accommodations from APC to manage her sensitivities.

The Archstone Defendants confirmed that routine painting and renovations occur at APC, including fresh paint for new tenants and a significant renovation project from late 2006 to 2008. This project involved cleaning and painting exterior surfaces for all units, requiring some interior painting for areas inaccessible from outside. APC utilized VOC paint, which poses health risks, particularly respiratory issues. Ms. Matarese developed a respiratory infection attributed to the exterior painting, prompting her to communicate her concerns to Defendant McGregor in May 2007, supported by a letter from her allergist, Dr. Alpan. Ms. Matarese requested that APC avoid painting her unit due to her health conditions, including allergies and chronic fatigue syndrome. McGregor reacted angrily and denied her request, asserting the company's right to paint as they saw fit. Consequently, the scheduled interior painting for the Plaintiffs and Ms. Bauman was deferred. A revised painting schedule was issued in October 2007, with Ms. Bauman's windows painted on November 12, followed by the Plaintiffs' on November 14. During the painting, strong fumes permeated Ms. Bauman's apartment, prompting her to vacate to her daughter's residence. The fumes also infiltrated Ms. Matarese's apartment, despite her previous requests for containment measures. The day after Ms. Bauman's windows were painted, Defendant Mann informed Ms. Matarese that her apartment's windows were next on the schedule.

Ms. Matarese contacted Mr. Mann regarding her chemical sensitivities and health condition, inquiring if he had reviewed the documentation she provided to Defendant McGregor. Mr. Mann acknowledged her situation and indicated that while they needed to complete the painting job, accommodations would be made for her health. Ms. Matarese emphasized her serious health issues and her previous attempts to schedule the painting during a more favorable time. She faxed Mr. Mann a letter from Dr. Alpan, which he confirmed had made him aware that the painting could harm her. Although he recognized her condition, he maintained that the painting must proceed, suggesting that she could stay in another unit once it was dry.

Throughout the conversation, Ms. Matarese requested the use of non-VOC paint, which Mr. Mann refused, citing coverage issues on metal surfaces. They agreed to wait for the drying of another apartment before commencing work in hers, ensuring she could stay there during the process. On November 16, 2007, Ms. Matarese informed Mr. Mann that the paint in her mother's apartment was still wet, making her unable to stay there. She questioned why the windows could not be painted elsewhere, but Mr. Mann insisted on accessing her unit. He offered a hotel stay, which she declined due to her sensitivities. That same day, Dr. Williams provided a letter emphasizing the risks posed to Ms. Matarese's health from paint fumes. Ultimately, no actions were taken regarding the painting in her apartment in November 2007.

On June 5, 2008, a significant leak occurred in the Plaintiffs' apartment, necessitating the replacement and painting of an 8-foot-by-10-foot section of drywall. Ms. Matarese informed Defendant Garcia about her sensitivity to VOC paint and requested non-VOC paint. Despite her request and providing information about the non-VOC paint previously used, Garcia opted to paint the wall with VOC paint, claiming unfamiliarity with non-VOC options. Concurrently, a leak in Ms. Bauman's apartment was reported, where mold was found growing due to water damage. Service technician Mr. Reilly confirmed the leak and mold presence, but the mold remediation protocol was not followed by APC personnel, who concluded there was no mold in Bauman's unit. 

In June, Ms. Matarese faced issues with smoke intrusion from a neighboring apartment, exacerbated by a malfunctioning hallway ventilation system. She requested Mr. McGregor to install weather stripping and a door sweep to mitigate smoke entry, but only received inadequate air purifiers a month later. Both Plaintiffs suffered respiratory issues and sought medical attention from Dr. Williams, who recommended that their apartment be confirmed mold-free. When Ms. Matarese presented this note to Mr. McGregor, he dismissed her concerns, stating that past mold issues were not his responsibility, and did not perform any follow-up tests. Additionally, Ms. Matarese's requests for accommodations during nearby painting projects were denied.

Ms. Bauman reported a persistent sewer smell from the bathroom adjacent to her bedroom, which was corroborated by Defendants Garcia and McGregor. Despite repeated complaints and attempts by APC personnel to address the issue, including a plumber's involvement, the odor remained unresolved. Mr. Garcia promised to investigate the apartment below Ms. Bauman's on August 6, 2008, but Ms. Matarese struggled to get updates, eventually confronting Mr. Garcia, expressing frustration over unfulfilled promises. On August 8, 2008, Ms. Matarese was informed that APC would not renew the Plaintiffs' lease set to expire on October 31, 2008, although they continued to reside there. The Plaintiffs frequently requested accommodations for Ms. Matarese's chemical sensitivities, often supported by a medical certification from Dr. Williams, but many requests were denied or ignored. On March 20, 2009, Dr. Williams provided a letter confirming Ms. Matarese's disability under the Fair Housing Act, yet Defendants persisted in denying her accommodation requests. Despite a written acknowledgment from Defendants' attorney on October 16, 2009, which stated that all reasonable accommodation requests would be granted, APC continued to refuse her requests. Ms. Matarese has been under the care of two doctors for her chemical sensitivities since late 2006, both of whom testified about her health issues, including diagnoses of rhinitis, eczema, and bronchitis, but noted no significant breathing difficulties.

Dr. Williams attributed Ms. Matarese's nosebleeds to dry winter air but did not further investigate her other conditions. He prescribed medication for bronchitis and recommended a dermatologist for her ear issues. Ms. Matarese first visited Dr. Alpan on December 28, 2006, where she provided her medical history and underwent allergy tests. These tests revealed she was highly allergic to dust mites and house dust, and a spirometry exam showed normal breathing without obstruction. Dr. Alpan diagnosed her with allergic rhinitis and chronic sinusitis but did not treat her for a respiratory infection or chemical sensitivities. 

In March 2007, Dr. Alpan sent a letter to APC stating Ms. Matarese was being treated for multiple allergies and advised against exposing her to certain chemicals, which he admitted were related to her dust allergy rather than chemical sensitivities. From March to September 2007, Ms. Matarese had multiple visits with Dr. Williams and one with Dr. Alpan, addressing ear infections, eczema, and seasonal allergies, but no breathing difficulties were noted. 

On November 16, 2007, Ms. Matarese informed Dr. Williams about her previous adverse reaction to paint and obtained a letter from him advising against exposure to chemicals. Dr. Williams clarified that his reference to chemical sensitivities related to medications and bacterial rhinosinusitis, not specifically to paint. After five months without visits, Ms. Matarese saw Dr. Williams again in March and May 2008 for ear cleanings, during which he found no signs of breathing problems, diagnosing her instead with ear wax, eczema, and rhinitis.

Ms. Matarese consulted Dr. Williams multiple times in June 2008 following repairs in her apartment, exposure to smoke, and mold issues in her mother's apartment. On June 13, she presented with a sore throat, phlegm, medication failure, cough, and headache after being exposed to paint fumes and mold. Dr. Williams found her throat red but otherwise normal, diagnosing her with throat inflammation and eczema, and prescribed antibiotics without determining the underlying cause. 

On June 18, Ms. Matarese reported persistent sore throat and lung discomfort, describing her symptoms as feeling like thrush. Dr. Williams noted her throat was relatively normal with mild white patches on her tongue, diagnosed her with thrush and pharyngitis, and attributed the thrush to antibiotic use. He prescribed an antifungal but did not investigate the cause of her condition.

On June 25, she returned with sore throat, oral discomfort, coughing, wheezing, and fatigue. Dr. Williams found her examination normal and diagnosed oral Candida, prescribing another antifungal. He ordered a chest x-ray due to her breathing complaints, which returned mostly normal, though mild hyperinflation was noted. Dr. Williams did not follow up on the x-ray results, attributing no urgency, and referred Ms. Matarese to internist Dr. Taubin for lung issues. 

During this visit, despite doubting a connection between mold exposure and her oral Candida, he advised ensuring her apartment was mold-free. In a follow-up on July 25, Ms. Matarese reported improvement with the antifungal, though a white coating persisted in her mouth. Dr. Williams found her condition normal aside from ear wax, continuing the oral Candida diagnosis. In her last visit on September 26, a physical exam showed normal results except for nasal mucosa, and a culture taken from her right passage showed no growth; no fungal test was ordered, and there were no signs of breathing difficulty.

On November 21, 2008, Ms. Matarese visited Dr. Williams for an ear cleaning, reporting controlled mucus and improved throat condition; examination results were normal. Dr. Williams diagnosed her with Candida, rhinitis, and chemical sensitivity, noting multiple sensitivities to medications. No breathing difficulties were reported. On December 19, 2008, she returned to discuss legal issues and medication problems; a physical exam was mostly normal, with improvement noted, but she complained of a cough without breathing issues. Dr. Williams wrote to Dr. Joel Taubin, requesting an evaluation of her cough, oral cavity, and overall health, summarizing her medical history, complaints, and chemical exposure. He referenced a June 25, 2008 visit where she reported severe coughing that hindered breathing but indicated her condition improved after treatment. On December 24, 2008, another visit confirmed a normal examination, despite her throat discomfort and a Candida diagnosis, with no breathing difficulties present. On December 29, 2008, Dr. Alpan diagnosed her with rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, and urticarial. 

On January 17, 2009, Ms. Matarese returned to Dr. Williams with complaints of lung pain, increased mucus, and a dry cough, but examination showed no signs of breathing problems. He noted her ongoing care with a pulmonologist. In February and March 2009, further visits involved ear wax removal and a follow-up on nasal drip; she had a productive cough but no breathing difficulties were identified. Dr. Williams diagnosed her with bronchitis in February and noted her well-being in March. During the March visit, she presented a medical verification form, which Dr. Williams signed, affirming her as handicapped under the FHA and advising avoidance of certain chemicals. However, he did not complete handwritten instructions and clarified that he did not conclude her ailments were caused by chemical exposure. Allergist Dr. Howard Weiner later reviewed Ms. Matarese's medical records and testimony on behalf of the defendants.

Dr. Weiner reviewed Ms. Matarese's medical records and concluded that her symptoms were not caused by exposure to paint or mold, citing a lack of evidence for mold presence in her apartment and no positive allergy test results. He also dismissed her claims of secondhand tobacco smoke exposure as negligible. Dr. Weiner noted few respiratory complaints documented by Dr. Williams and found no evidence of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) or other related conditions in Ms. Matarese’s records, suggesting her symptoms stemmed from a somatic disorder rather than a medical basis.

Additionally, evidence presented by the defendants indicated that complaints had been made against Ms. Matarese regarding her conduct within the apartment complex (APC). These complaints were not recorded in her tenant file, and she was not given a chance to respond. Reports included allegations of her feeding birds contrary to APC rules, disruptive behavior at the swimming pool, harassment of other residents regarding smoking, and negative interactions with contractors performing work at the building. Instances of Ms. Matarese's emotional outbursts were noted, including an incident in 2008 involving a neighbor's cat, which she refused to return until the neighbor ceased smoking.

On August 7, 2008, Ms. Matarese disrupted another tenant's apartment while seeking Mr. Garcia about sewer issues in Ms. Bauman's unit, expressing frustration over unfulfilled promises and lack of attention to her concerns. Ms. Deeqa Nur, a resident and APC employee, testified that she found Ms. Matarese's frequent complaints about Mr. McGregor's lack of responsiveness bothersome, as she felt unqualified to address resident issues.

The Plaintiffs' leases at APC typically spanned from November 1 to October 31, with renewal notices generally issued each August. They initially paid $1,814.00 per month for the lease from November 1, 2005, to October 31, 2006. Before this lease's expiration, they received a renewal offer at $2,175.00, which was lower than the market rate of $2,238.00 due to standard tenant discounts. After negotiating with the Community Manager, the Plaintiffs secured a reduced rate of $1,975.00 for the subsequent lease from November 1, 2006, to October 31, 2007.

In August 2007, as their lease neared expiration, renewal information was not provided, leading Ms. Matarese to fear eviction following her accommodation request in May 2007 for renovations. On October 23, 2007, she inquired about lease renewals, and Mr. Stuart Shaginaw indicated that APC had considered nonrenewing their lease. However, this decision changed, and on October 24, 2007, APC offered lease renewal with various rent options, including a proposed $2,640.00 for a 12-month lease, a 34% increase from their current rent.

Ms. Bauman was offered a 16% increase from $1,935.00 to $2,235.00. Ms. Matarese negotiated lower renewal rates, resulting in a final agreement of $2,490.00 for Plaintiffs and $2,088.00 for Ms. Bauman. These rates represented a 26% and an 8% increase, respectively, starting January 1, 2008, with options to terminate on October 31, 2008, or December 31, 2008. On November 7, 2007, the Plaintiffs signed a new lease at the negotiated rate. In summer 2008, as the lease expiration approached, Defendant McGregor communicated with Defendant Mann regarding the potential non-renewal of the Plaintiffs' and Ms. Bauman's leases.

Defendant McGregor sought to gather information to support the nonrenewal of leases for Ms. Matarese and Ms. Bauman, contacting Archstone personnel for their input. He initially reached out to Katrina Wood, Stuart Shaginaw, Veronica Ahmad, and Amilcar Garcia, requesting their responses by July 24, 2008. Shaginaw noted that while Ms. Matarese was time-consuming due to frequent complaints, she also had a positive role in reporting building issues. Wood reported multiple instances of Ms. Matarese's inappropriate behavior, including harassment of neighbors about their smoking and an incident where she threatened to keep a neighbor's cat. She also mentioned Ms. Matarese's harassment of staff. McGregor compiled this information in an email to Defendant Mann, describing Ms. Matarese as a "detriment to the community" and detailing her disruptive behavior as a pattern concerning issues like paint, smoke, and mold. Subsequently, McGregor inquired about the possibility of nonrenewing the leases while discussing a planned rent increase for other tenants. Defendant Mann instructed him to implement a 3% rent increase but advised him to delay sending renewal letters to Ms. Matarese and Ms. Bauman.

On August 7, 2008, Defendant McGregor informed Defendant Mann via email about Ms. Matarese's emotional reaction to Defendant Garcia's inaction regarding a sewer smell in Ms. Bauman's apartment. He noted that Defendant Garcia had to reassure a new tenant about Ms. Matarese's well-being. The following day, Defendant Mann communicated that Ms. Matheu had approved the nonrenewal of Ms. Matarese's lease and proposed a meeting with her, which Defendant McGregor agreed to. On August 8, McGregor left a voicemail for Ms. Matarese about meeting, but she expressed no leaks existed. Despite this, she visited McGregor's office with her mother, where McGregor disclosed the decision to not renew their leases, citing violations of community rules and lease terms by Ms. Matarese related to mold, sewer issues, and smoking. When pressed for specific lease violations, McGregor could not provide them, leading to his anger over her complaints about paint and cigarette smoke. Ms. Bauman corroborated that McGregor stated they would not renew the leases and expressed frustration with Ms. Matarese's complaints. At trial, McGregor denied making certain statements but acknowledged discussing Ms. Matarese's accommodation requests. The Court found McGregor's credibility lacking and noted that Ms. Matarese's complaints were factually supported, contrary to McGregor's assertions.

Complaints by Ms. Matarese regarding paint, smoke, and noxious odors were supported by testimony from APC personnel, indicating they were based on observable facts. Mr. McGregor displayed a biased attitude towards Ms. Matarese, both verbally and nonverbally, undermining his claims of impartiality. His actions, including emails to APC personnel to "build a case" against her, indicated animus and supported the Court's conclusion that he made a discriminatory statement during a meeting. Following the meeting, Ms. Matarese expressed significant distress concerning her and her family's living situation, particularly due to her health and her aging mother's condition. On August 11, 2008, she sent a letter to Mr. McGregor addressing his claims for the nonrenewal of their lease, framing it as retaliation for her complaints about mold and sewer odors, but did not mention his statement regarding her sensitivities. Ms. Matarese intended her letter to invoke the Virginia Landlord/Tenant Act, separate from her forthcoming discrimination claims, which she concurrently drafted for the Virginia Fair Housing Office. On the same day, Defendants sent a letter to the Plaintiffs notifying them that their lease would not be renewed, requiring them to vacate by November 11, 2008, as per the lease agreement terms. On August 17, 2008, Ms. Matarese found their apartments listed for rent on the Archstone website for availability after their lease expiration. She filed a discrimination complaint with the Arlington County Human Rights Commission on August 20, 2008, referencing Mr. McGregor's remarks about her accommodation requests. A subsequent conversation on October 6, 2008, revealed that Defendants assumed Ms. Bauman would leave with Ms. Matarese after their lease ended.

Ms. Matarese conveyed Ms. Bauman's desire to stay at Archstone Property Company (APC) during a call with Defendant Mann on October 6, 2008, who indicated that the option would be considered. However, he later stated that Archstone would not renew the Plaintiffs' lease or allow them to move to another Archstone property, suggesting they should seek alternatives in the area due to competition. Subsequently, Defendant McGregor instructed regional staff to avoid leasing to Ms. Matarese and to be vigilant regarding her maiden name, Bauman. Ms. Matarese was also placed on a decline list by Saferent, the screening entity for tenant applications.

On October 15, 2008, Ms. Matarese amended her housing discrimination complaint with HUD, alleging retaliation by Defendants for her original complaint. The Virginia Fair Housing Office began investigating her claims. On October 29, 2008, the same day her administrative complaints were served, APC issued an amended nonrenewal notice, requiring the Plaintiffs to vacate by December 31, 2008, per their lease agreement. The lease specified that renewal was at the owner's discretion, and if no agreement was reached, it would continue month-to-month, subject to a potential rent increase.

At trial, Defendant McGregor clarified that the nonrenewal decision was not due to any lease breach by the Plaintiffs but was simply the exercise of their right not to renew. The Plaintiffs remained as holdover tenants under a month-to-month agreement, which could be terminated with a proper 60-day notice. Ms. Matarese's Fair Housing complaint was dismissed in July 2009 due to a lack of reasonable cause for discrimination. On September 25, 2009, Defendants' counsel notified the Plaintiffs that their eviction would be lifted, confirming a transition to month-to-month tenancy and stating that a rent increase notification would be issued effective January 1, 2010.

On September 29, 2009, Defendant McGregor notified Plaintiffs of a rent increase to $2,964.00, effective January 1, 2010, and reminded them of their month-to-month tenancy, stating that a prior notice to vacate had been rescinded. Plaintiffs were required to inform APC in writing by October 31, 2009, if they wished to avoid the rent increase and vacate by December 31, 2009. Ms. Matarese rejected the notice, viewing it as a third eviction notice linked to the rent increase. Subsequently, Ms. Bauman received an invitation to renew her lease, along with a reminder on December 20, 2009. On December 31, 2009, Ms. Matarese and Ms. Bauman met with the assistant community manager to discuss renewal, but were told confirmation from Mr. McGregor was needed. Despite follow-ups in January and February 2010, APC ultimately decided not to renew the lease, citing Mr. Raftery’s instructions. Ms. Bauman thus remained a holdover tenant under a month-to-month agreement. The Plaintiffs reported significant anxiety and stress due to the uncertainty of their tenancy and the refusal of accommodation requests, impacting their marital relationship.

The document also outlines legal conclusions based on findings of fact. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) aims to provide equal housing opportunities, particularly for historically discriminated groups, including individuals with disabilities as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The FHA prohibits discrimination based on physical or mental disabilities and is interpreted broadly to protect fair housing rights. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the housing action had a discriminatory motive or impact. Disparate treatment claims under the FHA often utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as direct evidence of discrimination is typically hard to obtain, with parallels drawn from fair employment law.

A plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor, though it need not be the primary factor. If successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action in question. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the reasoning provided is a pretext for discrimination, ultimately establishing that intentional discrimination occurred. Notably, this framework does not apply if direct evidence of discrimination exists.

In the context of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the court found that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs based on Ms. Matarese's handicap by refusing to renew their lease and denying them rental opportunities at other locations. Under FHA § 3604(f)(1), it is unlawful to discriminate against a renter due to a handicap. To establish a prima facie case under this provision, the plaintiff must demonstrate membership in a protected class, awareness of this status by the defendants, qualification and willingness to rent, and denial of rental.

The court determined that Ms. Matarese qualifies as an individual with a handicap under the FHA because the defendants regarded her as handicapped, substantiating the claim of discrimination in their actions regarding the lease.

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) defines "handicap" as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, having a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. The evaluation of whether an individual qualifies as having a handicap is case-specific. In this instance, the court determined that Ms. Matarese qualifies as an individual with a handicap under the FHA because she was regarded as handicapped by the defendants, despite the plaintiffs failing to prove that her condition substantially limits her breathing as required under FHA standards.

To establish a "handicap" under the FHA, an impairment must significantly impact major life activities in a permanent or long-term manner. The court referenced previous cases indicating that intermittent manifestations of an illness do not meet the threshold for substantial limitation. The determination of whether someone is substantially limited considers the severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impairment.

Although the plaintiffs claimed Ms. Matarese suffers from chemical sensitivities to paint, smoke, and mold, they did not demonstrate that these sensitivities substantially limit her breathing. The evidence presented, which included testimonies and letters from Ms. Matarese, only indicated episodic reactions to these exposures without showing that her condition was more limiting than that of the average person in the general population.

Plaintiffs' assertion that Ms. Matarese experienced a substantial limitation in breathing is undermined by her medical records from Dr. Williams and Dr. Alpan, which do not document any breathing difficulties during her frequent visits from December 2006 to 2009, even during severe symptom episodes like bacterial rhinosinusitis. Only in June 2008 was there any noted concern regarding her breathing, which resolved shortly thereafter. A spirometry test returned normal results, and an ordered lung x-ray did not definitively indicate breathing issues. Furthermore, Dr. Williams' communications did not emphasize Ms. Matarese’s breathing problems, focusing instead on her complaints from a single visit. 

Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate a causal link between Ms. Matarese's exposure to paint, smoke, and mold and her alleged breathing limitations. No evidence of heightened sensitivity to these chemicals was established, as her allergy tests indicated only a strong reaction to dust. Although Dr. Alpan acknowledged that dust allergies could be triggered by certain chemicals, there was no proof that Ms. Matarese's symptoms were caused by exposure to paint, smoke, or mold. Additionally, letters from Drs. Alpan and Williams about her chemical sensitivities did not confirm sensitivity specifically to the aforementioned substances. Dr. Williams' causal conclusions were based solely on the timing of exposure and symptoms, without independent verification of exposure or consideration of alternative causes, an approach echoed by Dr. Alpan's testimony, which acknowledged multiple potential causes for her symptoms.

Plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between Ms. Matarese's exposure to paint, smoke, and mold and her breathing difficulties, which meant they could not prove her eligibility as an individual with a handicap under FHA Section 3602(h)(1). However, it was determined that Ms. Matarese qualifies under FHA Section 3602(h)(3) because the Defendants regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limited her breathing. The FHA stipulates that an individual is "regarded as" disabled if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the individual has a physical impairment limiting major life activities, or misconstrues a non-limiting impairment as limiting such activities. The court's analysis of whether an individual is regarded as having a handicap focuses on the attitudes of those involved in the discrimination.

In this case, evidence showed that Defendants perceived Ms. Matarese as having chemical sensitivities to paint, smoke, and mold that substantially limited her breathing and treated her accordingly. Defendant Mann, during his deposition, acknowledged that Archstone viewed Ms. Matarese as having this handicap. Although Mann later claimed Archstone did not share this perception, the court found this explanation inconsistent and untrustworthy. Notably, Archstone had received doctors' letters confirming Ms. Matarese's chemical sensitivities, which were unlike any provided by other tenants in the building, and the company had no reason to doubt their validity. Additionally, Defendants' FHA training recognized chemical sensitivities as a handicap when they substantially limit major life activities.

Between 2005 and 2009, Defendants made various accommodations for Ms. Matarese based on her reported sensitivities to paint, smoke, and mold, which were communicated through letters from her and her doctors. These accommodations indicate that Defendants recognized Ms. Matarese as having significant breathing difficulties rather than simply striving for excellent tenant service. For instance, in May 2007, Ms. Matarese informed Mr. McGregor about her sensitivities after a prior incident caused her severe illness during exterior painting, leading Defendants to refrain from painting inside her apartment. In November 2007, Ms. Matarese reiterated her health concerns to Defendant Mann, providing additional documentation from her doctors, which led Mann to acknowledge her condition and offer options for accommodation, though ultimately, they did not proceed with the interior painting due to her sensitivities.

Defendants' actions and admissions indicate they regarded Ms. Matarese as having a disability, despite her not having impairments that severely limit her breathing. Both McGregor and Mann understood that her chemical sensitivities significantly affected her health. McGregor, during discovery, admitted that Ms. Matarese was an individual with disabilities, although he later claimed this was an error, a position the Court found unpersuasive. During his deposition, he recognized her chemical sensitivities as a disability, which he connected to her respiratory issues. Mann also confirmed his understanding of her condition and its impact on her breathing. Overall, the evidence supports that both Defendants regarded Ms. Matarese as having a handicap due to her significant chemical sensitivities.

Ms. Matarese experienced severe respiratory issues related to paint exposure, prompting her landlord to agree she could not stay in the apartment during painting or at her mother's home if fumes persisted. The landlord proposed various accommodations, acknowledging her condition as a handicap under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). A letter from the defendants’ counsel dated October 16, 2009, explicitly recognized Ms. Matarese's disability, reinforcing their acknowledgment of her handicap status and establishing a basis for any discriminatory actions that followed. 

Plaintiffs demonstrated that Defendants discriminated by not renewing their lease, effectively converting it to a month-to-month tenancy, and refusing to rent them a unit at any other Archstone location. Evidence showed Ms. Matarese qualifies as handicapped under the FHA, and Defendants were aware of this status. Plaintiffs were willing and able to renew their lease in August 2008, but on August 8, 2008, Defendant McGregor informed them of the nonrenewal, followed by written notices to vacate. On October 6, 2008, Defendant Mann reiterated that the nonrenewal decision would not be reconsidered, and they would not rent to Plaintiffs at another Archstone property. 

Despite a subsequent September 2009 letter rescinding the nonrenewal, no new lease was offered, and Plaintiffs remained month-to-month tenants, subject to eviction with 60 days' notice. The statute prohibits rental discrimination based on handicap, and the actions taken by the Defendants fell within this prohibition. Furthermore, direct evidence, including testimonies from Ms. Matarese and Ms. Bauman, indicated that Defendants’ decision was influenced by discriminatory sentiments regarding Ms. Matarese's chemical sensitivities.

A bench trial judge appropriately evaluates evidence related to discrimination claims without relying on the McDonnell Douglas presumption when direct evidence is presented. The Court determined that the Defendants discriminated against the Plaintiffs by nonrenewing their lease and refusing to rent to them at another location, supporting the Plaintiffs' claims. Alternatively, even under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Plaintiffs established that the Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL) due to Ms. Matarese’s handicap.

The Plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) Ms. Matarese qualifies as an individual with a handicap; (2) Defendants were aware of her handicap; (3) the Plaintiffs were willing and able to renew their lease; and (4) Defendants refused housing by nonrenewing the lease and denying rental at another location. Additionally, evidence indicated that discriminatory motives influenced Defendants' actions, including statements made by Defendant McGregor expressing frustration with accommodating Ms. Matarese's needs.

In response, Defendants claimed their actions were justified by a history of complaints related to the Plaintiffs’ behavior that allegedly impacted the community's enjoyment of facilities. They provided evidence of complaints from tenants and staff regarding Ms. Matarese's conduct. The Court acknowledged that Defendants met their burden of presenting a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for their decisions. However, the Plaintiffs successfully proved that Defendants' justification was pretextual, highlighting inconsistencies in Defendants' explanations and asserting that discrimination was the actual motive behind the nonrenewal.

Defendant McGregor informed Ms. Matarese on August 8, 2008, that the lease for Plaintiffs would not be renewed due to allegations of lease violations, including complaints about mold and leaks and issues with other tenants' smoking rights. He also mentioned frustrations with accommodating her chemical sensitivities. In subsequent letters regarding the nonrenewal, Defendants referenced different lease provisions: the first letter cited paragraph 26.2, concerning tenant breaches, while the amended letter referred to paragraph 29, which pertains to the owner's discretion in lease renewals. When asked to reconsider the nonrenewal or allow renting at another property, Defendant Mann did not mention any tenant misconduct but suggested Plaintiffs find a more suitable apartment complex. At trial, Defendant McGregor acknowledged that the nonrenewal was not based on lease violations but was a matter of discretion, raising questions about the credibility of Defendants' stated reasons. Plaintiffs demonstrated that the Defendants' rationale was pretextual, as few complaints were documented in the Plaintiffs' file, and many surfaced only after the decision was made. The evidence indicated that Defendants' actions were motivated by discriminatory intent related to Ms. Matarese's handicap. Consequently, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs proved Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL) through discriminatory nonrenewal practices.

Plaintiffs demonstrated that Defendants discriminated against them in the rental terms and conditions of their apartment, violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). The Court found evidence supporting the claim that Defendants denied renewal options and benefits typically available to long-term tenants, ultimately offering a lease renewal at a significantly higher rate. Under FHA Section 3604(f)(2), it is unlawful to discriminate against individuals in the rental of a dwelling due to handicap. Although direct evidence of discrimination was lacking, the Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, concluding that Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination. 

Specifically, after 18 years of residency, Plaintiffs were denied a long-term tenancy discount and faced a proposed rent increase of 34%, later reduced to 26%. Defendants' nonrenewal and subsequent denial of the long-term tenancy discount, even after rescinding the notice to vacate, indicated discriminatory intent, especially following Ms. Matarese's accommodation requests related to a painting project. The proposed rate increase was significantly higher than past increases, which had not exceeded 8%. 

Defendants countered with a non-discriminatory justification for the rent increase, asserting it resulted from an automated pricing system compliant with market standards, and cited a history of complaints regarding Plaintiffs’ behavior as the basis for nonrenewal and the conversion to a month-to-month tenancy.

Plaintiffs demonstrated that Defendants discriminated against them regarding the terms of their apartment rental by proving that Defendants' legitimate reasons were pretextual. Plaintiffs were denied a long-term tenancy discount upon renewing their lease due to Defendants’ failure to timely provide renewal options, which was intentional. As a result, Plaintiffs were converted to month-to-month tenants without a lease agreement by the expiration date, affecting their eligibility for the discount. Despite successfully negotiating a reduced rent increase for the 2008 term, the increase was still substantially higher than their historical rates.

Plaintiffs presented evidence that management discretion influenced rental rates, contrary to Defendants’ claims of automated calculations. Notable instances included a directive from Defendant Mann to increase rents for all tenants, except Plaintiffs, indicating discriminatory intent. The nonrenewal of Plaintiffs' lease and subsequent rent increase, despite rescinding a notice to vacate, further illustrated Defendants' discriminatory actions.

Additionally, Defendants McGregor and Mann were found to have made discriminatory statements regarding the rental process, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). The Court concluded that Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to establish that these statements indicated discrimination based on handicap, fulfilling the necessary elements for a violation under FHA section 3604(c).

Courts interpret statements of discrimination in housing as actionable only if they relate directly to decisions about selling or renting property. Remarks unrelated to these decisions are not considered violations under 3604(c). The "ordinary listener" standard is applied to assess whether a statement suggests that individuals with protected statuses are either preferred or disfavored. In this case, the Court found that Defendants McGregor and Mann made discriminatory remarks regarding the rental of a unit to Plaintiff Matarese, indicating a bias against her due to her handicap. Specifically, McGregor's comment about being "tired of accommodating" Matarese's sensitivities was deemed disfavored under the ordinary listener standard. Additionally, Mann's suggestion that Matarese should seek housing elsewhere, without providing a valid reason for her disqualification from another Archstone property, also reflected discrimination based on her handicap. Consequently, the Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). Furthermore, the Plaintiffs demonstrated that the Defendants retaliated against them by not renewing their leases and imposing a significant rent increase, actions prohibited under FHA section 3617 and VFHL section 36-96.5.

Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference against individuals who assist others in securing equal housing opportunities. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendants retaliated against them for engaging in protected activities, which includes protesting or opposing discrimination or exercising rights under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. To establish a retaliation claim, Plaintiffs must show: (1) they engaged in protected activity; (2) Defendants were aware of this activity; (3) Defendants took adverse action against them; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.

In this case, Plaintiffs successfully proved that Defendants retaliated against them by not renewing their leases and imposing significant rent increases. The Court, using the McDonnell Douglas standard, found Defendants' claims of non-discriminatory reasons for their actions to be pretextual. Specifically, the nonrenewal of leases followed Ms. Matarese's requests for reasonable accommodations and her filing of fair housing complaints. Initially, Defendants attributed the nonrenewal to alleged lease violations; however, after the complaints, they issued a notice citing the owner’s option for renewal instead, indicating a shift in rationale that suggests discriminatory intent. Furthermore, the nonrenewal of Ms. Bauman's lease lacked justification, as Defendants erroneously assumed she would vacate with Ms. Matarese, indicating that the actions were motivated by Ms. Matarese's protected activities. This established the necessary causal connection for a retaliation claim under FHA § 3617.

Defendants' refusal to rent to Plaintiffs shortly after the Plaintiffs exercised their protected rights indicates retaliatory conduct, as the stated reason for refusal appears pretextual. Additionally, the substantial rent increases following a history of accommodation requests and a non-renewal attempt further suggest retaliation, especially as they escalated in response to ongoing requests and legal actions by Ms. Matarese. The continuation of a month-to-month tenancy with further rent hikes after rescinding a notice to vacate reflects a lack of good faith by Defendants, confirming retaliation against Plaintiffs' protected rights under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL).

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for these violations. Under FHA provisions, the Court can award actual and punitive damages, issue injunctions, and grant reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Virginia law holds multiple tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for a single injury when the contribution of each cannot be determined, and the FHA allows for vicarious liability of principals for their agents' discriminatory actions. In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for injuries, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, equitable relief to prevent further discrimination, and any other appropriate relief.

The Court will evaluate compensatory damages for the Plaintiffs due to Defendants' discriminatory rent increase and violations of fair housing laws. The Court determines that the Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal economic damages for Counts I, II, VII, and VIII, as they did not demonstrate actual injury from these violations, particularly regarding their refusal to rent claims, since they continued to reside at the property. However, Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages for economic losses due to the discriminatory rent increase, specifically for overpayment since November 2007. The Court calculates that Plaintiffs overpaid $455.00 monthly, resulting in a total of $17,318.50 for the period from November 2007 to January 2011, plus $455.00 for each subsequent month of overpayment, along with prejudgment interest starting November 1, 2007.

Additionally, the Court awards Ms. Matarese $50,000 and Mr. Matarese $1,000 for emotional distress caused by the Defendants' discriminatory conduct, recognizing that emotional distress stemming from housing discrimination is compensable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court references prior cases to support the notion that damages for emotional distress must exceed minimal aggravation and must be substantiated by sufficient evidence.

Damages for emotional distress can be established through circumstantial evidence or plaintiff testimony. A plaintiff's testimony alone is sufficient for compensatory damages, provided it demonstrates specific, articulable emotional distress rather than mere conclusory statements. The testimony must detail how the distress manifested. However, in cases of inherently degrading actions by a defendant, less detailed evidence may be acceptable. A causal connection between the violation and emotional distress must also be shown. 

Factors courts consider for substantial evidence in awarding emotional distress damages include evidence of physical injury, need for psychological counseling, pecuniary loss, degree of distress, context of events, corroborating evidence, the nexus between the conduct and distress, and mitigating circumstances. Although specific measurement of damages is not required, plaintiffs must adequately show demonstrable emotional distress tied to the defendant's discriminatory actions. In this case, plaintiffs have sufficiently articulated their emotional distress related to persistent discriminatory treatment, including stress and anxiety from specific incidents involving accommodation requests and discriminatory statements.

Ms. Matarese experienced significant emotional distress due to years of discrimination, which manifested in her crying, withdrawal, and depression. Testimonies from Ms. Bauman and Defendants McGregor and Mann confirmed the emotional toll on Ms. Matarese, detailing her anxious behavior and emotional outbursts, particularly during attempts to address her complaints at the front desk. An incident in August 2008, where Ms. Matarese expressed frustration over a persistent sewer smell and felt dismissed by Defendant Garcia, exemplified her emotional state and was deemed a breaking point, despite Defendant Mann labeling it as "the last straw" for lease nonrenewal. The Court noted that Ms. Matarese's frustrations were justified, given that both Defendants Garcia and McGregor acknowledged the sewer issue yet failed to rectify it.

Moreover, Ms. Matarese's complaints about exposure to smoke, paint, and mold were often validated by investigations that confirmed these conditions, yet Defendants neglected to follow their own mold remediation protocols, exacerbating her distress. Defendants routinely ignored her simple requests, such as providing notice before painting, contributing to her ongoing fear of health risks. The testimony underscored the regular stress and frustration she faced from Defendants' conduct, culminating in emotional injury upon learning, for the first time, that her lease would not be renewed after 18 years at APC. This distress supports claims for damages due to emotional harm experienced by Ms. Matarese.

Defendant McGregor's defense for the nonrenewal of Ms. Matarese's housing was based on unfounded complaints, which she could not address at the time. He ultimately admitted that the true reason was the Defendants' fatigue with accommodating her sensitivities. Ms. Matarese's elderly mother, present during the meeting, had no complaints against her. This discriminatory treatment caused Ms. Matarese significant anxiety about her housing situation and emotional distress, which also affected her husband, Mr. Matarese, due to the strain it placed on their marriage and his concern for his wife. 

The couple's anxiety was heightened by their long-term residency of over 18 years and Ms. Matarese's reclusive nature, limiting her outings to essential errands due to chemical sensitivities. Their worries about finding new housing were compounded by the potential need to place Ms. Matarese's mother in a nursing home. The Plaintiffs lived in constant fear of Defendants' actions, including potential eviction and discriminatory remarks. 

Despite not seeking psychological help or experiencing physical injuries, the Court deemed the emotional distress caused by years of discrimination egregious enough to warrant compensatory damages. The ruling emphasized that denying damages would trivialize their suffering. The amount of compensatory damages sought was considered reasonable relative to other civil rights cases, citing a precedent of $50,000 awarded for emotional distress in a race discrimination case.

The court upheld the emotional distress damages awarded to the plaintiffs, finding that the plaintiff's testimony about her feelings of embarrassment, frustration, and anger was sufficiently specific. The court noted that the emotional trauma led to physical ailments, which were valid for consideration despite the plaintiff not seeking medical treatment. The $50,000 award for Ms. Matarese and $1,000 for Mr. Matarese were deemed appropriate, especially given the egregious circumstances surrounding the case.

Additionally, the court awarded $100,000 in punitive damages against Defendant McGregor for acting with malice and reckless indifference to Ms. Matarese's rights under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The court referenced that punitive damages are permissible under the FHA when a defendant's actions demonstrate willful disregard for the plaintiffs' rights. It was highlighted that punitive damages can be justified if the defendant's conduct shows a willingness to act despite knowledge of potential legal violations. The court emphasized the need to assess the nature of the defendant's conduct, the appropriateness of punitive measures, and their deterrent effect on future violations, all while ensuring compliance with due process standards.

Elementary notions of fairness in constitutional jurisprudence require that individuals receive adequate notice of both the conduct that may lead to punishment and the severity of the penalty. The Supreme Court has identified three key factors for courts to evaluate whether a punitive damages award violates due process:

1. **Reprehensibility of Conduct**: This is the most critical factor. Courts should assess whether the harm was physical rather than economic, if the conduct showed indifference or reckless disregard for others' safety, if the victim was financially vulnerable, whether the behavior was isolated or repeated, and if the harm resulted from intentional malice or mere accident.

2. **Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages**: The ratio serves as a common indicator of whether a punitive damages award is excessive. While there is no strict formula, a reasonable relationship must exist between punitive and compensatory damages. Generally, awards exceeding a single-digit ratio are likely to breach due process, with ratios above four times the compensatory amount nearing the constitutional limit.

3. **Comparison to Civil or Criminal Penalties**: Courts should consider the punitive damages in relation to existing civil and criminal penalties for similar conduct, giving substantial deference to legislative judgments on appropriate sanctions.

Additionally, a defendant's financial status is a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of punitive damages.

Evidence of a defendant's financial worth is admissible under federal law to determine punitive damages, provided it is sufficient for the court to assess an amount that aligns with deterrence and punishment objectives. In this case, the court awarded $100,000 in punitive damages against Defendant McGregor for acting with malice and reckless indifference toward Ms. Matarese's rights under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). McGregor, having received training on FHA obligations concerning individuals with handicaps, was fully aware of Ms. Matarese's federally-protected rights yet repeatedly denied her requests for reasonable accommodations, even with supporting medical documentation. He ignored established mold remediation protocols, actively pursued the nonrenewal of leases due to his frustration with her complaints, and demonstrated malice by seeking to build a case against her. His actions, including dismissive responses to accommodation requests and discriminatory remarks regarding her chemical sensitivities, reflect outright discrimination and a disregard for her rights. The court determined that the punitive damages awarded would adequately punish McGregor and deter similar future misconduct, given the reprehensible nature of his actions, which violated Ms. Matarese's rights without any attempt to conceal his discriminatory intent. The awarded amount was deemed reasonable and in line with due process principles.

Defendant McGregor exhibited malicious behavior, characterized by frustration, arrogance, and bias, which led to a reckless disregard for Ms. Matarese's rights and safety. His inaction on her health concerns resulted in her suffering physical injuries, including sore throats, coughs, and breathing difficulties. McGregor's discriminatory actions were not isolated; they included repeated failures to provide requested accommodations, nonrenewal of her lease, significant rent increases, and retaliatory remarks against Ms. Matarese for asserting her rights. The court noted that McGregor's claims of neutrality were contradicted by his actions, including emails to APC personnel aimed at building a case against Ms. Matarese for lease nonrenewal. 

McGregor referenced undocumented complaints from other tenants as justification for the lease nonrenewal, without allowing Ms. Matarese an opportunity to respond. He also mischaracterized her legitimate complaints regarding mold and other issues, which were substantiated by evidence from APC personnel. The court concluded that McGregor's conduct was egregiously reprehensible, warranting punitive damages. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was assessed as reasonable, being less than 1.5 times the compensatory award, which aligns with constitutional limits. Although the punitive damages exceeded the maximum FHA fine for a first violation, the court noted that the FHA allows for additional fines alongside compensatory and punitive damages, supporting the award's reasonableness.

The Court determined that a $100,000 punitive damages award is appropriate to achieve deterrence and retribution against Defendants based on their financial circumstances. SP Holdings owned APC, with Archstone Communities, LLC managing it and handling costs that are reimbursed by SP Holdings. In 2009, SP Holdings reported total assets of $95,096,561, while Archstone Communities, LLC had total assets of $54,264,380 with over $2 million in cash. Despite both entities showing a negative net worth that year, the Court noted that they did not demonstrate an inability to pay a larger judgment or that a lower amount would suffice for deterrence.

The testimony of Archstone's general counsel indicated that Archstone Communities, LLC could pay a judgment if found liable, needing only to allocate that liability appropriately. The Court found that the defendants were vicariously liable for punitive damages due to Defendant McGregor’s actions while acting in a managerial capacity within the scope of his employment, which aligned with civil rights principles that allow punitive damages against a principal based on the agent's conduct if authorized or ratified. The definition of "managerial capacity" does not require an employee to hold top management positions, but rather considers the authority and discretion granted to the employee.

An intentional tort may be considered within an employee's scope of employment if the conduct aligns with their job duties, occurs within authorized time and space, and is intended, at least in part, to benefit the employer. However, a principal cannot be held vicariously liable for discriminatory actions by managerial agents that contradict the principal's good faith efforts to comply with civil rights laws. Sufficient evidence exists to attribute a punitive damages award against Defendant McGregor to the Archstone entity Defendants, as McGregor acted with malice and reckless indifference towards Ms. Matarese's federally protected rights under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). As Assistant Community Manager and later Community Manager, McGregor had decision-making authority regarding lease renewals and accommodations, and his actions were within the scope of his employment, occurring during working hours at the business location. The Court determined that the Archstone entity Defendants did not engage in good faith compliance with the FHA; the existence of a compliance policy alone does not exempt them from punitive damages liability, as they failed to take necessary steps for its implementation. Despite Ms. Matarese's complaints to the corporate office, which were sometimes addressed, the office did not ensure ongoing compliance. Consequently, the Archstone entities are vicariously liable for McGregor's punitive damages. In contrast, the Court denied punitive damages against Defendant Mann, as his actions did not reflect malice or reckless disregard; he made attempts to accommodate Ms. Matarese, offering her alternatives when work was to be done in her apartment.

Defendant Mann's conduct towards Ms. Matarese was not deemed as indifferent to her federally-protected rights, unlike Defendant McGregor's actions. Consequently, the Court denied punitive damages against Mann but awarded Plaintiffs $100,000 from McGregor, with the Archstone Defendants held vicariously liable. As the prevailing party, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) § 3613(c)(2), with the Court emphasizing the need for a reasonable fee based on the damages awarded relative to the overall litigation scope. Plaintiffs must submit documentation supporting their fee request within 10 days. 

The Court also granted equitable relief to address the lasting impacts of the Defendants' discrimination and prevent future violations of the FHA and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). The Court is empowered to issue temporary or permanent injunctions under FHA § 3613(c)(1) and VFHL § 36-96.17, focusing on eliminating residual effects of discrimination and ensuring future compliance. An injunction was imposed, prohibiting Defendants from further discriminatory practices against Plaintiffs. Additionally, Defendants are mandated to reinstate Plaintiffs and Ms. Bauman as residents of APC on annual leases, offering Plaintiffs a lease rate of $1,975.00, consistent with their previous lease from 2006-2007, and a similar rate for Ms. Bauman.

Defendants are prohibited from applying rental criteria in a discriminatory manner against Plaintiffs or others based on handicap, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). They must provide Plaintiffs with renewal options, discounts, and preferences equivalent to those offered to other long-term tenants and ensure all rental increases are uniformly applied. Defendants are also required to comply with FHA and VFHL regarding Ms. Matarese's requests for reasonable accommodations.

The Court finds Defendants liable for violations related to multiple counts and awards damages to Plaintiffs, Ms. Linda and Mr. Domenic Matarese. Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal economic damages for certain counts and compensatory damages for economic losses totaling $17,318.50 for overpaid rent plus additional monthly overpayments since February 2011 and prejudgment interest since November 1, 2007. Ms. Matarese is awarded $50,000, and Mr. Matarese is awarded $1,000 for emotional distress. Additionally, Plaintiffs are awarded $100,000 in punitive damages against Defendant McGregor, with the Archstone entities held vicariously liable. Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs, requiring them to submit documentation for this within 10 days. Injunctive relief as specified is also granted. A separate judgment order will be issued.

Mr. Amilcar Garcia has served as the Service Manager for APC since October 2007, having previously worked as a service technician. The Plaintiffs initially included several Defendants: (1) Archstone Pentagon City (formerly Pare Vista), (2) Archstone MultiFamily Series I Trust, (3) Archstone LLC, (4) Deeqa Nur, former Community Manager (2005-2006) and acting Community Manager in summer 2008, and (5) Katrina Wood, receptionist. However, all claims against these Defendants have been dismissed.

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 expanded the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to protect individuals with disabilities, and claims under the Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL) will be analyzed similarly to the FHA. The Plaintiffs first amended their Complaint as a matter of course and later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which was deemed a request for leave by Magistrate Judge Anderson and granted on June 2, 2010.

On March 22, 2010, the Court dismissed Counts IX and X of the Complaint, which the Plaintiffs acknowledged applied to their amended Complaints. On May 29, 2010, the Court granted a Judgment on the Pleadings for Defendant Katrina Wood on Counts I-VIII and for Deeqa Nur on Counts I-IV, VII, and VIII. On July 26, 2010, the Court dismissed Count XII against Defendants Nur and Wood, leading to Wood's official dismissal due to no remaining claims. Nur was also dismissed subsequently due to the absence of claims against her.

Additional points include that Ms. Bauman relies on a caregiver for her physical needs, Virginia banned the sale of oil-based paints in 2005, and Dr. Alpan considered but did not diagnose Ms. Matarese with several respiratory issues during a visit. Medical records from September 12, 2008, show no breathing difficulties noted. The Plaintiffs received a letter on April 23, 2007, from then-Community Manager John Birkhofer regarding alleged overuse of resources, which was later confirmed as inaccurate, leading to an apology and a $200 gift check from the company.

Paragraph 26 of the Lease Agreement lacks subparts. At trial, the Court incorrectly stated that Ms. Bauman's lease had been renewed, while evidence shows it was not, and she is currently on a month-to-month tenancy at APC. The Court previously granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding disparate impact claims due to the absence of evidence demonstrating a neutral policy affecting a protected class. Thus, the Court will only assess claims based on discriminatory intent. The Court will evaluate whether Ms. Matarese's impairment significantly limits her breathing, with Plaintiffs arguing that Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC and EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp. may no longer be valid under the amended Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However, since most alleged discriminatory acts occurred before the 2008 ADA amendments took effect, this issue is not central to the Court's determination. Even if Ms. Matarese's breathing issues were deemed substantially limiting, Plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link to exposure to paint, smoke, and mold. The Court finds that Defendants regarded her as having a handicap, qualifying her for Fair Housing Act (FHA) protection. The Court's analysis of intentional discrimination and indirect evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework negates the need for mixed-motive analysis. Relief granted under 42 U.S.C. 3613(d) does not affect any prior contracts or leases without actual notice of a complaint. Defendants may have applied a rent increase to tenants, but they did not present evidence of a generally-applied increase since a prior 3% increase, leading the Court to base calculations on that figure. The Court declines to adopt the Pumphrey standard concerning punitive damages liability, asserting that Defendants authorized the discriminatory decision to nonrenew Plaintiffs' lease, thus making them liable for punitive damages.