People v. Benny S.

Citations: 230 Cal. App. 3d 102; 281 Cal. Rptr. 1; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3479; 91 Daily Journal DAR 11328; 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 779Docket: B046137

Court: California Court of Appeal; April 24, 1991; California; State Appellate Court

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The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in the case of In re Benny S., where the appellant, a 17-year-old, was adjudicated a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code § 602 for possessing marijuana for sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code § 11359. The court denied the appellant's requests for disclosure of a confidential informant and for suppression of evidence related to a search. The appellant contested the trial court's ruling, specifically the order for potential juvenile hall confinement of 60 days if probation conditions were violated.

The case stemmed from an incident on February 15, 1989, when Deputy Sheriff Clifford Busick received a tip from a reliable informant about two males, one identified as Javier Telemontes, dealing drugs from a green and white Pinto near two high schools. Upon locating the vehicle, Deputy Busick observed Telemontes holding a bag that appeared to contain marijuana. The officers initiated a stop, during which Telemontes attempted to conceal the bag in the vehicle. The court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the marijuana possession charge while rejecting the cocaine possession allegation. The ruling emphasized the reliability of the informant and the legality of the officers' actions in arresting the appellant.

Occupants of a vehicle were ordered out, and Deputy Busick conducted a search, discovering a bag containing marijuana and another bag with fifteen bundles of a white powder resembling cocaine. Both individuals, referred to as appellant and Telemontes, were arrested. A subsequent search of appellant revealed additional marijuana in his jacket pocket. They were taken to the station for booking. The informant last saw the vehicle shortly before the arrest and did not indicate purchasing anything from the suspects.

Appellant argued that the trial court incorrectly denied his motions for an in camera hearing and for the disclosure of the informant's identity. The court found that the statutory conditions for an in camera hearing, as outlined in Evidence Code section 1042(d), were not fully satisfied; specifically, the prosecuting attorney did not request a hearing, which meant the trial court's actions were justified. 

Appellant further contended that the informant's claim of witnessing a drug sale made them a material witness. The court clarified that while non-disclosure of an informant's identity could deprive a defendant of a fair trial, the burden of proof for disclosure rests on demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the informant could provide evidence affecting the defendant's guilt. This standard is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, particularly considering the informant's proximity to the alleged crime.

A reasonable possibility exists that testimony from an unnamed informant could be relevant to a defendant's guilt, but this likelihood decreases with the informant's degree of connection to the crime. If the informant is not a direct witness to the events leading to an arrest, their testimony is unlikely to be pertinent to the defendant's guilt or innocence. In cases where the informant is neither a participant nor an eyewitness to the charged offense, the potential for them to provide exculpatory evidence becomes speculative, potentially rendering it unreasonable. In the reviewed case, the charge was possession for sale of marijuana found in the defendant's jacket, not sale itself. Precedents indicate that in such circumstances, the informant is not considered a material witness. Had the defendant been charged with sales witnessed by the informant, disclosure would have been necessary; however, since he was charged with possession, the trial court properly denied the motion for disclosure.

Furthermore, the defendant's motion to suppress evidence from a search was also denied. In suppression hearings under section 1538.5, the trial court acts as the finder of fact, holding the authority to assess witness credibility and resolve conflicts in testimony. The appellate court must uphold the trial court's findings if supported by substantial evidence and affirm the trial court's determination of the search's reasonableness under constitutional standards. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that the informant was reliable, and that Deputy Busick had both cause to detain the vehicle's occupants and probable cause to arrest them upon observing marijuana in the possession of one occupant. Additionally, the discovery of further marijuana and cocaine during the search provided further basis for probable cause.

The trial court correctly denied the appellant's motion to suppress evidence from a search and seizure. The court also ruled that if the appellant violates probation, he would serve 60 days in juvenile hall. The court declared the appellant a ward of the court under section 602, allowing him to remain at home but under the court's care and control. The appellant argued that this constituted an unlawful order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (e), which he claimed requires a supplemental petition for custody longer than 30 days. However, the court found that the statute permits the imposition of a specified custody period that is stayed pending compliance with probation conditions. The section’s requirement for a supplemental petition applies only to probation violation hearings, not original disposition hearings like the one in this case. Thus, the trial court did not err, and the judgment was affirmed.

The section applies only if information is provided confidentially to specific parties: law enforcement officers, representatives of relevant administrative agencies, or individuals for the purpose of transmitting information to those parties. There is no privilege preventing the informer from revealing their identity. In criminal proceedings, if a party requests disclosure of the informant's identity as a material witness, the court must conduct a hearing where all parties can present evidence, held outside the jury's presence. If privilege is claimed and the authorized person refuses to answer questions that could reveal the informant's identity, the prosecution may request an in camera hearing, which occurs without the defendant and their counsel present. During this hearing, the prosecution may present evidence regarding the informant's identity to help the court assess whether nondisclosure would jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial. A court reporter must be present, and all proceedings and evidence from this hearing are to be sealed, accessible only by the court. The court cannot order disclosure or dismiss proceedings based solely on the refusal to disclose the informant's identity unless it finds that nondisclosure could reasonably compromise the defendant's right to a fair trial based on evidence from both the public and in camera hearings.