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Floyd v. City of New York
Citations: 813 F. Supp. 2d 417; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99129; 2011 WL 3856515Docket: 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)
Court: District Court, S.D. New York; August 31, 2011; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs David Floyd, Lalit Clarkson, Deon Dennis, and David Ourlicht filed a class action against the City of New York, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and various NYPD officers, alleging unconstitutional stops and frisks based on race and national origin. They claim this conduct violates Section 1983 of the U.S. Code, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and relevant New York laws. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that these practices are unconstitutional, a class-wide injunction against their continuation, and compensatory and punitive damages for themselves. The case highlights broader public concerns about racial disparities in the criminal justice system, specifically the disproportionate impact on African-Americans and Latinos relative to Caucasians. While the plaintiffs focus on patterns of suspicionless, race-based stops, they acknowledge the historical context of racial inequities in law enforcement. The issue of racial profiling has gained attention, with a consensus that it is unconstitutional, yet solutions remain complex. Since the mid-1990s, New York City has seen a significant drop in crime rates, attributed variously to policing strategies based on the 'broken windows' theory or broader economic trends. Nonetheless, the city’s policies have resulted in nearly 600,000 pedestrian stops annually, with a notable racial disparity in those affected, although the extent and reasons for this disparity are contested. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on certain claims, raising critical legal questions regarding the constitutionality of the NYPD's practices. The City attributes a decline in crime to its "pre-emptive" policing strategies and high stop rates, while plaintiffs contend that these practices disproportionately target African-American and Latino men, leading to unjust stops, questioning, and frisks based largely on race. This is not the first instance of racial profiling allegations against New York City; a previous case, Daniels v. City of New York, resulted in a settlement mandating the adoption of measures to mitigate racial disparities in stops and frisks, including the implementation of a Racial Profiling Policy and regular audits of documentation forms. Despite these measures, plaintiffs argue that the City's efforts are insufficient, constituting a pattern of unconstitutional stops and an indifference to necessary training and supervision. This situation raises concerns of municipal liability, as the NYPD routinely faces decisions regarding the justification of stops based on reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court's ruling in Terry v. Ohio highlights the significant intrusion that a stop and frisk entails, making the widespread practice, especially when lacking reasonable suspicion, particularly troubling. The motion for summary judgment by the defendants is considered within this context. The plaintiffs assert individual claims regarding specific incidents of unjust stops, with challenges to the validity of these claims, especially concerning two incidents involving named plaintiffs. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that the NYPD's practices violate the Fourth Amendment by using race as a primary factor in stops, and infringe upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, primarily affecting African-American and Latino males. Plaintiffs assert that constitutional violations stem from policies and practices set by the City, Commissioner Kelly, and Mayor Bloomberg, who they claim acted with deliberate indifference in several areas: failing to adequately screen, train, and supervise NYPD officers; insufficiently monitoring officers' stop and frisk practices; neglecting to discipline officers for constitutional abuses; and endorsing the NYPD's unconstitutional behaviors. In a specific incident on February 27, 2008, Floyd, an African-American man, was approached by NYPD officers while attempting to help a basement tenant access his locked apartment. Floyd was retrieving keys from his bag when Officers Joyce, Hernandez, and Sergeant Kelly intervened, frisked him, and questioned both men about their actions. Officer Joyce justified the stop by claiming he suspected Floyd was involved in burglary, citing Floyd's behavior of fiddling with the doorknob and looking around nervously, paralleling a pattern of neighborhood burglaries. Joyce documented the encounter on a UF250 form, noting Floyd's movements and the absence of physical force but did not categorize the area as having a high incidence of the reported offense. Officer Hernandez corroborated the suspicion of burglary based on Floyd's actions and the presence of multiple keys, which he claimed resembled a makeshift key ring. Sergeant Kelly observed two men acting suspiciously near a door and lock, leading him to suspect a burglary due to a known pattern in the area. He noted one man holding an extensive keychain, which heightened his suspicion that they might be attempting to enter a property illegally and possibly armed. Although he completed a UF250 form for the encounter, he did not document it in his memo book. While Kelly and his fellow officers claimed they were unaware of any quotas for stops or arrests, other NYPD officers testified to receiving directives to meet specific quotas, corroborated by audio recordings of precinct commanders. A labor grievance was filed in 2004 regarding officers being transferred for not meeting a ten summons-per-month quota, and in 2006, an arbitrator ruled against the 75th precinct's enforcement of such quotas as unlawful under state labor laws. Officer Adhyl Polanco testified about illegal stops and searches of minority residents at the 41st Precinct, noting he was instructed to complete UF250 forms for non-existent encounters and issue summonses without probable cause, admitting to issuing at least ten summonses without justification. In a separate incident in June 2008, David Ourlicht, of mixed African-American and Italian descent, described an encounter with police while sitting with friends outside a public housing complex in Harlem. Police officers, responding to a report of a gun, ordered the group to lie on the ground and conducted searches, lifting the men by their belts and checking their pockets. After approximately ten minutes, the officers allowed them to stand and requested their identification before entering a nearby building. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that the police received reports of a gun near Ourlicht on June 6 or June 9, 2008, or that a gun was recovered from that area. Ourlicht testified that all police officers present were White men in dark blue uniforms with NYPD patches. In a photo array on August 24, 2009, Ourlicht reviewed 402 photographs and identified eleven officers he believed were present during the incident, but only one, Sergeant Gordon Pekusic, was assigned to PSA 5 at that time. Pekusic did not document his presence at the incident in his memo book and served as the desk sergeant on June 9, 2008. Plaintiffs argue that the absence of documentation does not preclude desk officers from participating in law enforcement activities. The other identified officers were either not with the NYPD or not assigned to PSA 5 during the incident. Further, in a January 12, 2010 photo array, Ourlicht identified Officers Campos, Kennedy, Mifsud, and Pekusic as possibly involved. Van 9466, which Ourlicht claimed was used by some officers, was assigned to PSA 5; however, records show Officers Negron, Delgado, and Goris were operating the van on truancy patrol during the relevant times on June 6, 2008, while Officers Crawford and Socorro had the van at Bellevue Hospital and subsequently at the 7th Precinct on June 9, 2008. Ourlicht did not recognize any officers assigned to Van 9466 in the photo array. Plaintiffs noted that the Van Assignment Sheet and roll call for June 6, 2008, did not clarify which officers were assigned to the van. The NYPD's Racial Profiling Policy, implemented as part of a settlement in Daniels v. City of New York, prohibits using race, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a determining factor in law enforcement actions, though these factors can be used for suspect identification. The policy mandates self-inspections by commanding officers and audits by the Quality Assurance Division to ensure compliance. In summary judgment proceedings, defendants presented evidence of NYPD policies concerning training, monitoring, supervision, and discipline to counter claims of municipal liability for constitutional violations. Plaintiffs contended that, while these policies exist, actual NYPD practices do not meet the stated objectives. Plaintiffs challenge the defendants’ claims regarding the NYPD's training policies and practices, presenting conflicting testimonies from officers. For each officer cited by defendants as evidence of policy awareness, plaintiffs offer counter-testimony from another officer unfamiliar with those policies. While defendants provide extensive training materials to support the sufficiency of NYPD training, plaintiffs argue that these materials do not reflect actual training practices, as several officers reported not seeing or being instructed on the provided documents during their training. Defendants assert that training covers essential topics, like reasonable suspicion and racial profiling, citing various officers' testimonies. However, plaintiffs counter that many of these officers cannot adequately explain reasonable suspicion or lack familiarity with the Racial Profiling Policy. Additionally, while defendants claim officers are instructed to document their activities in logs, plaintiffs argue that this is not consistently practiced, supported by testimonies indicating officers do not remember such requirements. Overall, there are significant factual disputes regarding the effectiveness of the NYPD's training, monitoring, and disciplinary practices in relation to constitutional standards for stops and frisks under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants claim that NYPD officers receive ongoing training on stop-and-frisk (SQF) procedures throughout their careers, including specific training for those assigned to Operation Impact and specialized units. However, plaintiffs argue, supported by officer testimonies, that post-Academy training on SQF procedures is lacking, and many officers do not recall receiving relevant training during plainclothes assignments. Defendants also assert that newly promoted sergeants and lieutenants receive promotional training covering SQF and reasonable suspicion, while plaintiffs maintain that this training is insufficient or nonexistent. Regarding monitoring, defendants state that the NYPD's annual Quality Assurance Division (QAD) audits assess compliance with the Racial Profiling Policy and evaluate Stop, Question, and Frisk practices. In contrast, plaintiffs argue that the audits do not genuinely assess whether stops are based on reasonable suspicion, citing testimony indicating the audits focus primarily on the completion of UF250 forms. While defendants assert that specific worksheets guide evaluations of UF250 form quality and compliance, plaintiffs counter that these worksheets do not evaluate the basis of reasonable suspicion or overall compliance with the Racial Profiling Policy. Additionally, plaintiffs highlight that QAD practices have not consistently enforced detailed reporting requirements for activity logs corresponding to UF250 forms, and assert that the monthly command self-inspections have limited effectiveness in evaluating compliance with the policy. Defendants argue that the 802A self-inspection process effectively tests an officer's capacity to establish reasonable suspicion for stops. In contrast, plaintiffs claim that the review of the UF250 form is inadequate for assessing the legitimacy of police stops and frisks. Defendants maintain that the checkmarks on the UF250 provide sufficient justification for a stop, while QAD audits the self-inspections of 136 commands/units. From 2006 to 2009, 43 commands received unsatisfactory ratings for various deficiencies, particularly in activity log entries, with citywide scores remaining low throughout this period. Defendants assert that commands were directed to correct deficiencies as noted, while plaintiffs argue that corrective actions were not mandated for commands with overall satisfactory ratings despite deficiencies in activity logs. In 2008, the QAD introduced Worksheet 803 to enhance compliance with activity log entry requirements, requiring a review of UF250 forms to ensure proper documentation of stops. However, plaintiffs contend that NYPD practices allow for minimal detail in activity logs to achieve satisfactory ratings. Additionally, both parties dispute the sufficiency of NYPD oversight and the extent of racial disparities in stop and frisk practices, referencing a 2007 RAND study on racial disparities in these policies. Plaintiffs submitted an expert report by Professor Jeffrey Fagan, highlighting significant racial disparities in the NYPD's stop and frisk practices. In 2006, 89% of pedestrian stops involved people of color, broken down into 53% Black, 29% Hispanic, 11% White, and 3% Asian, with 4% of stops having an unknown race. The report also noted that 45% of Black and Hispanic suspects were frisked compared to 29% of White suspects, although White suspects were 70% more likely to possess a weapon when frisked. Defendants referenced the RAND Report, which suggested that the racial disparities are less severe than the raw statistics imply, advocating against major changes to NYPD policies but acknowledging the need for monitoring. RAND employed various benchmarks for analysis, ultimately favoring the crime suspect benchmark, which indicated that Black pedestrians were stopped 20-30% less than their crime suspect representation, while Hispanic pedestrians were stopped 5-10% more. In contrast, using the residential census benchmark, Black pedestrians were stopped 50% more than their residential representation, and Hispanic pedestrians aligned with their census representation. The arrest benchmark showed Black pedestrians were stopped in line with their arrestee representation, while Hispanic suspects were stopped slightly more (6%). RAND's internal benchmark method was critiqued for potentially overlooking precinct-wide bias. Fagan's report contested RAND's findings, asserting that the NYPD's stop practices disproportionately affected Black and Latino residents and were concentrated in areas with high populations of these groups, demonstrating that racial demographics influenced stop patterns even after factoring in crime rates, social conditions, and police resource allocation. Fagan highlights significant racial disparities in NYPD stop practices, noting that Black and Hispanic individuals are stopped more frequently than White individuals, even in low-crime areas and racially diverse neighborhoods. He asserts that 6.71% of discretionary stops lack legal justification, while 24.37% lack adequate documentation to evaluate their legality. Fagan indicates that nearly half of all stops are justified by constitutionally questionable reasons, such as "furtive movements" and proximity to high-crime areas, with the latter cited as an additional reason in over half of all stops, irrespective of actual precinct crime rates. He points out that arrests occur in under 6% of stops, a figure lower than those seen in random checkpoints in related lawsuits. Furthermore, Black and Hispanic suspects face a higher likelihood of arrest instead of receiving summonses and are more often subjected to the use of force compared to White suspects. Fagan critiques the RAND Report's methodology, arguing that its reliance on suspect race from violent felony complaints is problematic due to the low percentage of violent crimes relative to total crimes and the high rate of unknown suspect races in complaints. He also criticizes RAND's use of a non-representative officer sample, which he believes cannot reliably represent the broader universe of stops. Additionally, he argues that RAND's assumptions regarding bias and its approach to analyzing post-stop outcomes are flawed, suggesting that it underrepresents the racial disparities in outcomes such as frisks and the use of force. The legal standard for summary judgment is outlined, indicating that it is applicable when no genuine dispute exists regarding material facts, and the movant is legally entitled to judgment. An issue is considered genuine if a reasonable jury could favor the nonmoving party, and a material fact is one that could influence the suit's outcome based on governing law. The burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine material fact. The burden of proof typically falls on the nonmoving party at trial, requiring the movant to demonstrate a lack of evidence for an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. To successfully contest a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact, which cannot be accomplished through mere speculation or conclusory statements. Courts must view facts favorably towards the nonmoving party, resolving ambiguities against the movant, while recognizing that credibility and evidence weighing are jury responsibilities. The court's role is limited to determining if factual issues exist for trial. In terms of law enforcement, police may conduct a Terry stop—briefly detaining a person for investigation—if they possess reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, even without probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause and requires objective justification beyond mere hunches. Although an officer's subjective motives are not relevant, a combination of seemingly innocent acts can collectively warrant further investigation. Mere presence in a high-crime area does not suffice for reasonable suspicion, but such context is a factor in the analysis. Courts assess the totality of circumstances to determine if there is a particularized basis for suspecting wrongdoing. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 allows individuals to sue for the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, stating that any person acting under state authority who subjects others to such deprivation is liable. Section 1983 does not establish new federal rights but serves as a means to enforce existing rights. Section 1983 aims to prevent state actors from abusing their authority to violate federally protected rights and to offer remedies for victims when deterrence fails. Liability under this section necessitates direct involvement of the defendant in causing the alleged harm, as vicarious liability is not applicable; plaintiffs must demonstrate that each government official defendant, through their individual actions, violated the Constitution. For a plaintiff to hold a municipality liable under section 1983, they must prove that the harm resulted from an established municipal "policy, custom, or practice." A municipality cannot be deemed liable solely based on the wrongful acts of its employees. Additionally, a single instance of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee does not establish a policy or custom. The requirement for an "official policy" is designed to differentiate municipal actions from those of individual employees, thus ensuring municipal liability is based on actions for which the municipality is actually accountable. The Supreme Court has clarified that it is insufficient for a plaintiff to merely attribute conduct to the municipality; they must show that the municipality was the "moving force" behind the alleged injury through its deliberate actions, establishing a direct causal link to the deprivation of federal rights. In the absence of a documented policy, a plaintiff can demonstrate that the discriminatory practices of municipal officials are so entrenched as to be considered a "custom or usage" with legal force, or that subordinate employees’ practices imply senior officials' tacit approval. Municipal liability may also arise from a failure to adequately train employees, which can indicate deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. The Second Circuit outlines three criteria for establishing that a municipality's failure to train or supervise reflects such indifference: (1) a policymaker's awareness that employees will face a specific situation; (2) the situation must present a challenging choice that training could alleviate or show a history of mishandling; and (3) this mishandling must frequently result in constitutional rights violations. A duty to train exists to help employees differentiate between lawful and unlawful actions, and recognizing specific training needs may only occur after observing a pattern of similar violations. The burden of proof is significant in demonstrating that a municipality's response was grossly inadequate, amounting to deliberate indifference. Inadequate governmental action must stem from a conscious choice among options rather than negligence. Government officials performing discretionary functions are typically granted qualified immunity unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. When a defendant claims qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, courts follow a two-part analysis: first, whether the facts indicate a constitutional violation, and second, whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. The determination of whether a right is clearly established hinges on whether a reasonable officer would recognize their conduct as unlawful in the given circumstances. The objective reasonableness standard is satisfied if reasonable officers could disagree on the legality of the conduct. If no reasonable officer would see the actions as lawful, immunity does not apply. The inquiry into objective reasonableness is integral to the clearly established rights analysis. Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is inappropriate when material facts are disputed regarding reasonableness. In the context of the February 2008 incident involving Floyd, summary judgment was granted to the defendants regarding Floyd's Fourth Amendment claim. The officers testified their suspicion of Floyd stemmed from a recent pattern of midday burglaries in the area and Floyd's and his neighbor's suspicious behaviors, such as "furtive movements" near a basement door. The existence of the burglary pattern was uncontested, and all officers acknowledged awareness of it. Although Officer Joyce failed to check a specific box on the UF250 form related to the area having a high incidence of crime, he did check relevant boxes that aligned with the ongoing burglary investigation. This choice did not create a material factual dispute. However, the mere existence of a burglary pattern was deemed insufficient for reasonable suspicion, necessitating further evaluation of the alleged "furtive movements." Floyd and his neighbor's demeanor while attempting to unlock a door is a key disputed fact, with Floyd claiming he was unaware of the officers' approach until they were near him. Whether Floyd was nervously looking back or appeared suspicious is unresolved. Both parties agree that Floyd and his neighbor were trying to unlock the door, but their descriptions differ; Floyd described using several keys, while officers noted the men were "jostling" with the lock. This behavior could suggest either criminal intent or innocent actions, and thus does not inherently render the stop unconstitutional. Officers observed either Floyd or his neighbor holding a key ring, with discrepancies over the number of keys—Floyd claims seven to ten, while officers estimate up to fifty. This difference requires credibility assessment. Despite the disputed facts, the officers' reasonable suspicion was justified by their observations, including a recognized pattern of midday burglaries in the area. Consequently, the officers were permitted to conduct a brief investigatory stop, and due to their suspicion of a violent crime, they were also justified in frisking the men for safety. Floyd alleges that officers conducted a search of his pockets post-frisk, yet there is no evidence indicating that the officers felt any weapons or contraband during the frisk. Additionally, it was noted that no search was recorded in the UF250 form. The legality of the alleged search remains a material disputed issue. Summary judgment is granted to defendants on Floyd's Fourth Amendment claim, with the exception of the issue regarding the alleged unconstitutional search of his pockets, which can proceed as a section 1983 claim due to the lack of probable cause. The court finds that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, as material facts are disputed that could influence the assessment of the officers' actions' reasonableness. The court cites that a reasonable jury may conclude that the search violated established Fourth Amendment rights requiring probable cause. For Floyd's Equal Protection claim related to the February 2008 incident, summary judgment is also granted to defendants since the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Floyd, indicating race was not the determining factor. Regarding the June 2008 incident involving Ourlicht, summary judgment is denied for his Fourth Amendment claim. Defendants argued that no individualized suspicion was necessary due to an emergency report of a gun nearby; however, the court found no evidence supporting that the officers were responding to such a report. It emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment mandates reasonable individualized suspicion before a stop and frisk. Additionally, there is a factual dispute over whether the officers involved were NYPD, as defendants contest Ourlicht's ability to substantiate that claim, citing discrepancies in officer assignments and activity logs. Defendants contend that Ourlicht cannot meet the burden of proof regarding the involvement of NYPD officers in his stop. However, the arguments raised highlight a triable issue of fact regarding whether NYPD officers conducted the stop. Ourlicht identified a van number linked to the command where the incident occurred, and two officers noted in their memo books that they were near the stop at the relevant time. Additionally, while Ourlicht indicated other officers, their exact locations remain unclear. A reasonable jury could infer from the evidence presented that NYPD officers were responsible for the stop, regardless of whether an officer was specifically identified. The court emphasizes that resolving this matter requires a credibility assessment, which is inappropriate during a summary judgment motion. Defendants are denied qualified immunity on Ourlicht's Fourth Amendment claim due to disputed material facts affecting the assessment of the officers' actions' reasonableness. A jury could find the officers' behavior objectively unreasonable, given established legal standards regarding stops and frisks in New York, which necessitate individualized reasonable suspicion. It is also acknowledged that the officers searched Ourlicht without probable cause, leading to a denial of summary judgment for this claim. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, summary judgment is similarly denied, as a reasonable jury could determine that Ourlicht's stop was unconstitutional and possibly racially motivated, particularly in light of documented racial disparities in stop-and-frisk practices that cannot be attributed to chance or crime patterns. For the Monell claims against the City, the court notes that while there is no written policy permitting suspicionless stops and frisks, the focus is on whether there is a widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that implies the acquiescence of senior officials. The court accepts the Fagan Report's findings for the purpose of this motion, which suggests that a significant percentage of recorded stops lacked adequate documentation to assess their legality, indicating potential widespread unconstitutional practices. Thus, there are disputed issues of fact concerning the City's acquiescence in such practices. Defendants contend that the Fagan Report fails to establish a material fact regarding a widespread custom, asserting that nearly 70% of stops from 2004-2009 are constitutionally valid. However, the remaining 30% raises sufficient concern to suggest a widespread custom. Defendants challenge the 6% figure, claiming it stems from incomplete documentation rather than substantive issues, but this oversimplifies Fagan's thorough analysis, which categorized stops into justified, unjustified, and indeterminate categories. Fagan's finding that 31% of stops lack legal sufficiency indicates a flawed monitoring system within the NYPD, countering the argument of adequate oversight based on UF250 completions. Despite potential flaws in Fagan's analysis, his rigorous approach and statistical support lend credibility to the plaintiffs' claims, creating a genuine dispute over the NYPD's practices regarding suspicionless stops and frisks. Additionally, plaintiffs allege a separate widespread practice of illegal quotas for stop and frisk, summons, and arrests imposed by NYPD supervisors, with evidence suggesting that high-level officials were aware and encouraged these quotas. Defendants argue the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of quotas or their link to constitutional violations, but plaintiffs have provided evidence of numerical expectations and pressure for increased enforcement, showing that such quotas are relevant to their claims. Defendants presented testimony from various officers and supervisors denying knowledge of any quotas for stops and frisks. In contrast, plaintiffs provided testimonies from other officers confirming the existence of such quotas, along with audio recordings from roll call meetings where these quotas were discussed. Additionally, a 2006 labor arbitrator's ruling found that quotas were imposed in one precinct, which alerted NYPD leadership to their existence. Plaintiffs argue that circumstantial evidence, including roll call recordings and statistical data, supports their claim that these quotas have led to a pattern of suspicionless stops. The court finds there is a triable issue regarding whether NYPD supervisors have a custom of enforcing quotas that contribute to these stops, denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claims. Regarding Equal Protection claims, plaintiffs assert that race is a determining factor in stop decisions, although they do not claim that the City has a formal policy of racially-based stops. The court is not convinced that plaintiffs have demonstrated an express racial classification, emphasizing the lack of evidence for a policy treating individuals differently based on race. However, there are factual disputes about whether a pattern exists where race, rather than reasonable suspicion, is the primary factor in stops. Defendants challenge the reliability of the Fagan Report, which indicates racial disparities in stop rates, but the court declines to dismiss the report at this stage, highlighting that the issues raised will need to be resolved by a jury. He has effectively addressed the City's criticisms of his report, justifying his methodological choices and critiques of the RAND Report. The defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims of equal protection deprivation concerning the NYPD's deployment to predominantly African-American and Latino neighborhoods lack merit, asserting legitimate law enforcement purposes behind these deployments and denying any discriminatory motive. In contrast, plaintiffs clarify that their challenge pertains not to the resource allocation but to the stop-and-frisk practices occurring in those neighborhoods. They allege that the NYPD systematically targets Black and Hispanic communities based on racial composition, resulting in unconstitutional stops based on race. The plaintiffs reference the Fagan Report, which indicates that racial composition predicts stop patterns beyond crime-related factors, highlighting that, despite increased officer presence in high-crime areas, African-Americans and Latinos are stopped disproportionately compared to Whites. This statistical evidence creates a disputed material fact regarding the disparate impact of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policies. Furthermore, plaintiffs use the statistical disparities not only to demonstrate disparate impact but also to argue for evidence of discriminatory intent. They cite the NYPD's awareness of historical racial disparities and its insufficient corrective actions as indicative of discriminatory purpose. The plaintiffs also highlight the City's non-compliance with the Daniels settlement and its failure to fully implement its Racial Profiling Policy as evidence of discriminatory intent, along with its refusal to adopt certain RAND Report recommendations. Defendants counter that plaintiffs have not established a discriminatory purpose by City decision-makers or proved that the deployment policy caused their alleged injuries. They contend that only extreme statistical disparities, akin to those in landmark cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, could demonstrate discriminatory intent. Defendants assert full compliance with the Daniels settlement, implementation of their Racial Profiling Policy, and adoption of many RAND Report suggestions. Plaintiffs have not provided legal authority to support their claim that the NYPD was obligated to implement all recommendations from RAND, which were not aimed at addressing unconstitutional conduct. They argue that, despite some changes made by the defendants, these changes were not effectively or comprehensively executed. For their Equal Protection claim, while the statistical evidence indicates a disparate impact, it may not sufficiently demonstrate discriminatory intent on its own. However, plaintiffs also present additional evidence highlighting the City's inadequate remedial efforts to address racial disparities in stops. Viewing the evidence favorably for the plaintiffs, the failure of the City's corrective actions raises an inference of intentional discrimination being a standard practice, leading to the denial of the defendants' summary judgment motion on these claims. Regarding allegations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, plaintiffs assert that defendants exhibited deliberate indifference through inadequate training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline, resulting in widespread constitutional violations. Defendants counter that the City maintains a comprehensive oversight system for the constitutionality of police stops. They argue that even if suspicionless stops are common, this does not equate to deliberate indifference since systems are in place to address policy deviations. Plaintiffs counter that there is a significant disparity between the City's policies and actual practices, supported by officer testimonies. Defendants claim that a lack of specific training recollection does not indicate a lack of training overall. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to dispute this claim, particularly regarding the adequacy of racial profiling training, which many officers do not recall receiving. Many NYPD officers claimed ignorance of the Department's Racial Profiling Policy, with some stating that they do not engage in racial profiling, defined as judging individuals by race or appearance. Notably, senior officials like Inspector Dwayne Montgomery and Deputy Commissioner Julie L. Schwartz were unaware of this policy. Evidence presented by plaintiffs indicates that racial profiling was not discussed during CompStat meetings, which is a violation of departmental mandates. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding officers' training on reasonable suspicion and stop-and-frisk procedures. While some officers could recite a basic definition of reasonable suspicion, they struggled to apply it to specific situations, potentially due to the questioning style used. Deputy Commissioner Schwartz expressed uncertainty about the clarity of search and seizure laws under the precedent set by DeBour, highlighting a lack of understanding among high-ranking officials about constitutional mandates concerning stops and frisks. This raises concerns over the effectiveness of the NYPD's disciplinary practices related to the Racial Profiling Policy. The complexity of racial profiling extends beyond superficial judgments, as psychological studies indicate that perceptions influenced by race can affect crime interpretation. Plaintiffs argue that the NYPD's training and supervisory measures on racial profiling and reasonable suspicion are inadequate, pointing out that the review processes for stop reports (UF250s) are superficial, which compromises constitutional compliance. Defendants contend that UF250 forms are designed to gather the necessary information to assess the constitutionality of stops. The audit establishes that a UF250 form with appropriate checkmarks validates a stop, barring contrary evidence on the form. However, plaintiffs argue that relying solely on these forms fails to establish the constitutionality of stops without additional context, such as officer notes. They assert that the Quality Assurance Division (QAD) audits reveal deficiencies that the Department inadequately addresses through disciplinary actions. Furthermore, a study by Fagan indicates that a considerable number of UF250 forms are improperly completed. This evidence suggests a potential issue of fact regarding the City's alleged deliberate indifference to the proper training and oversight of police officers, leading to unwarranted and racially biased stops. Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims of insufficient training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline against the City is denied. Regarding plaintiffs' Title VI claims, the legal standard parallels that of Equal Protection claims, thus the defendants' motion for summary judgment on these claims is also denied for similar reasons. However, the plaintiffs did not contest the motion for summary judgment concerning claims against Mayor Bloomberg and NYPD Commissioner Kelly, resulting in the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on those claims. In conclusion, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is partially granted and partially denied, with further proceedings scheduled. In 1995, murder rates decreased by 33.9%, from 1,181 to 1,582, and in 2009, the number of murders fell to 471, the lowest since 1964. Since 2003, overall crime has dropped by approximately 76%. The document includes references to various legal reports and memoranda, highlighting opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties involved use terms such as Black/African-American, Hispanic/Latino, and White/Caucasian interchangeably. The excerpt cites numerous depositions of NYPD officers, indicating discussions about enforcement activity levels and the perception of insufficient law enforcement actions in particular precincts, as noted by high-ranking officials within the NYPD. Specific details from depositions and supplemental reports support the claims made by the plaintiffs regarding law enforcement practices and statistical crime data. The document contains references to various Bates-numbered exhibits and testimonies related to an incident involving the NYPD, specifically focusing on the events that occurred around June 6 or June 9, 2008. The parties have not reached a consensus on the exact date of the incident. Multiple citations to depositions and testimonies, particularly from individuals including David Ourlicht and NYPD Officer Victor Marrero, highlight differing accounts concerning the officers' conduct during the incident, including whether officers had their weapons drawn and the treatment of individuals present. Jurisdiction over the incident falls under PSA 5, the NYPD command responsible for the location. The document also touches on the lack of defendants' presence during certain procedures, such as a photo array. Additionally, it references the NYPD's Racial Profiling Policy and the CompStat system, which maps crime data to identify high-crime areas. The parties acknowledge that the terms "stop and frisk," "stop, question, and frisk," and "SQF" are used interchangeably throughout the document. The defendants emphasize their formal policies while not adequately disputing the plaintiffs' evidence regarding the NYPD's enforcement practices, which include the alleged pressure for increased stops and summonses contributing to unconstitutional practices. The document references various testimonies and depositions from multiple individuals, including Joyce, Moran, Salmeron, and Lieutenant Albano, as part of the evidentiary basis for the case. Specific citations indicate the inclusion of deposition transcripts, training materials, and audit protocols related to the NYPD's practices. The excerpts note the significance of supervisor reviews on forms such as the UF250 and the activity log (memo book). Plaintiffs challenge the defendants' interpretations of the testimony by pointing out inconsistencies and omissions in the defendants' arguments. The document also highlights the procedural aspects of self-inspections, emphasizing the need for thorough documentation on encounters classified as Level III. Overall, the text illustrates the extensive reliance on witness statements and procedural guidelines in the context of the legal arguments presented. The document addresses the inspection process related to a specific procedural form, 802-A, and the associated evidence in the case. It references multiple submissions and claims from both plaintiffs and defendants, highlighting disputes over the reliability and admissibility of certain expert reports, particularly those by Professor Jeffrey Fagan and the Attorney General's report. Defendants argue against relying on these reports without first addressing their Daubert challenge concerning the scientific reliability of Fagan's methods. However, the court indicates that all three reports, including the RAND Report, are accepted for the limited purpose of demonstrating the existence of disputed factual issues, despite not meeting the Daubert standard at this time. The court expresses skepticism about the likelihood of Fagan's report being deemed insufficiently reliable in future challenges. The excerpt also includes citations to various legal precedents and rules governing the summary judgment process. In Brod v. Omya, Inc., the Second Circuit references multiple precedents to outline the legal standards regarding police intrusion and the requirements for establishing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Key points include: 1. **Police Intrusion Standards**: The justifications for various levels of police intrusion are derived from New York law, specifically the case of People v. DeBour, which sets forth a framework for assessing police conduct. 2. **Constitutional Precedents**: The excerpt cites landmark Supreme Court cases, including Terry v. Ohio and Illinois v. Wardlow, which address the thresholds for lawful police stops and searches. These cases emphasize the necessity of reasonable suspicion based on specific facts. 3. **Municipal Liability under § 1983**: The document explains that § 1983 does not independently provide protection; rather, to claim a violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged harm, referencing Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. 4. **Liability Criteria**: It is emphasized that the misconduct of a single low-level officer cannot suffice to establish municipal liability, highlighting the need for a direct connection between the municipality's policies and the plaintiff's injury. 5. **Judicial Interpretations**: The excerpt also discusses various judicial interpretations regarding the scope of municipal liability, including the necessity for showing that the municipality was directly responsible for the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Overall, the legal standards articulated encompass both the constitutional protections against unlawful police actions and the stringent requirements for holding municipalities accountable for civil rights violations. The excerpt addresses various legal precedents related to qualified immunity and the standards for lawful stops and frisks by law enforcement in the Second Circuit. It references multiple cases, including Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dept., Green v. City of N.Y., Patterson v. County of Oneida, and others, establishing the framework for evaluating qualified immunity as either a two-step or a three-part process, with commentary on inconsistencies in descriptions of this analysis. Key points include: 1. **Qualified Immunity Analysis**: Courts are not bound to a specific order in the two-step inquiry established by *Pearson*, though the traditional sequence is often more suitable. The analysis may also incorporate an evaluation of objective reasonableness. 2. **Legal Standards for Stops and Frisks**: Referring to *Wardlow* and *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, it emphasizes that mere presence in a high-crime area does not justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A Terry stop requires specific, articulable facts and cannot rely solely on general criminal activity in the area. 3. **Monell Claims**: The document notes that certain claims related to unconstitutional stops and frisks remain unchallenged by defendants, indicating potential grounds for further legal consideration. 4. **Scope of Terry Exception**: The excerpt highlights that the Terry exception for stops does not allow for frisks without reasonable suspicion directed specifically at the individual being frisked, citing relevant case law. Overall, the excerpt synthesizes critical legal standards and case law relevant to qualified immunity, the legality of police stops, and the necessary conditions for frisks, providing a comprehensive view of the current legal landscape in this area. Key points include the classification of police stops based on the justification for those stops, as outlined by Fagan. Stops may be justified under different conditions: (1) solely justified if circumstances alone warrant the stop (e.g., casing, drug transactions); (2) conditionally justified if additional circumstances are present (e.g., suspicious behavior, fitting a suspect description); (3) unjustified if based solely on presence in high crime areas; (4) of indeterminate legality if only conditionally justified circumstances are present without further context; and (5) of indeterminate legality if only "other circumstances" are cited. The Dennis Report suggests that a significant percentage (24.37%) of stops deemed indeterminate should be discarded or redistributed, a move Fagan criticizes due to potential selection bias, particularly as such stops disproportionately involve Black suspects. Fagan highlights that stops are more frequently classified as indeterminate in precincts with higher Black populations, and that certain crime-related stops are less likely to be deemed indeterminate. Fagan notes that a majority of stops are based on factors such as being in a high crime area or exhibiting furtive movements, which alone do not meet the standard for reasonable suspicion but could when combined. He also critiques the "hit rate" of stops resulting in arrests during 2004-2009, suggesting it is lower than that of random vehicle checkpoints, emphasizing that different legal standards govern stops and arrests. Finally, the excerpt mentions the Supreme Court's acceptance of multivariate regressions as valid statistical methods to demonstrate racial discrimination in civil rights cases. In Fagan's Supplemental Report, several significant concerns regarding the reliability of UF250 stop-and-frisk data are raised. He notes an increasing tendency among officers to justify stops with vague or subjective circumstances, suggesting a decline in their sensitivity to accurately match real situations with available categories. Fagan also highlights that officers are less frequently identifying specific crimes when conducting stops, often omitting any crime or citing non-specific categories. Additionally, the use of subjective circumstances in stops has increased, indicating a potential development of a "narrative or script of suspicion." Fagan points out that many stop-and-frisk activities occur in Operation Impact zones, primarily conducted by inexperienced officers recently graduated from the Academy, who lack sufficient mentorship from seasoned colleagues. The document also references testimony indicating performance pressures on officers to achieve certain quotas of UF250s, with repercussions for failing to meet these expectations. Furthermore, analysis from a RAND study is critiqued for downplaying significant racial differences in stop outcomes while focusing on broader nonwhite versus white comparisons, which obscure stark disparities. The report also inaccurately represents the magnitude of racial differences by conflating percentages and percentage points, affecting the interpretation of data on frisk rates among different racial groups. The nonwhite-white frisk rate difference is reported as being between 3 to 4 percentage points, translating to a 10 to 12 percent higher likelihood of being frisked for nonwhites, which is approximately three times greater than previously claimed. Fagan's analysis indicates that stop patterns are significantly influenced by the racial composition of neighborhoods, particularly the percentages of Black and Hispanic residents, rather than by observed crime rates or police resource allocation. This trend persists even in areas with low crime rates and diverse or predominantly White populations. Fagan concludes that Black and Latino individuals are more likely to be stopped than Whites across various contexts. Defendants have indicated challenges in identifying officers who disproportionately stop African-Americans and Latinos, despite acquiring recommended software to benchmark stop patterns. Additionally, there is skepticism regarding the effectiveness of self-inspections and audits related to the Racial Profiling Policy. Testimonies reveal a lack of awareness or access to the NYPD's Racial Profiling Policy among several officers and command staff. Stops and frisks in New York are governed by both case law and statutory law. A warrantless stop is permissible when an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity, whether felony or misdemeanor, as outlined in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1). Frisks are allowed when an officer reasonably suspects they are in danger of physical injury (Id. § 140.50(3)). Research cited indicates that the demeanor of both police and individuals significantly influences the outcomes of police-citizen interactions. A respectful exchange may lead to different treatment compared to a confrontational one. Data does not adequately capture the nuances of these interactions, leading to incomplete conclusions regarding racial disparities in stop outcomes. The potential for a cyclical pattern of suspicion and antagonism exists, where perceived disrespect may stem from prior experiences of disproportionate suspicion by police. Lastly, references to legal precedents clarify that the standards of discrimination applied in Title VI cases align with those under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.