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Tepeyac v. Montgomery County

Citations: 779 F. Supp. 2d 456; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26532; 2011 WL 915348Docket: Civil Action No. DKC 10-1259

Court: District Court, D. Maryland; March 15, 2011; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves a dispute over a Montgomery County Resolution that mandates Limited Service Pregnancy Resource Centers (LSPRCs) to display signs indicating the absence of licensed medical professionals and encouraging consultation with licensed healthcare providers. The Plaintiff, a non-profit fitting the definition of an LSPRC, challenged the Resolution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed motions by both parties, granting in part the Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success regarding claims of compelled speech, while denying the Defendants' motion to strike. The Court determined the Resolution's requirements were content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, finding that the mandated speech did not qualify as professional or commercial speech. Despite the Resolution's intent to prevent misinformation, the Court found the Plaintiff had shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. Consequently, the court enjoined enforcement of the Resolution's provision requiring LSPRCs to post signs suggesting consultation with licensed providers. The Court maintained that parts of the Resolution could be severed, allowing continued enforcement of non-violative sections.

Legal Issues Addressed

First Amendment - Compelled Speech

Application: The court found that the Resolution mandating LSPRCs to display certain signs likely violates the First Amendment by compelling speech not otherwise expressed by the Plaintiff.

Reasoning: The complaint sufficiently alleged that the Resolution unconstitutionally compels speech, affirming that the First Amendment protects both the right to speak and the right not to speak.

Preliminary Injunction - Requirements for Granting

Application: The Plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, leading to a partial grant of the preliminary injunction against parts of the Resolution.

Reasoning: The Plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest.

Professional Speech - Definition and Application

Application: The Resolution's requirements do not regulate professional speech since the Plaintiff, as a generic information provider, lacks the personal relationship necessary for professional speech.

Reasoning: The Plaintiff identifies as a generic information provider, lacking the personalized context necessary to establish a quasi-fiduciary relationship.

Severability - Legislative Intent

Application: The Court found parts of the Resolution severable, as there was no indication against severability, allowing unconstitutional portions to be enjoined while leaving others intact.

Reasoning: The presumption of severability applies not only to legislation enacted by the General Assembly but also to local ordinances.

Strict Scrutiny - Content-Based Regulations

Application: The Resolution is subject to strict scrutiny as it compels LSPRCs to convey specific government-mandated messages, which are content-based regulations.

Reasoning: Laws that require individuals to express specific content are typically classified as content-based regulations and thus subject to strict scrutiny.