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Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. New Jersey
Citations: 790 F. Supp. 2d 241; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887; 2011 WL 1871431Docket: Civil Action 11-1317 (RBK)
Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; May 13, 2011; Federal District Court
The court case involves Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc., which filed a complaint against the State of New Jersey and other defendants. The submissions included a complaint and a prepayment of the filing fee. The court, presided over by District Judge Robert B. Kugler, decided to dismiss the complaint and issue limited preclusion orders against the individuals who submitted the filings, as well as their associates and any entities associated with them. The background section outlines two relevant movements: the Moorish movement, which is linked to individuals identifying as 'Moors' and characterized by a distinct interpretation of religious texts, and the redemptionist or sovereign citizen movement, which rejects U.S. citizenship and promotes the idea of imaginary citizenship and diplomatic immunity. The court references previous rulings that have discussed the Moorish movement, noting its relation to a black Islamic sect predominantly found in prisons, while also explaining the sovereign citizen movement's belief in the illegitimacy of the U.S. government and its use of intimidation tactics. A decade after the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Johnson-Bey v. Lane, the Third Circuit identified extensive government efforts to combat 'paper terrorism' by sovereign citizens, which had evolved into a pervasive criminal operation. Participants in this scheme 'self-legitimized' their names to facilitate fraudulent legal transactions, often by filing bogus financing statements under Article 9 of the UCC. These filings, which are straightforward to execute and difficult to retract, enabled individuals to impose significant fraudulent liens on officials. For instance, a group in New Jersey lodged a $14.5 million lien against a federal prosecutor and a $3.5 million lien against a federal judge for alleged misuse of their copyrighted names in legal contexts. Research indicated that various publications promoted the misuse of the UCC process, providing detailed guidance on how to create fraudulent security interests, rooted in the 'Redemptionist' theory. This theory posits a distinction between a 'real person' and a 'strawman,' suggesting that governmental authority applies only to the strawman. Redemptionists believe they can liberate themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby creating financial claims against their strawman. They further assert that government officials must compensate them for using the strawman's name, leading to the filing of liens against officials who refuse. Additionally, some redemptionists argue that by renouncing U.S. citizenship, their strawman becomes 'deceased,' allowing them to claim 'estates' linked to their strawman and assert sovereignty over self-declared territories, often referencing the ancient Sultanate of Morocco. The document notes that adherence to the sovereign citizenship movement does not necessarily correlate with Moorish ethnic or religious affiliations. Certain individuals have misused concepts of Moorish ancestry and religious beliefs to engage in criminal activities and file baseless legal claims, asserting self-granted 'diplomatic immunity' based on self-declared 'Moorish citizenship' and homemade documents, as well as other legally unrecognized claims. In 2009, a series of nineteen legal actions, collectively known as the 'Marrakush Society Cases,' were filed in this District, involving a group identified as the 'Marrakush Society.' These cases included suits against various municipalities and entities, all initiated in July and June of 2009, and were assigned to Judge Jerome B. Simandle to avoid judge-shopping. Among these, two cases were habeas corpus matters while the others claimed civil rights violations. The initiation of these cases coincided with similar actions in other U.S. District Courts. Multiple legal actions involving the Marrakush Society were initiated across various jurisdictions, including several in Florida and one in New York, between January and June 2009. On July 30, 2009, Judge Simandle issued a comprehensive order and opinion addressing these cases collectively. The litigants in these cases identified themselves with titles such as 'Noble Æmer Shyaam M.K. El' and 'Universal Supreme Allah Bey,' claiming to represent the Marrakush Society and asserting representation by an entity called Aboriginal Law Firm. Judge Simandle highlighted ambiguities regarding the Marrakush Society's status as a legal entity versus a social group, noting its online presence featured a fictitious geographic location and various cultural symbols from different regions. Additionally, the Aboriginal Law Firm was not recognized by the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics and advertised services that included tasks typically beyond the scope of private legal practice, such as executing unusual documents and proclamations. M.K., K.S., and Bey represented the Marrakush Society and Aboriginal Law Firm in pro se appearances, as the Aboriginal Law Firm lacked legal admission. They sought in forma pauperis status and filed numerous pleadings in the Marrakush Society Cases, which included over four dozen documents addressing their ethnic classifications and references to various treaties and governmental documents. They submitted numerous copies of significant texts, including the Barbary Treaties and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, along with extensive homemade documents featuring titles like 'records certifications by body custodian' and various complaint warrants. These filings contained Arabic terminology, geographic coordinates, and references to fictional territories. An example excerpt quoted by Judge Simandle described an encounter with law enforcement, detailing an alleged unlawful stop and subsequent detention, which the individual claimed occurred under coercion and without legal justification, citing a lack of probable cause for the officer's actions. The individual describes a series of events involving an examination of their body, referred to as "Solar Vessel," by an unnamed person and subsequent handling by the New Jersey State Police. The examination included unauthorized contact with genital areas and resulted in the individual being transported to a police facility, specifically chained to a wooden rail. After being examined again without consent, the individual refused to read a card given by a person named JOHN DOE. The narrative details a second transportation to Burlington County Jail. Additionally, Judge Simandle dismissed various legal actions associated with the Marrakush Society, citing numerous deficiencies including failure to pay filing fees and improper submissions. The Judge highlighted the systemic issues within the submissions and noted that the plaintiffs repeatedly filed complaints without adhering to court guidance. The document mentions the involvement of multiple jurisdictions and indicates a broader context of legal challenges faced by the Marrakush Society, emphasizing prior judicial notice of related actions in New York, Delaware, and Florida. Notices of appearance from attorneys admitted to practice in the Court have not been submitted, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the Aboriginal Law Firm. The Marrakush Society's allegations regarding third-party claims further complicate the situation. Current actions involve up to fourteen sets of pleadings, violating Local Rule 7, which mandates a singular complaint to commence an action. Even if these pleadings are viewed as a single submission, they do not satisfy the requirements of Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The civil complaints seek the arrest of defendants and initiation of criminal proceedings, while being poorly constructed in an obscure language, containing factless and self-serving statements that fail to meet Rule 8's pleading standards. Judge Simandle aims to guide the litigants on these deficiencies to allow them to correct their legal practices and inform them of court expectations and consequences of non-compliance. Specific points clarified include: (a) juridical entities like the Marrakush Society or Aboriginal Law Firm cannot prosecute while appearing in forma pauperis, although impoverished natural persons may apply for such status; (b) these entities cannot represent themselves pro se and must secure a duly admitted attorney to litigate; and (c) all litigants, whether juridical entities or natural persons, must have standing to sue, with Local Rules requiring clear identification of parties involved in legal proceedings. A complaint that uses pseudonyms or nonsensical addresses for parties or their counsel fails to meet filing requirements outlined in Local Civil Rule 10.1(a). The 'next friend' doctrine, a narrow exception to the 'case or controversy' requirement under Article III, is governed by a two-prong jus tertii test from Whitmore v. Arkansas. Additionally, Rule 18 restricts a plaintiff's ability to join claims, which is further conditioned by the transactional-relation requirement of Rule 20. Rule 8 mandates that plaintiffs provide a clear statement of facts to show entitlement to relief, as clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, with specific considerations for claims against municipalities and officials. The All Writs Act allows district courts to limit meritless cases to prevent harassment of defendants and maintain docket order. Judge Simandle emphasized the seriousness required in litigations and warned that future abuses could lead to sanctions or restrictions on filing future cases. Following this guidance, the Marrakush-Order was issued, resulting in various administrative terminations of cases, with specific conditions for each, including the dismissal of duplicative claims. In the case of Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro (Civil Action No. 09-3503), one of fourteen complaints was administratively terminated with the option to amend, while the others were dismissed for being duplicative of other cases. Similarly, in Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton (Civil Action No. 09-25219), the first complaint was terminated with leave to amend, but the second was dismissed as duplicative. The subsequent case against Westampton (Civil Action No. 09-3441) was terminated without leave to amend due to duplication. The case against Pennsville (Civil Action No. 09-3502) was also terminated without the possibility of amendment for the same reason. In another Westampton case (Civil Action No. 09-2521), the second complaint had leave to amend, while the rest were dismissed as duplicative. The complaint against Mansfield (Civil Action No. 09-3505) was terminated without amendment rights due to duplication with a previous case. Multiple other cases against various entities, including the New Jersey State Police and Burlington County Jail, were also administratively terminated with leave to amend. The Marrakush Society and Aboriginal Law Firm could reopen their cases by paying a $350 filing fee and submitting a clear complaint by an admitted legal counsel. Individual plaintiffs like M.K., K.S., and Bey could reopen their cases by submitting either a completed in forma pauperis application or the filing fee, along with a clear complaint signed per Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The order indicates that no actions to amend or file fees were taken before the deadlines expired in August 2009, well before the initiation of the current matters. Judge Simandle's decision was entered on July 30, 2009. Ten days after Judge Simandle issued the Marrakush-Opinion and Marrakush-Order, a submission was received in the Estate Case from 'Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Æmer' M.K., alongside three other plaintiffs, including 'Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Æmer Kernel C. El' and two estates identified as 'Estate of Brandon Casimir, Expatriate Decedent' and 'Estate of Cornell Hall/Dixon, Expatriate Decedent.' The submission sought to remove state criminal cases to federal court and claimed that the State of New Jersey owed K.C. $60 million. The arguments in this submission were similar to those made in a related Delaware case, Thompson v. Delaware, where M.K. and K.C. also attempted removal of state criminal proceedings. Judge Simandle denied the removal application, emphasizing that fictitious aliases and non-probated estates cannot be litigants, as they lack juridical existence. He explained that a name alone does not constitute a legal entity capable of initiating a lawsuit, and that juridical entities cannot represent themselves pro se or proceed in forma pauperis. Consequently, the application was deemed a sham pleading, violating established legal principles, and the case was remanded to state court. In a subsequent round of submissions on March 8, 2011, six documents were filed in the current matter, asserting that "Murakush Caliphates of Amexem" was the sole plaintiff. Notably, only four documents held substantive content, including a complaint, an application for fee waiver, a motion for pro bono counsel, and an order for injunctive relief. The application to proceed without prepayment of fees identified Shyaam M.K. El as the Chief Executive Officer of the plaintiff. Ministers and Members of the Murakush Caliphate of Amexem currently do not receive salaries for their duties. The court is urged to consider the past incarcerations of several members of this entity in relation to their application. The Murakush Caliphate requests the acceptance of a Private Bond valued at $20,000, with a 2% interest from the Murakush Imperial Fund, to cover fees associated with the legal filings in the case involving Murakush Caliphate of Amexem v. State of Delaware. The bond is detailed to include specific features such as CUSIP and ISIN numbers, and it emphasizes that the instrument is issued in the U.S. The bond is described as a homemade document with unique inscriptions and warnings about its acceptance and security features. Additionally, Murakush-Amexem has submitted an application for pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1), citing their non-profit status, limited litigation abilities, and inability to afford legal representation. They request the appointment of specific attorneys from New Jersey and New York Bars. Alongside these applications, a draft "Order" for injunctive relief has been submitted, directing defendants to justify why such relief should not be granted. Defendants are ordered to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued to prevent them from: (1) referencing the plaintiffs by names changed for religious and cultural reasons, (2) charging the plaintiffs under New Jersey statutes for possessing Moorish credentials or indigenous identifications, (3) assuming jurisdiction over any individuals identifying as Moors, and (4) violating the provisions of the Barbary treaties from 1786-1836. The accompanying Complaint, submitted by Murakush-Amexem, spans twenty-one pages and includes a comprehensive list of defendants, with the first seven pages dedicated solely to naming them. The "Facts" section (paragraphs 37-57) outlines a timeline of events from October 24, 2007, to November 2010, detailing multiple arrests of individuals including M.K., K.C., K.S., and Mrs. El. Bey, along with various charges such as possession of controlled substances and driving while intoxicated. It also notes the use of homemade "Moorish" papers and "world passports" as substitutes for valid identification and the resulting legal consequences, including jail detentions, fines, and the conduct of prosecutors and judges during these legal proceedings. The Complaint seeks declaratory relief regarding violations of rights under the Barbary Treaties, $20 million in attorney's fees, injunctive relief requiring apologies from state authorities, punitive damages of $5 million, and compensatory damages of $10.5 million from each defendant. It also requests the vacating of all criminal charges against M.K., K.C., Bey, and a party referred to as "Myrsha Faustin-El." The Complaint is signed by M.K., K.C., Bey, and El, all residing at the same address in Vineland, New Jersey. Subsequent to the initial submissions, a request to amend the Complaint was filed, seeking to substitute one defendant's name and add three additional defendants, along with a filing fee of $350. Submissions by Murakush-Amexem in the Caliphate case mirror those in the Instant Matter, including a request to waive the filing fee supported by a homemade bond, a pro bono counsel application, and a draft order for injunctive relief to prevent the prosecution of individuals using "Moorish" credentials. The Complaint-Caliphate asserts that Judge Simandle violated the rights of M.K., K.C., K.S., and Bey by acknowledging developments related to the Barbary Treaties, terminating certain cases, and remanding the Estate Case to state court. It claims Judge Simandle's actions reflect a "white colonist supremacy agenda," alleging incompetence in his judicial decisions and an attempt to impose a caste system for taxation purposes. The relief sought includes a declaration of constitutional violations, compensatory damages of $2.5 million, punitive damages of $250,000, reassignment of the cases to a different judge, restrictions on Judge Simandle's future involvement in Murakush-Amexem cases, a declaration of his mental incompetence, and an injunction against enforcing laws perceived as unconstitutional by the individuals involved. Additionally, two letters from Bey clarified that the request was for proceeding without prepayment of fees, accepting the homemade bond instead. Two legal actions associated with the Murakush-Amexem entity are detailed, highlighting their connection to ongoing cases in sister courts. The first, the Virginia Action (Civil Action No. 10-0509), involved substantial filings totaling 351 pages, including various documentation claiming "aboriginality," trademark notices, and affidavits related to a self-declared "civil death." The plaintiff, identified as M.E. Bey, attempted to invoke constitutional and treaty claims against a state judge and prosecutor amid a criminal case concerning controlled substances. This action was reassigned to Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., who offered M.E. a 30-day period to prove standing but ultimately dismissed the case due to M.E.'s failure to respond. The second action, Delaware Action-III (Civil Action No. 11-0211), was initiated shortly after the Virginia Action's termination. Submissions in this case mirrored those in the Instant Matter and included an application for pro bono counsel, a draft order seeking to prevent prosecution based on the use of "Moorish" credentials, and a request to waive filing fees. The complaint was signed by K.C., identifying themselves as the "Sheikh Operating Officer" of Murakush-Amexem, thereby continuing the themes and legal strategies seen in the previous Virginia Action. Amexem is identified as a non-profit Moorish-al-Marikanos Corporation and an organ of the Sultanates of Murakush, incorporated in Colorado. The document details the arrest of K.S., who drove a vehicle with homemade "Moorish" license plates, presented homemade "Moorish" identifications, refused fingerprinting, and underwent a series of legal proceedings including arraignment, bail hearing, and a sixteen-day detention, which included a strip search. The complaint in the associated Delaware Action-III seeks several forms of relief: an injunction against state criminal proceedings, destruction of K.S.'s fingerprints, a declaration of rights violations under the U.S. Constitution and Barbary Treaties, letters of apology from state officials, and financial damages totaling $20 million in attorney fees, $10.5 million in compensatory damages per defendant, and $5 million in punitive damages per defendant. Additionally, there is a demand for an injunction preventing the labeling of "Moors" as "blacks" or "African-Americans." On April 29, 2011, Judge Robinson denied K.S.'s application to proceed in forma pauperis, requiring a $350 filing fee and the retention of counsel. The document also verifies the registration of multiple entities associated with Murakush in Colorado, all sharing the same address in Brighton, CO, and linked to K.S., who has multiple listed residences, including a mailbox in a UPS store. The Murakush Law Firm is noted to operate under legal services while sharing operational details with other Murakush entities. Murakush-Amexem is acknowledged as a juridical entity and was named as the sole Plaintiff in the current matter. However, the Court finds deficiencies in Murakush-Amexem's attempts to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Although the filing fee was ultimately received, the initial application to waive this fee was deemed inappropriate and indicative of mockery toward the Court. Previous judges have already explained the basics of IFP eligibility to Murakush-Amexem multiple times, including that a homemade "bond" cannot replace a valid payment. Additionally, Murakush-Amexem cannot represent itself pro se or qualify for pro bono legal representation, as reiterated by several judges. A juridical entity does not qualify as a pauper under Section 1915 and cannot secure pro bono counsel, leading to the dismissal of the Complaint due to lack of representation by a duly admitted attorney. Furthermore, the Complaint fails to comply with the requirements of Federal Rules 18 and 20, which dictate that claims must have a transactional relationship and set limits on the joinder of defendants. This requirement has been previously explained to the signatories of the Complaint in detail by Judge Simandle. The Complaint is characterized as a lengthy, disorganized account of unrelated events over three years involving various parties, which fails to meet the requirements of Rules 18 and 20, rendering it subject to dismissal. The court likens the Complaint to a voluminous narrative akin to Tolstoy's "War and Peace," indicating its lack of focus and coherence. Additionally, Murakush-Amexem lacks standing to sue, as established by prior judicial rulings and the Supreme Court's two-prong test in Whitmore. The claims presented are unrelated to the organization’s business operations and do not demonstrate that the organization is acting in the interest of the individuals mentioned. Consequently, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice due to the absence of standing, as no factual changes are anticipated to remedy this issue. Furthermore, the court notes a pattern of vexatious litigation by the Complaint's signatories and warns that any future abuse of legal process will lead to sanctions or restrictions on their ability to file cases. This warning reinforces the court's commitment to curbing frivolous legal actions associated with Murakush-Amexem and its affiliates. M.K. K.S. K. C. El, Bey, and their associates have disregarded judicial warnings, leading to a series of frivolous and vexatious lawsuits that burden the court system. The judges expect litigants to engage in litigation seriously and without abusing the legal process. The litigants in question have repeatedly filed multiple actions in federal courts, often at no cost, using inadequate in forma pauperis (IFP) petitions. This pattern not only drains judicial resources but also delays justice for other litigants. The court emphasizes the necessity of managing such abusive litigation practices to preserve judicial efficiency. As a result, the court plans to impose restrictions on these litigants to ensure they file clear, concise claims while still allowing them the opportunity to pursue legitimate grievances in good faith. The court's objective is to balance the need to prevent misuse of the judicial system with the rights of individuals to pursue valid claims. The Court faces challenges in issuing preclusion orders against the Murakush Group, composed of M.K., K.S., K.C. Bey, El, and their associated entities. This difficulty arises from the group's rapid creation of numerous juridical entities and names, which complicates identification and enforcement. Examples include similar-sounding names (e.g., Murakush, Marrakush) and distinct entities (e.g., Imperial Temple, Moorish-al-Marikanos Corporation). They also generate extensive self-granted titles quickly, using abbreviations that obscure actual identities. The Court acknowledges that any effective order must be flexible to allow for quick reference and applicability to future cases. Additionally, a key issue is the Murakush Group's frequent reference to the Barbary Treaties, particularly the Treaty of Morocco, in their legal submissions. This invocation is used to contest various legal actions occurring within U.S. jurisdiction. However, the Court notes that the provisions of the Treaty with Morocco do not apply to the types of challenges typically raised in federal prisoners' litigation, which the Murakush Group has pursued over the years. Key objectives included the reduction or elimination of piracy affecting North African coastal waters and the cessation of fees imposed by rulers on American merchants for maintaining peace in these regions. The Barbary Treaties primarily addressed maritime issues, war, and merchant transactions, with a strong focus on the protection of vessels. The Treaty with Morocco consists of twenty-five articles, three of which address human rights: Article 6 mandates the immediate release of U.S. citizens and their possessions if captured by Moors; Article 20 designates the U.S. Consul as the arbiter in disputes among U.S. citizens in Morocco; and Article 21 ensures that U.S. law governs proceedings if an American injures a Moor, with the U.S. Consul present during trials. These articles do not support habeas corpus or civil rights claims by the Murakush Group against state authorities regarding arrests or prosecutions, as illustrated in Seals-Bey v. Cross, where claims based on self-identified "Moorish" nationality were dismissed. Article 6 was specifically designed to protect American citizens from enslavement and theft by pirates in Moroccan waters. The Article is deemed inapplicable to the Murakush Group due to the absence of relevant arrests, searches, criminal proceedings, or incarcerations occurring near the coastal waters and ports of Morocco, and because these actions were not conducted by "Moors." The interaction stipulated by the Treaty with Morocco is limited to the Mediterranean, thus falling outside U.S. jurisdiction. A self-identified "Moorish" minister lacks diplomatic immunity in U.S. criminal proceedings. Similarly, Articles Twenty and Twenty-One of the Treaty do not apply to the Murakush Group, as they had no right to consular assistance, and their legal issues took place within U.S. borders, where they were afforded equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Claims related to arrests and prosecutions within the U.S. territory do not engage the Treaty with Morocco, rendering such claims frivolous and lacking bona fide status. Organizations like the Moorish American Nation and the Nation of Washitaw are recognized as non-credible entities that attempt to evade legal responsibility while seeking protections under U.S. law. Legal precedents affirm that such groups are not recognized by the U.S. government, and claims asserting their independence from legal authority have been consistently rejected as frivolous. Plaintiff's land claim as a member of the Washitaw was dismissed as "patently frivolous," based on documents deemed to have "dubious legal significance." Similar claims related to Moorish ancestry were characterized as "baseless, fantastic and delusional," with complaints described as "indecipherable." Courts have consistently ruled that the United States does not recognize the sovereignty of the Moorish Nation, negating sovereign immunity claims based on such assertions. Consequently, claims based on membership in the Moorish American Nation are classified as frivolous. In response, two preclusion orders will be implemented against entities associated with the Murakush Group, particularly in light of their tendency to file confusing and nonsensical legal actions. Future submissions naming any juridical entity with specific terms related to "Moorish" or "Marrakush," or referencing various historical treaties, will be scrutinized. If such submissions lack identifiable legal counsel or if the attorney's credentials cannot be verified, the Clerk will either open a new case and scan the submission into the docket if it is 15 pages or fewer, or only scan the first three pages if it exceeds that length, with a notice indicating the submission's length. A hard copy of the *274 Submission is filed with the Clerk. The following actions are mandated: 1. Docket the Opinion as "Docket Entry No. 2," with accompanying text detailing the bases and scope of preclusion under Civil Action No. 11-1317. 2. Create a new docket entry stating that the matter is administratively terminated due to preclusion, with a provision for reopening if within thirty days the Clerk receives a one-page statement from counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners, including verification of their admission to practice in the district. 3. No submissions, other than a notice of appeal of five pages or less, will be accepted until counsel's admission is verified; non-compliant submissions will be returned. 4. Notices of appeal will be forwarded to the Court of Appeals with the accompanying opinion. 5. Administratively terminate the new matter without assigning a judge, designating it as "unassigned." 6. Mail the docket sheet and opinion to the address provided in the submission. 7. Upon receipt of a compliant statement, the matter will be docketed and assigned to a judge; if not compliant, the matter will be closed and notified as such. 8. Submissions made pro se on behalf of juridical entities by the Murakush Group are recognized, and future actions may be initiated similarly. 9. If new submissions name juridical entities with specified terms or refer to treaties and indicate pro se status, the Clerk will open a new matter and scan the submission, provided it is within specified page limits. Submissions exceeding fifteen pages must include only the first three pages in scanned form, accompanied by a docket text indicating that a hard copy is on file with the clerk. The opinion related to the matter must be docketed as "Docket Entry No. 2" with specific text detailing the bases and scope of preclusion. A separate docket entry is required to administratively terminate the matter, allowing for reopening within thirty days pending proper appearances of counsel, which must include detailed contact information and verification of admission to practice in the district. No other submissions, except for notices of appeal not exceeding five single-sided pages, will be docketed until such appearances are made. Any other submissions will be returned to the sender. Notices of appeal within the specified volume will be forwarded to the Court of Appeals along with the opinion. Additionally, any new matter will be administratively terminated without assignment to a judge and designated as "unassigned." The docket sheet and opinion will be mailed to the designated address. Properly documented appearances of counsel will lead to docketing and assignment to a judge, while failure to establish such appearances results in closure of the matter and mailing of a final updated docket sheet. The Murakush Group has previously initiated actions on behalf of both registered entities and natural persons, suggesting future filings may occur, thus necessitating relevant preclusion orders from the court. Filing amended complaints in the Marrakush Society Cases is subject to specific requirements aimed at preserving the Murakush Group's right to litigate while ensuring compliance with formatting and presentation standards. The Court allows for the submission of amended complaints if filed within a year-and-a-half delay but mandates the following: 1. Amended complaints must: - Be limited to fifteen single-sided, double-spaced pages without any accompanying materials such as exhibits. - Include a concise statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, relating solely to the named plaintiffs. - Clearly state the names and addresses of each plaintiff, avoiding pseudonyms or self-generated geographic names. - Adhere to Rules 18 and 20 as outlined in the Marrakush-Opinion. - Contain a section titled "BASES FOR DELAYED FILING" explaining the reasons for late submission. 2. Each amended complaint must be accompanied by: - A prepayment of the filing fee of $350 via a personal or cashier check from an FDIC-registered bank or a money order from an authorized agency, or - A properly executed application to proceed in forma pauperis, including a six-month prison account statement if applicable, free from extraneous content. 3. Upon receipt of an amended complaint, the Clerk will: - Docket it only if it fully complies with the stated requirements and does not reference Treaties. - If non-compliant, only the first three pages will be scanned into the docket, with a notation indicating stricken status due to non-compliance, and a copy will be mailed to the designated address, if provided. These measures aim to streamline the process and ensure that the Court only reviews compliant submissions. The document outlines procedures for handling submissions that may be manipulated by members of the Murakush Group, particularly where individuals claim to be represented by counsel who may not be properly admitted to practice in the District. To prevent potential abuse of the legal process, the Clerk is instructed to take specific actions upon receiving such submissions: 1. If a submission names a plaintiff with terms like "Moorish," "Marrakush," or similar, and references Treaties, while identifying counsel as either a generic law firm or an attorney whose admission cannot be verified: a. For submissions of 15 pages or fewer, the Clerk will open a new matter and scan the entire submission as "Docket Entry No. 1." b. For submissions exceeding 15 pages, the Clerk will scan only the first three pages and annotate the docket accordingly, noting that the full submission is on file. 2. The Clerk must also docket the Opinion detailing the preclusion basis as "Docket Entry No. 2." 3. A new docket entry will indicate that the matter is administratively terminated due to the preclusion order from Civil Action No. 11-1317, but can be reopened if within 30 days, a one-page statement from properly admitted counsel is provided, including specific contact information. 4. No other submissions will be accepted until counsel's admission is confirmed; any excess submissions will be returned to the sender. 5. Notices of appeal of five pages or less will be forwarded to the Court of Appeals along with the relevant Opinion. 6. The new matter will be administratively terminated without assignment to a judge, labeled as "unassigned." Mail a copy of the docket sheet and this Opinion via regular U.S. mail to the designated address in the submission. Upon receipt of a written statement confirming that the action was initiated with assistance from admitted counsel in this District, docket the statement and assign the matter to a judge per Local Civil Rules. If the statement lacks clear confirmation of counsel's admission, only the first page will be scanned into the docket, and a new entry will be made stating the matter is closed due to failure to establish counsel's due admission. The file will then be closed, and a final updated docket sheet will be mailed to the designated address. Regarding initiating new pro se actions, the Court will consider preclusion orders for the Murakush Group, acknowledging that while members may develop valid claims, they must refrain from using pseudonyms and frivolous references. Until such a transformation occurs, the judiciary aims to prevent abuse of the legal system. The preclusion order will not allow amendments for deficient pleadings aimed at abusing the process, nor will it require prepayment of filing fees, as fees cannot justify frivolous claims. If the Clerk receives any pro se submission with plaintiff names or designations containing terms associated with "Marrakush," "Murakush," or similar phrases, specific actions will be taken. The document identifies issues with the submissions from the plaintiffs, specifically noting that the names used (such as "Empress," "Caliph," "Aboriginal Indigenous Shaik," and "Shaikhess") do not include proper street or post office addresses. The Clerk is instructed to manage the submissions according to certain protocols: if the submission is 15 pages or fewer, it will be scanned into the docket as "Docket Entry No. 1." If it exceeds 15 pages, only the first three pages will be scanned, and a notice will indicate that the full submission is on file. Additionally, an opinion will be docketed as "Docket Entry No. 2," outlining the preclusion applied to this matter due to prior orders. The matter will be administratively terminated without a filing fee being assessed, and no amended pleadings will be accepted. However, the plaintiffs may start a new matter with proper identification and claims unrelated to the Barbary Treaties. Only notices of appeal not exceeding five pages will be docketed; all other submissions will be returned. In terms of filing fees, if a payment is made via a negotiable instrument, the funds will be deposited, but if the sender's information is insufficient, the fee will not be processed until proper identification is provided. The court warns the Murakush Group against engaging in abusive litigation practices, stating that failure to comply could result in increased sanctions or a complete bar on future legal actions. Ultimately, the complaint will be dismissed as specified in Docket Entry No. 1. Dismissal of the case will occur without prejudice, allowing for a timely submission of a properly counseled amended complaint that adheres to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this District, and that asserts only claims for which Murakush-Amexem has standing. The plaintiff's motion for pro bono counsel is denied with prejudice, deemed frivolous. Five limited preclusion orders will be issued against the Murakush Group, with two orders targeting practices of their juridical entities and three addressing the actions of natural persons. The Clerk is instructed to docket this Opinion in the Marrakush Society Cases, Estate Case, and Caliphate for informational purposes only. The term "Moors" is noted to connect to claims of ancestry from ancient Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. The document references "sovereign citizenship" and "world passports," highlighting that such passports are not recognized as valid identification in the U.S. or most countries. The history of the World Service Authority, established by Garry Davis in 1953, is also discussed, emphasizing the promotion of "world citizenship." The use of "world passports" by individuals renouncing U.S. citizenship can lead to attempts to evade legal accountability through claims of diplomatic immunity. Furthermore, the concept of "estate" mentioned is identified as legally deficient. Estates of the litigants cannot be considered actual litigants due to the absence of a probate court order recognizing these estates. It is established that a decedent's body does not constitute an estate, which is defined as the real and personal property of the decedent, as clarified in relevant case law. Claims of diplomatic immunity raised by the plaintiffs are deemed baseless; they conflate expatriation with immunity without meeting legal requirements for expatriation, which does not affect the state court's jurisdiction in criminal matters. The court also questions the authenticity of the names and titles used by the plaintiffs, suggesting that "Shyaam" and "El" may be assumed aliases rather than actual names, and "Noble Æmer" appears to be a fictitious title rather than a legitimate designation. The court expresses uncertainty regarding the identities of the individuals referred to as M.K. and K.S., indicating that if they exist, they are likely male based on naming conventions. Additionally, the term "Allah" is clarified as meaning "God" in Arabic, whereas Bey's title suggests a self-perception of supremacy. Bey's signed complaint indicates that members of the Marrakush Society refer to their self-assigned titles as "attributes." The court will use the term "attribute" to describe these titles. In various cases involving the Marrakush Society, multiple complaints have been filed for single matters, with instances noted of up to fourteen complaints per case. The excerpt also discusses the Hobo-Dyer Equal Area Projection, a map that presents a "south-up" view of the world, reducing the size of North American and European continents to reflect their actual proportions. Additionally, it references the Hijri calendar, an Islamic lunar calendar, explaining that the current year in this calendar correlates to 1432. Judge Simandle has interpreted phrases used in the Marrakush Society's complaints, revealing their unique terminology, such as "solar vessel" for the torso, "solar plexus" for the head, and other unconventional terms for body parts and actions. A sample cover letter from the Marrakush Society claims it is an official ecclesiastical entity recognized with various legal documentations and references treaties and rights concerning indigenous peoples. All Sovereign and Private Civilians have the right to free access to judicial proceedings, as stated in 745 (1867). In the Marrakush Society Cases, Judge Simandle noted that the complex language used by the litigants was not due to a lack of English proficiency but appeared to be an intentional mockery of the court, aimed at creating confusion. The associated web video clips from the Marrakush Society were presented in clear English, devoid of any specialized or fictitious terms. Furthermore, a Florida-V action referenced a television report describing the Marrakush Society as an obscure Islamic faction of squatters. The actual identities of individuals involved in the case, such as "Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Æmer K. S." and "Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Æmer Kernel C.," were suggested to be Brandon Casimir, Cornell Hall, or Cornell Dixon, while "Bey" might be Scott or Alvin McArthur. The notice of removal in the Estate Case indicated that M.K. and K.C. faced state criminal charges stemming from their possession of fraudulent U.S. Department of State Public Minister Credentials and cocaine. Lastly, the excerpt explains the CUSIP system, a 9-character alphanumeric identifier for North American securities, and its relationship with the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), detailing how CUSIP numbers can be converted into ISINs. The Court clarifies that Linda L. Campbell, William H. Buckman, Susan Chana Lask, and Eleanor Capogrosso, Esqs. are not associated with or responsible for the submissions of Murakush-Amexem, nor are they aware of them. The term "Barbary Treaties" pertains to treaties made between the United States and North African city-states (Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis) and the Sultanate of Morocco from 1795 to 1836, aimed at addressing piracy and high protection fees imposed by these rulers. These treaties underwent multiple reconfirmations and terminations due to political upheavals in North Africa and decisions made by the U.S., with specific treaties noted for their obsolescence upon changes in sovereignty. The rationale behind Murakush-Amexem's request for attorney's fees is unclear, especially given their pro bono counsel application. The term "caliphate" denotes "successor" in Arabic, referring collectively to successors of Mohammed, and is distinguished from sultanates based on claims of lineage to the Prophet. Each caliph acts as a ruler of a state-like entity, contrasting with the sultanate's basis in pure power accepted for social stability. The Court notes that its identification of two Murakush-Amexem matters arose from limited research, suggesting the existence of other recent cases. Despite filings being submitted three weeks apart, discrepancies in M.K.'s address cannot be attributed to this timeframe, as all related entities registered by M.K. in Colorado share the same address. The Court emphasizes that there is no legal provision allowing entities to proceed without prepayment of filing fees, as the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915, applies solely to natural persons, not juridical entities. Any attempt by Murakush-Amexem to navigate around this requirement through semantics is counterproductive, as it invokes non-existent legal provisions. Furthermore, the titles or ownership claims by M.K. and associates do not alter the corporate identity of Murakush-Amexem; should it be treated as their alter ego, it would lose its juridical status, effectively piercing its corporate veil. The term "abuse of process" is defined as the improper use of legal processes for purposes other than intended by law, distinguishing it from "malicious prosecution," which concerns wrongful issuance of process. The Court recognizes that filing fees serve as a deterrent against frivolous lawsuits, which is particularly relevant here, as the litigants claim inability to pay but promise future payments, distorting incentives. Without financial constraints, frivolous lawsuits could overwhelm federal courts. References to the Barbary Treaties in the Murakush Group’s submissions seem to focus on the Treaty with Morocco, while the term "vessel" is creatively used by the group to refer to themselves in an effort to connect their identity to the Treaties. The Articles of the Barbary Treaties, which use the term "vessels," do not apply to human beings, as the context clearly defines "vessel" as non-human crafts for navigation. No provisions within the Treaties, including the one with Morocco, can be invoked in legal claims regarding the arrest or incarceration of individuals. The Treaty lacks a definition for "Country," but references to Morocco indicate that "Country" refers to the United States when not preceded by a possessive pronoun. The Murakush Group, which claims not to be U.S. citizens, finds Articles that focus on U.S. citizens irrelevant. If the Murakush Group disagrees with the Court’s interpretation of the Treaties, they cannot seek reconsideration but must appeal to the Third Circuit. A motion for reconsideration is not appropriate for rearguing previous theories. The Court does not comment on the merits of any potential appeal but notes that it requires prepayment of fees and warns that any in forma pauperis appeal would likely be frivolous. Complaints filed on behalf of quasi-juridical entities related to the Murakush Group will be subject to existing preclusion orders. The Court expresses uncertainty regarding the implications of the Marrakush Society Cases and emphasizes that any forged checks or money orders will be sent to prosecutorial offices for potential criminal prosecution. It clarifies that its opinion does not indicate a stance on the validity of any amended complaints in these cases or on the appropriateness of allowing delayed filings; these matters are solely within Judge Simandle's discretion. The Court notes that if the guidance provided by various judges does not lead the Marrakush Group to correct their approach, the final preclusion order will not consider any amendments to pleadings. It asserts that genuine intent to litigate claims will prompt the judiciary to evaluate a litigant's financial capacity for fee payment, as seen in the Olivares v. Marshall case, where a court can require partial payment from those with limited means. Conversely, if a litigant submits frivolous pleadings despite extensive previous judicial guidance, their payment of filing fees will not justify misuse of the federal judiciary.