Chisholm v. MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING CANCER CENTER

Citations: 824 F. Supp. 2d 573; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130089; 2011 WL 5448251Docket: Case No. 09 Civ. 8211

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; November 4, 2011; Federal District Court

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Aubrey Chisholm filed a lawsuit against Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and his former supervisors, alleging unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law. Following a trial from May 17-26, 2011, a jury awarded Chisholm $233,290.32 in back pay, determined he was entitled to front pay, and imposed $1 million in punitive damages against supervisor Paul Adamec, for which Sloan-Kettering was vicariously liable. After the verdict, the Court indicated it would consider a reduction (remittitur) of the punitive damages. A telephonic conference on June 7, 2011, led to the parties failing to reach an agreement on remittitur and front pay, except for a two percent present value discount on front pay.

The Court interpreted the Defendants' June 28, 2011 letter as a motion for a new trial on punitive damages and Chisholm's response as opposition to this motion. Ultimately, the Court awarded Chisholm $102,545.62 in front pay, granted the motion for a new trial on punitive damages unless Chisholm reduced the award against Adamec to $50,000, and confirmed that Chisholm was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the back pay. The Court affirmed the jury’s finding on front pay, emphasizing that while it is an equitable remedy under Title VII, it constitutes a legal remedy under the NYSHRL, and was appropriately submitted to the jury for determination. The Court noted that front pay aims to make the victim whole without providing an advantage over their pre-termination position.

The Court recognizes that the jury's back pay award reflects an assumption that Chisholm would have remained employed at Sloan-Kettering for over four years post-termination, which aids in compensating him. Chisholm requests front pay from the verdict date of May 26, 2011, until his retirement age of 65 on January 13, 2020, totaling approximately 8.5 years. Defendants argue this amount is speculative, asserting that Chisholm would likely have been terminated before 2020 for performance-related reasons. They propose a more reasonable front pay award covering 3.5 years, until the end of 2014.

The Court sides with the Defendants, determining that awarding front pay through 2020 is unwarranted due to significant changes in management at Sloan-Kettering’s transportation department, which negatively impacted Chisholm's working relationship. Evidence indicated that he struggled to adapt and had conflicts with colleagues, undermining his likelihood of continued employment. Although the jury found the April 2007 incident was not the true cause of his termination, Chisholm's conduct related to that incident and other behaviors suggested he would not have remained employed until retirement age.

The Court emphasizes that front pay cannot be speculative, referencing case law that supports limiting awards to avoid creating a potential 'windfall' for Chisholm. Ultimately, it concludes that no more than two years of front pay is justified. The Court's decision on the front pay rate is informed by the jury's back pay award of $233,290.32, which corresponded to the four years and one month from Chisholm’s termination to the verdict. The jury's decision included annual merit raises but did not account for overtime pay, as there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Chisholm would have been offered overtime given the existing tensions with his supervisors.

Chisholm's relationship with the transportation department management had significantly deteriorated before his termination, leading the Court to conclude that he would not have continued receiving annual raises, particularly at the previous rate of four percent, after 2007. The Court also doubts that Sloan-Kettering would have maintained its pattern of generous raises following the 2008 economic crisis. Thus, the Court awards Chisholm a maximum of two years of front pay at his 2007 salary of $52,820.45, totaling $105,640.90, which, when reduced to present value at a two percent discount rate, amounts to $102,545.62. Chisholm is entitled to post-judgment interest from May 26, 2011, as calculated by the Clerk of Court.

Chisholm additionally seeks $201,750 for the diminished value of his pension, based on a July 2006 pension statement and assuming continued employment through early 2020. The Court, however, finds insufficient evidence to support that Chisholm would have remained employed past 2013 or to substantiate his pension loss calculations. Therefore, the Court denies any front pay related to his pension, noting that speculative methods for calculating such losses are not permissible. Any losses accruing from his termination in 2007 until the verdict in 2011 are likely included in the jury's back pay award and cannot be added to the front pay.

Regarding punitive damages, the Court determined that only Adamec exhibited the necessary malice for a punitive damages award, instructing the jury accordingly. The jury awarded $1 million in punitive damages against Adamec, which Sloan-Kettering is required to pay. The defendants contend that this award is excessive and should be remitted.

Remittitur allows a court to require a plaintiff to choose between accepting a reduced verdict or facing a new trial, contingent on the determination of whether the original verdict is excessive. The court retains the authority to remit the jury's award to the highest permissible amount that is not considered excessive. In this case, while punitive damages are justified against Adamec, the awarded amount of $1 million is deemed excessive given the circumstances. The court emphasizes that punitive damages should serve the purpose of punishment and deterrence without risking the defendant's financial ruin. A punitive damages award of $1 million is generally excessive except in the most severe cases. Although Chisholm argues that this amount is necessary to deter an institution like Sloan-Kettering, no supporting authority is provided for this claim.

The New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) holds employers strictly liable for unlawful retaliatory actions by employees in supervisory roles. However, the court asserts that strict liability does not change the standards for evaluating punitive damages. The court applies the traditional guideposts established by the Supreme Court in BMW v. Gore, which include the degree of reprehensibility, the ratio of harm to punitive damages, and comparisons to civil penalties in similar cases. The degree of reprehensibility is considered the most critical factor. The court focuses on Adamec's conduct rather than Sloan-Kettering's vicarious liability, concluding that the jury's punitive damages award should be reduced to $50,000. This amount is justified as it reflects significant financial hardship for an individual defendant and recognizes that Adamec's actions, while reprehensible, did not involve violence or offensive conduct.

The Court has reduced the punitive damages awarded to plaintiff Aubrey Chisholm from $20,000 to $10,000 in a prior case involving assault and racial slurs. It finds that a punitive damages award of $50,000 is more consistent with similar cases in the Circuit, and unless Chisholm agrees to this amount, a new trial on punitive damages will be ordered. The Court also determined that Chisholm is entitled to pre-judgment interest on his back pay award of $233,290.32 from April 25, 2007, until judgment entry, which is typically standard practice in such cases. The interest will be calculated at the average rate of return on one-year Treasury bills and compounded annually. 

The Court's order states that if Chisholm does not elect to remit the punitive damages to $50,000 within 14 days, a new trial will be granted. It also outlines the preliminary judgment to include: back pay of $233,290.32 with pre-judgment interest, front pay of $102,545.62 with post-judgment interest, and punitive damages of $50,000 against defendant Paul Adamec. The Clerk of Court is instructed to finalize any pending motions and close the case, with provisions for reopening if Chisholm requests attorney fees. The parties have agreed on a discount rate of 2% for future value calculations.