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People v. Mord
Citations: 197 Cal. App. 3d 1090; 243 Cal. Rptr. 403; 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 36Docket: F006510
Court: California Court of Appeal; January 21, 1988; California; State Appellate Court
Gary Lee Mord was arrested on March 6, 1979, for the shooting death of his father and subsequently underwent competency proceedings at Atascadero State Hospital, where he was declared competent to stand trial on November 30, 1979. An information charging him with murder was filed on January 23, 1980. Mord waived his right to a jury trial, and the court, after reviewing evidence, found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and not guilty by reason of insanity on March 21, 1980. He was committed to Atascadero State Hospital for a maximum of four years and received 386 days of custody credits. Mord appealed the decision, which was affirmed, and the remittitur was filed on December 24, 1981. In August 1982, he was placed in a local locked facility for 60 days and later granted a leave of absence for community outpatient treatment. Recommendations for renewing his outpatient status were made by medical professionals in 1983 and 1984, but no hearings were conducted on these recommendations. On June 26, 1985, Mord was ordered back to Atascadero pending a request for parole revocation. Following a request for revocation by his case supervisor on June 27, 1985, the Atascadero staff agreed to revoke his parole. Mord was taken into custody on July 1, 1985, and returned to Atascadero on July 8, 1985, without a court hearing prior to the revocation of his parole. On July 16, 1985, David Jones recommended the extension of the appellant's commitment under section 1026.5, subdivision (b). Subsequently, on August 8, the Merced County District Attorney filed a petition asserting that the appellant posed a significant danger to others, initiating extension proceedings. The appellant filed a motion to dismiss this petition on September 6, contending he was entitled to precommitment conduct credits for his jail time, which would render the petition untimely. He also argued noncompliance with outpatient parole hearing requirements under section 1611, subdivision (a). The court denied the request for conduct credits on September 17 and appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate the appellant, setting the matter for a jury trial at his request. The court denied his motion to dismiss the extension petition on September 27. A jury trial commenced on November 21, 1985, resulting in a verdict the following day that the appellant had a mental disorder and posed a substantial danger to others. On November 26, the appellant filed a post-trial motion claiming entitlement to conduct credits for time spent in a state hospital, which was denied on December 9. The court found an extended commitment necessary and ordered his return to Atascadero State Hospital for an additional two years starting December 1, 1985. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 10. The facts indicate that the appellant suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which contributed to his previous finding of not guilty by reason of insanity in a 1979 shooting case. Following treatment at Atascadero State Hospital, he was released to Merced Manor, then to outpatient status. Although he initially thrived, his condition deteriorated in spring 1985 due to auditory hallucinations and stress from community rumors about his past. After a second altercation in June 1985, he expressed fears of harming others and agreed to a 72-hour psychiatric hold, after which he showed improvement and was relocated to be closer to his family. Mr. Jones, the appellant, began moving his possessions to his sister Elena Mord's home in Modesto with a third man. He placed some items in his car's trunk but warned against using it due to hinge issues. The majority of his belongings were transported in a county pickup truck. After unpacking, he allowed Elena and her roommate, John McMullen, to use his car but specifically instructed them not to open the trunk. The following day, McMullen discovered a shotgun, a knife, and ammunition in the trunk while retrieving a jack for a flat tire. Appellant was prohibited from possessing weapons due to conditions of his parole, which he acknowledged in signed contracts. His case supervisor, Frank Huble, had previously discussed this prohibition with him. Upon learning of the firearm, Elena reported it to mental health authorities, fearing for her safety and expressing concerns about appellant’s mental state, including potential hallucinations and paranoia. Appellant was taken into custody on July 1, 1985, and returned to Atascadero State Hospital on July 8, following a court order for his transfer pending a parole revocation request. Mr. Jones initiated the revocation process, which was supported by Gordon Gritter, Medical Director at Atascadero. On July 16, Mr. Jones recommended extending appellant's term under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), leading to a petition by the district attorney on August 8. A jury trial commenced on November 21, 1985, where five experts testified that appellant, due to his schizophrenia, posed a significant danger to others. Their evaluations considered his recent secretive behavior regarding the shotgun, high paranoia levels, and a troubling history, including past criminal behavior and violent tendencies. One psychiatrist noted an incident of violence in jail, which raised concerns about appellant’s potential for harm and his inability to explain the possession of the weapons. Dr. Richard Lloyd, the second court-appointed psychiatrist, conducted his third evaluation of the appellant since 1979, assessing the appellant's dangerousness based on several factors: chronic and incurable condition, delusions of persecution, persistent auditory hallucinations even with medication, a history of aggressive behavior during psychotic episodes, and a lack of insight regarding the inappropriateness of acquiring weapons. Dr. Lloyd expressed concerns about the appellant's altercation in jail, emphasizing that despite controlled appearances, the underlying mental disorder remains a significant danger to others. On appeal, the appellant raises three main issues, including a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction to extend his hospital term under section 1026.5. He argues that procedural errors occurred in extending his commitment, particularly regarding the timeliness of the recommitment petition filed on August 8, 1985, which he contends was improper due to alleged denials of custody and conduct credits that would have reduced his commitment term. The appeal will address whether the lower court had the authority to extend the appellant's term in light of these procedural claims. Precommitment Conduct Credit under section 1026.5 limits a person's confinement in a state hospital to the maximum term specified by the court, which is based on the potential imprisonment for the committed offense, minus certain credits. A person committed under section 1026 cannot be held in custody longer than this maximum term, with no precommitment conduct credits allowed for time spent in jail or treatment facilities, as established in prior case law (People v. Smith). The trial court correctly denied the appellant's request for conduct credits for his precommitment time spent in jail and at Atascadero State Hospital. The distinction between treatment confinement and punishment means that equal protection principles do not require granting conduct credits to those undergoing treatment under section 1026, as supported by case law (People v. Saffell; People v. Bodis; People v. Waterman). The appellant's assertion that the denial of conduct credits extended his confinement period beyond that of an incarcerated individual is rejected, as the treatment goals differ significantly between the two types of confinement. Confinement under section 1026 is focused on treatment rather than punishment, as established in People v. Bodis. Legislative distinctions exist between individuals committed for treatment and those for punishment, justified by varying circumstances. The concept of 'good time' credit applies only to fixed criminal sentences, and equal protection is not violated by the difference in conduct credits available to state prison inmates versus section 1026 patients. The Supreme Court ruled in In re Huffman that equal protection is not breached when pre-1981 mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSOs) are denied conduct credits given to drug-addicted individuals at CRC, a rationale consistent with People v. Waterman. The appellant attempts to differentiate his case from MDSOs and section 1370 inmates, yet fails to provide a valid equal protection argument, which requires demonstrating that the state treats similarly situated groups unequally. Although the appellant claims that individuals like him and CRC patients may benefit from credit incentives, he overlooks that section 1026 patients must have a mental disorder that CRC patients do not necessarily share. This distinction provides sufficient justification for the different treatment outlined in prior case law. Regarding the appellant's claim of not receiving custody credit for time spent at Merced Manor, the record shows he was placed there on August 5, 1982, and subsequently awarded custody credit for that period upon his return to Atascadero in July 1985. Despite the absence of a release order from Merced Manor in the court file, an order on August 5, 1982, documents the 60-day placement, followed by a commitment to a halfway house program, which confirms that the appellant did receive credit for the time served. Appellant claims he is entitled to custody credits for his six months spent at the Frontier Halfway House after his parole release on October 7, 1982. He argues that, following his return to Atascadero in July 1985, his maximum commitment date should reflect these credits. According to Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1), custody credits must be granted pursuant to Section 2900.5, which acknowledges time in a halfway house as creditable. However, it must first be established whether appellant was 'in custody' during his time there. The respondent contends that the conditions at the halfway house were not sufficiently restrictive to qualify as custody. The court refers to People v. Reinertson, which established that 'custody' should be broadly construed, considering factors such as freedom of movement, visitation regulations, and daily structure. An examination of appellant's halfway house agreement reveals several controlling factors: he was charged rent, refusal to take medication could result in discharge, a daily chore list was provided, mental health programs and other meetings were mandatory, and there were strict regulations regarding alcohol, drugs, and weapons. Visitation was limited, and a curfew was imposed. While these conditions present a complex assessment of 'custody,' the court indicates that even if appellant were granted six months credit, it would render the district attorney's petition to recommit him untimely but would not invalidate the recommitment order. The court cites People v. Minahen, establishing that jurisdiction to extend a commitment under Section 1026.5, subdivision (b) is not lost due to a late petition, as the time limits are not jurisdictional. In Minahen, the court upheld the authority to extend commitments, even when procedural compliance is lacking. The extension provisions of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(2), are intended to benefit the public rather than the individual defendant. An extension petition can be filed after the original commitment term expires if good cause is shown for the late filing and procedural due process is provided to the defendant. The court found good cause to relieve the district attorney from default regarding custody credits, as the error was not the district attorney's fault. The petition process ensured the defendant received procedural due process, as he was still confined. Even if the appellant is eligible for custody credits, the principles established in Minahen and section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(2) apply, granting the trial court jurisdiction. Regarding the failure to hold necessary parole hearings, the appellant was released on parole on October 7, 1982, under former section 1611, which mandated annual hearings to assess the appellant's status. These hearings were not conducted, violating procedural requirements. After a parole revocation request on June 27, 1985, a hearing was also required within 15 judicial days but was not held. The court must evaluate the appropriate remedy for these procedural failures, with the appellant arguing that these violations justify his claim for custody credit for time served, asserting he was not legally on parole from October 8, 1983, onward due to the absence of a required order extending his outpatient status. Appellant acknowledges that he was not discharged from his commitment due to the absence of a legal order, arguing that he should be treated as a person under supervision, similar to a work furlough prisoner. He contends that, under Penal Code section 2900.5, he is entitled to custody credits for the period from October 8, 1983, to July 1, 1985, which would imply his commitment should have ended before December 1, 1985, making the subsequent recommitment petition untimely. He cites cases related to mentally disordered sex offenders and conservatorships, asserting that procedural violations led to a loss of jurisdiction and wrongful orders, and argues these principles apply to his case under section 1611, subdivision (a). The court, however, rejects appellant's claims. It states that even if he were entitled to custody credits, the untimeliness of the petition does not invalidate the recommitment, referencing People v. Minahen. Furthermore, the court finds that appellant did not demonstrate that he was in sufficiently restrictive custody to warrant credits under section 2900.5, noting that he lived independently, attended school, and worked during much of the relevant period. The court distinguishes the cases cited by appellant, emphasizing that those involved actual loss of liberty due to procedural violations, while in appellant's case, the lack of hearings did not confine him. The court also points out that the hearings would have assessed his status but did not result in confinement. Lastly, the respondent argues that appellant waived his right to these hearings as he never requested them. Respondent argues that appellant was not prejudiced by the failure to hold section 1611, subdivision (a) hearings, asserting that even if the hearings had occurred, appellant would not have been discharged from his commitment. This claim references In re La Croix, where the petitioner was denied a prerevocation hearing despite requesting it, yet the court found this failure harmless because he could not demonstrate any prejudice. In contrast, while appellant did not waive his right to the hearings due to a lack of evidence of knowledge of such rights, the court holds that the absence of the section 1611, subdivision (b) hearing was harmless because sufficient evidence existed to revoke appellant's parole. However, the failure to conduct the subdivision (a) hearings raises questions about potential prejudice, as these hearings might have provided appellant with opportunities that could have altered the course of events leading to his recommitment. Nonetheless, despite this speculation, appellant is not entitled to a remedy for the violation of section 1611, subdivision (a), as the established legal framework indicates that such a violation does not invalidate the subsequent recommitment. Determining the consequences of noncompliance with statutory procedures involves applying the criteria set by the California Supreme Court, specifically from Pulcifer v. County of Alameda and People v. McGee. The distinction between 'mandatory' and 'directory' statutes is critical: a mandatory statute invalidates subsequent governmental actions if not followed, while a directory statute does not. Courts assess this distinction by examining the purpose of the procedural requirement and legislative intent. In this case, the hearing provisions of former section 1611, subdivision (a) are deemed directory. The determination of whether a provision is mandatory or directory requires a comprehensive analysis of legislative intent, which can be inferred from the statute's language and overall objectives. Although the statute uses the word "shall," which indicates a directive, it is not definitive of legislative intent. The primary aim of the annual review hearings is to serve the public interest by ensuring individuals with mental illness receive necessary treatment, rather than solely protecting individual rights. The legislative framework emphasizes public safety and humane treatment for those deemed dangerous during their illness exacerbations. Therefore, interpreting the statute as directory aligns with public protection goals and benefits the appellant by facilitating ongoing treatment, rather than invalidating the recommitment order and potentially endangering the community. The 'mandatory-directory' effect should not be conflated with the 'mandatory-permissive' distinction, which determines whether a public official must follow a statute or can choose to disregard it. The assertion is not that the procedures outlined in section 1611, subdivision (a) are optional for the lower court; instead, it is noted that many mandatory statutory provisions may only have directory effects. If subdivision (a) is deemed to have a directory effect, this would align with established legal principles. The issue of the appellant's release from a two-year recommitment, starting December 1, 1985, becomes moot as that period expired on December 1, 1987. Nonetheless, the court's decision will influence its continued jurisdiction over the original commitment and the recommitment. Regarding the affidavit requirement in section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(2), the appellant claims non-compliance with the requirement that the petition state reasons for extended commitment with supporting affidavits. The appellant points to a typographical error referencing a non-existent June 16, 1985 letter, but this error was likely recognized by the appellant. A July 16, 1985 letter from David Jones adequately provided the necessary factual basis for the extension request. The appellant did not raise the affidavit issue in the lower court, despite it being mentioned in a prior memorandum, and he could have addressed any perceived prejudice during the motion to dismiss. The record suggests that the appellant waived the affidavit requirement. Additionally, the appellant's claim of procedural due process violations due to a lack of notice regarding the conduct leading to the extension request is unfounded, as the public defender received relevant correspondence, including a July 16 letter and a June 27 letter requesting parole revocation. Appellant argues that a "careful consideration" standard is necessary for extending a commitment, asserting that such consideration was evident in the letters submitted. The lower court's refusal to dismiss the recommitment petition based on this argument was not erroneous. Appellant raises a procedural issue regarding section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(2), claiming the recommendation for extension was both untimely and not submitted by the appropriate official. Although respondent acknowledges the recommendation, submitted on July 16, 1985, was late, they argue its tardiness was justifiable and not prejudicial. The court notes that no case law addresses the jurisdictional implications of missing the 180-day deadline for recommendations, leading to a comparison with the 90-day petition filing deadline. Previous rulings indicate that violations of the 90-day deadline are not jurisdictional if good cause for delay exists and due process is provided. The legislature also suggests that procedural non-compliance does not strip the court of its authority to extend commitments for dangerous individuals. Respondent asserts there was good cause for the delay, referencing the case of People v. Echols, where the court found no due process violation despite a late petition due to the prosecutor's delayed awareness of the defendant's dangerousness. In this case, the recommendation's basis stemmed from the discovery of weapons linked to the appellant, occurring shortly before the recommendation date, thus making timely submission impossible. Appellant fails to demonstrate concrete prejudice, leading the court to conclude that the procedural violation did not compromise its jurisdiction. Lastly, appellant's claim regarding the submission of the recommendation by the proper authority is deemed unsubstantiated. David Jones, the Psychiatric and Forensic Coordinator of the Merced County Mental Health Department, authored a recommendation to recommit the appellant, which was supported by Gordon Migliore, a social worker, and earlier by Dr. Gordon Gritter, the Medical Director at Atascadero State Hospital. While Dr. Gritter's letter did not meet the technical requirements of the statute, it mitigated any potential prejudice against the appellant. The appellant's claim of prejudice is generalized and does not convincingly demonstrate a rights violation, especially since the recommendation came from his case supervisor. Regarding the timeliness of the recommitment order, the order was filed on December 16, 1985, after the appellant's original term expired on December 1, 1985. The appellant failed to prove any error, acknowledging that the statute does not mandate pre-expiration filing. The order extended his term for two years starting December 1, 1985, without causing additional prejudice. The timing of the order was also deliberate to accommodate the appellant, given that his trial concluded just before the expiration of his term. The court found no procedural infirmity in the December 16 filing and affirmed its jurisdiction under section 1026.5. Although the cumulative errors in the proceedings were noted, they were not sufficient to overturn the recommitment order, which was ultimately affirmed by the court. The opinion is certified for publication, excluding parts II and III. The document outlines procedures for the extended commitment of patients in state hospitals. Specifically, 180 days prior to the end of a maximum commitment term, the medical director must provide an opinion to the prosecuting attorney on whether the patient meets specific criteria for extended commitment. If requested, this opinion should include supporting evaluations and relevant records. The prosecuting attorney can file a petition for extended commitment within 90 days before the original commitment expires, stating reasons and providing affidavits supporting the claim. Upon filing, the court must inform the patient of their right to legal representation and a jury trial, with discovery rules applicable. A hearing on the petition is mandated, which must occur at least 30 days before the patient's scheduled release unless waived. The document also notes that once a defendant is released from confinement, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an extension petition, as it would then constitute an unauthorized new term of commitment. Additionally, section 1026.5 outlines the criteria for extended commitment, emphasizing the necessity of a mental disorder that poses a danger to others. Changes made in 1985 allowed recommendations for extended commitment to be submitted by local program directors for individuals in non-hospital settings. Lastly, the respondent acknowledges procedural noncompliance regarding the timing of the trial but asserts it did not undermine the court's jurisdiction, a point not contested by the appellant on appeal.