Carrington v. State

Citations: 678 N.E.2d 1143; 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 419; 1997 WL 189396Docket: 45A03-9602-PC-51

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; April 21, 1997; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Victor Carrington, along with co-defendant Dominick Wardlaw, was convicted by a jury of two counts each of rape and robbery. This appeal follows the denial of Carrington's post-conviction relief. The facts, established in a previous case, detail two separate incidents involving the victims. In the first, on January 20, 1982, following a bank visit, a victim was attacked in her car, threatened with a knife, and raped by both Carrington and Wardlaw. The second incident occurred on February 25, 1982, when another victim was similarly assaulted and raped. Both victims identified Carrington and Wardlaw in lineups and at trial. The defendants were tried together and convicted in November 1982, with their convictions later affirmed.

Carrington filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition in October 1988, followed by an amended petition in November 1993, claiming that the State failed to properly redact references to him from his co-defendant's confession, that his convictions constituted double jeopardy, and that he received ineffective assistance from both his trial and appellate counsel. The court ultimately denied his petition for post-conviction relief.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, denying Carrington's post-conviction petition. Carrington appeals, raising three issues: (1) the alleged error in admitting Wardlaw's confession without redacting references to Carrington; (2) the claim that his convictions for rape and robbery violate double jeopardy; and (3) the assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Indiana's post-conviction relief rules, the petitioner must prove grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellate courts review only the evidence supporting the post-conviction court's judgment and require the petitioner to demonstrate that the evidence contradicts the court's findings.

Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal but addresses issues not previously available at that time. If an issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, it is typically waived unless it constitutes fundamental error, which is so severe that it denies the defendant a fair trial. Carrington argues his rights to confrontation and cross-examination were violated when Wardlaw's confession, implicating him, was introduced without redaction and without Wardlaw testifying. Both Carrington and Wardlaw provided confessions to police, which were admitted as evidence, but references implicating each other remained unredacted. The law states that a defendant's right to confrontation may be compromised when a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements implicating them are admitted in a joint trial without redaction. Exceptions exist, permitting such use if the defendant has also confessed and the confessions interlock, with appropriate jury instructions provided.

In Cruz v. New York, the Supreme Court rejected the "interlocking confession" doctrine, ruling that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession that incriminates the defendant at a joint trial, even with jury instructions to disregard it. However, a defendant's own confession may be used to evaluate the reliability of the co-defendant's statements for potential admissibility, and can be considered on appeal for harmless error analysis. Indiana courts have found it harmless error to admit a co-defendant's confession when it mirrors the defendant's confession and is supported by corroborating evidence of guilt. In this case, both Carrington and Wardlaw's confessions were substantially similar and corroborated by victim testimony, thus the admission of Wardlaw's confession was not reversible error.

Carrington contends that his convictions for rape as a Class A felony and robbery as a Class B felony violate double jeopardy principles, arguing that enhancing both offenses based on the use of a knife during the commission of each crime is impermissible. Although this issue was not raised on direct appeal, it is not waived as it constitutes fundamental error if proven. Carrington was charged with rape and robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, meeting the statutory criteria for the felony classifications. He cites Bevill v. State, where the court reversed convictions for attempted murder and aggravated burglary due to a single instance of bodily injury. However, Indiana courts have not extended Bevill's reasoning to cases where offenses are elevated due to being armed, as shown in Barker v. State and Smith v. State, where multiple offenses were upheld despite the use of a weapon.

In the case of White v. State, the court distinguished the elevation of felonies due to armed offenses from the case of Bevill, where the elevation stemmed from a single instance of bodily injury. In White and Smith, the use of a weapon occurred during separate crimes, which led to the conclusion that Carrington did not face double jeopardy for his convictions of rape and robbery while armed with a knife. Carrington claimed ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel for their failure to object to references made in Wardlaw's statement, and for not contesting the double jeopardy of his convictions. However, these issues were raised for the first time in his post-conviction relief petition. The court emphasized that ineffective assistance claims generally must be known at the time of direct appeal, but Carrington preserved his claims by arguing that appellate counsel failed to address trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The burden rests on the petitioner to prove that counsel's performance fell below reasonable standards and that such failure was prejudicial enough to deny a fair trial. The court found no evidence of prejudice from the admission of the statement referencing Carrington and confirmed that double jeopardy was not violated. As a result, Carrington's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were rejected, and his convictions were affirmed.