Millbrae School District v. Superior Court

Citations: 209 Cal. App. 3d 1494; 261 Cal. Rptr. 409; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 285Docket: A044532

Court: California Court of Appeal; March 31, 1989; California; State Appellate Court

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The Millbrae School District and other educational entities challenged the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Millbrae Redevelopment Agency and the Millbrae City Council regarding a redevelopment project, which was dismissed for failing to adhere to the validating proceedings outlined in Code of Civil Procedure sections 860-870. The petitioners argued that section 869 does not prohibit public agencies from raising challenges outside these proceedings, but the court disagreed with this interpretation. However, the court granted the petitioners' request for relief due to 'good cause' for not meeting the procedural requirements. The dismissal occurred after the redevelopment agency moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of improper service of summons. Following the dismissal, the petitioners sought to vacate the order and were denied. While the court typically refrains from writs when an appeal is available, it found the appeal insufficient in this case due to potential mootness and the need for a timely resolution of the public agency's actions. The court emphasized the importance of speedy validation procedures and highlighted key sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant to validating proceedings, including section 860, which allows public agencies to file actions to determine the validity of matters within 60 days, and Health and Safety Code section 33501, which authorizes validating proceedings for redevelopment plans and bonds.

A validating proceeding is distinct from traditional actions against public agency decisions, being an in rem action with binding effects on the agency and all interested parties. To fulfill due process, Section 861 allows for jurisdiction over interested parties through publication of summons in a designated newspaper and any additional notice ordered by the court. If the public agency or interested parties do not comply with validating proceeding requirements, Section 863 permits any interested person to initiate an action within specified timeframes to assess validity, with the public agency as a defendant. Failure to complete required publication and notification within 60 days will result in dismissal of the action unless good cause is shown.

Section 869, central to the dispute, states that only the public agency or its agents may contest matters under this chapter within the specified time and manner. It emphasizes that the remedy outlined does not prevent public agencies from utilizing mandamus or other means to determine validity. Petitioners' action was dismissed due to their failure to serve summons by publication within the 60-day limit. They argue that as public agencies, Section 869 allows them to challenge agency actions through a writ of mandate without adhering to validating proceeding requirements. The broad language of Section 869 appears to grant all public agencies the right to seek alternative remedies, diverging from the more restrictive language used in other sections. Historical examination reveals that Section 869 originally did not recognize alternative validating procedures, which was altered to include public agencies. This change raises questions about the interpretation and application of the section's provisions.

The validating statutes, initially adopted in 1961, were limited to specific public agencies and allowed these agencies to utilize alternative procedures to enforce or validate their decisions. However, in 1963, Government Code sections 53510 and 53511 significantly broadened the scope of these statutes, allowing any public agency, including counties, cities, and public authorities, to use validating procedures. This change was accompanied by an amendment to section 869, which clarified that the expanded validating procedures did not grant third-party public agencies the right to challenge the actions of other agencies outside of these procedures. 

The court rejected the petitioners' argument that the amendment exempted them from complying with validating statutes when challenging other agencies, emphasizing that such a reading would undermine the purpose of the statutes. The court noted that previous cases did not address the requirement for third-party agencies to follow validating procedures. 

The court also reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the petitioners' claim of 'good cause' for failing to comply with a 60-day service requirement. It found that the ambiguity of section 869 justified a reasonable misunderstanding by the petitioners' counsel, which constituted good cause under the statute. Consequently, the court ruled that the trial court erred and issued a peremptory writ of mandate, instructing it to allow the petitioners relief from their failure to meet the service deadline. The petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied on June 21, 1989.