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Turney v. State

Citations: 759 N.E.2d 671; 2001 Ind. App. LEXIS 2130; 2001 WL 1587869Docket: 27A02-0010-CR-644

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 13, 2001; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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John R. Turney was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, classified as Class C felonies, and one count classified as a Class B felony, following a jury trial. He appeals these convictions, raising seven issues, the most critical being the prosecution's alleged violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by withholding evidence of the minor's prior sexual misconduct. The Court of Appeals of Indiana found this issue dispositive, leading to a reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new trial.

The case facts reveal that Turney supervised the in-school suspension program at Marion High School. In early February 1999, he engaged in inappropriate discussions with a female student, A.D.H., about sexual topics. On February 6, during an ISS session, Turney assaulted A.D.H. by touching her inappropriately and performing oral sex on her. Despite A.D.H.'s discomfort, she felt compelled to stay due to fear of disciplinary consequences. After the incident, she confided in her sister but later recanted claims that alcohol was involved. The court's ruling emphasizes the significance of the withheld evidence in impacting Turney's right to a fair trial.

A.D.H. reported sexual misconduct to a friend and school official, leading to Turney's charges on June 29, 1999, for three counts of sexual misconduct with a minor. After a five-day trial, he was found guilty on July 1, 2000, and sentenced on September 18, 2000, to six years for a Class B felony (three years suspended to probation) and three years for two Class C felonies, served concurrently. Turney later discovered that A.D.H. had engaged in sexual activity with two boys prior to the incident, information that was not disclosed to his defense. The prosecution acknowledged the nondisclosure but claimed no obligation to reveal it. Turney argued this suppression violated his due process rights, asserting that it affected the portrayal of A.D.H. as an innocent victim and bolstered her credibility during the trial. The court noted that due process requires the disclosure of favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment, citing established case law. It emphasized that a reasonable probability exists that the disclosure would have altered the trial's outcome, constituting a constitutional error. The State conceded the evidence was favorable and willfully suppressed but contended it was not material. The court's analysis referenced the components of a Brady violation, underscoring the significance of the suppressed evidence in determining the case's outcome.

Turney asserts that evidence regarding the victim’s past sexual conduct, specifically her molestation of two young boys, was material and suppressed by the State. He argues that this evidence would have provided an alternative explanation for the victim A.D.H.’s emotional distress and her removal from her foster family, countering her portrayal as an innocent victim. Turney claims he was unable to present this evidence during cross-examination, leading the jury to wrongfully infer that he caused her behavioral problems.

The State counters that even if the evidence had been disclosed, it would be inadmissible under Ind. Evidence Rule 412(a), which restricts the admission of a victim's past sexual conduct in sex crime prosecutions, except under specific circumstances. The State maintains that Turney's evidence does not meet these exceptions.

Turney references the case of Steward v. State, arguing that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses must prevail over Rule 412 in cases where the exclusion of evidence hampers effective cross-examination. In Steward, the court noted that the trial court's exclusion of evidence should not prevent full cross-examination and discussed the concept of "partial corroboration," where evidence of a victim's condition may bolster the victim's credibility and implicate the defendant. The court determined that when the State introduces evidence suggesting sexual contact, the defendant must be allowed to present evidence indicating another potential perpetrator. However, this right to cross-examination is limited and does not allow for a general inquiry into the victim's sexual history or hypothetical scenarios, which would breach the Rape Shield Statute. The court concluded that the State "opened the door" for Steward to introduce exculpatory evidence related to prior molestations through cross-examination.

Using the Rape Shield Statute to exclude evidence that could suggest an alternative explanation for a victim's behavior hinders a defendant's ability to counteract the implications drawn from expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The State's use of this statute allows it to present incriminating evidence while preventing the defense from introducing potentially exculpatory evidence. While expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome can indicate that abuse occurred, it cannot be used to both protect the victim's credibility and prevent the defense from presenting its case. In this instance, expert testimony supported the notion that the victim, A.D.H., exhibited behaviors typical of sexually abused children, which was central to the State's argument that she was an innocent victim. This opened the door for the defense to present evidence of A.D.H.'s prior sexual conduct as an alternative explanation for her behaviors. The State incorrectly argued that the current case differed from precedents where the exclusion of a victim’s prior sexual conduct reinforced their testimony. Previous rulings, such as in Davis v. State, established that excluding such evidence can unfairly enhance the credibility of the victim’s claims by implying that accurate identification of one perpetrator also validates the victim’s overall testimony. Therefore, the exclusion of A.D.H.'s prior sexual conduct was similarly erroneous, as it could have indicated another potential source for the alleged abuse.

Turney was entitled to challenge the child sexual accommodation syndrome evidence through cross-examination, which could have revealed alternative sources for A.D.H.'s emotional distress. Consequently, Evid. R. 412 would not prevent the introduction of evidence regarding A.D.H.'s prior sexual conduct in foster care, as this information was relevant to her credibility as a witness. The State's failure to disclose this evidence could have affected the presentation of A.D.H.'s emotional state and child abuse syndrome evidence, crucial in credibility-focused sex-related cases. Under Brady, the prosecution must disclose favorable evidence to the accused, and the failure to disclose material evidence in this instance constituted a violation, warranting the reversal of Turney's convictions and a remand for a new trial. Additionally, the court addressed the admissibility of testimony from three female students regarding Turney's inappropriate conduct. Despite Turney's Motion in Limine to exclude this testimony, the trial court allowed it, leading Turney to argue that its admission violated Evid. R. 404(b) and unfairly suggested his predisposition to commit the crimes.

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts to establish a person's character and show actions consistent with that character. However, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including proving motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. The rule aims to prevent juries from inferring a defendant's guilt based on past behavior. 

To admit 404(b) evidence, the trial court must determine its relevance to an issue other than the defendant's character and assess its probative value against potential prejudicial effects under Evidence Rule 403. Evidence can be admitted even if it suggests bad character, provided it increases the likelihood of an element of the charged crime. Nevertheless, if the prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value, the evidence may be excluded.

In the case at hand, the State argued that evidence of Turney's prior sexual conversations was relevant to demonstrate motive, preparation, plan, and intent. However, the court found that these conversations did not indicate a plan to act on a specific victim and were not linked to Turney's relationship with A.D.H. Consequently, the evidence was considered to have minimal probative value and was inadmissible for proving preparation, plan, or motive. Additionally, Turney's intent was not at issue, further justifying exclusion under the intent exception. The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value, leading to a reversal and remand of the case.