Coe v. Davidson

Citations: 43 Cal. App. 3d 170; 117 Cal. Rptr. 630; 1974 Cal. App. LEXIS 1311Docket: Civ. 31851

Court: California Court of Appeal; November 18, 1974; California; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Two, is reviewing a case involving the Registrar of Voters of Alameda County, Rene C. Davidson, who appeals a judgment mandating him to accept the candidacies of plaintiffs Lee Coe and others for the Alameda County Central Committee without a loyalty oath. The plaintiffs submitted their candidacy declarations for the June 1972 primary election, but the Registrar refused them, claiming non-compliance with Elections Code section 6491 due to the removal of an oath asserting they were not affiliated with any organization attempting to overthrow the government. The superior court ruled that this part of the oath violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected the Registrar's proposal to amend the oath with a specific intent clause or to sever the unconstitutional portion, asserting it would constitute unlawful legislative action. Consequently, the court ordered the issuance of a writ of mandate for the Registrar to accept the modified declarations without the oath. Although the Registrar complied for the June 1972 primary, he appealed the judgment, particularly the court's refusal to amend the oath. The plaintiffs sought enforcement of the judgment during the appeal, which was initially denied but later granted by the California Supreme Court, requiring acceptance of the candidacies without the oath for the June 1974 primary. This case raises significant constitutional questions regarding the loyalty oath mandated by section 6491, distinguishing it from prior rulings, notably Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, which invalidated a similar oath.

The second portion of the loyalty oath regarding known membership is deemed constitutionally flawed, supported by precedents such as Keyishian v. Board of Regents and Elfbrandt v. Russell. The Registrar has conceded this defect. The appellate issues include whether the trial court erred in refusing to incorporate the defendant's proposed curative language or in not severing the unconstitutional portion from the rest of the oath. The question of severability necessitates evaluating the constitutionality of the remaining section of the oath related to participation in activities aimed at overthrowing the government. The case remains relevant despite the election having occurred, as future elections will likely raise similar issues regarding the loyalty oath's adequacy.

The defendant claims the court should have allowed the addition of curative language, arguing that the term "substantially" in section 6491 of the Elections Code indicates legislative intent for flexible language in the declaration. However, the original statute emphasized the general language of the declaration rather than allowing significant alterations to the oath. The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation suggests "substantially the following form" does not necessitate exact wording but requires adherence to essential statutory elements. The defendant further contends that the court should have added the proposed language to meet constitutional standards, which would align with the Vogel decision. Past rulings indicate that oaths requiring disclosure of membership in organizations advocating violent government overthrow should only apply to groups known to the employee.

The Supreme Court in Vogel clarified that the oath required by section 3 of article XX of the California Constitution does not necessitate a specific intent to advance the unlawful aims of an organization for membership to be prohibited. The court refused to modify the oath by adding language not present in the statute, asserting that the trial court did not err in declining to include proposed curative language. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by not severing the unconstitutional part of the oath from its valid portions. Generally, unconstitutional provisions do not invalidate an entire statute unless they are integral to the law's purpose. The court referenced the necessity of legislative intent for severability and the actual feasibility of separating the provisions. Section 48 of the Elections Code supports the idea that invalid provisions do not render the entire code ineffective. The court opined that the Legislature likely intended for the valid portions of the oath to remain effective. It concluded that the invalid parts of the oath could be severed if they are not interdependent with the valid sections. The trial court failed to consider the constitutionality of the first part of the oath in its determination of severability, which was an oversight. However, the judgment would be affirmed regardless of whether the reasoning was correct, provided the overall decision was sound.

In Davey v. Southern Pacific Co., the court established that an error in the reasoning behind a correct legal ruling does not affect the ruling's validity on appeal. The critical issue at hand involves the constitutionality of the first part of an oath. If this portion is constitutional, the trial court's failure to address its validity and to sever any invalid parts constitutes an error; if it is unconstitutional, the trial court's decision is affirmed. The United States Supreme Court has expressed disfavor towards loyalty oaths, invalidating several for vagueness and overbreadth, as seen in cases like Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction and Baggett v. Bullitt, where oaths were struck down for being too ambiguous for objective interpretation. The first part of the oath in question is criticized for its vague language, which could encompass various interpretations and potentially implicate individuals in "guiltless knowing behavior." Consequently, it is suggested that the oath required by section 6491 of the Elections Code is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Additionally, a previous Supreme Court case, Gerende v. Election Board, upheld a similar oath, but this was later distinguished in Speiser v. Randall, which clarified that the oath in Gerende did not infringe upon First Amendment rights and was justified by a compelling state interest.

In Baggett v. Bullitt, the court referenced the Gerende loyalty oath, reaffirming its validity while narrowing its permissible scope. Conversely, in Whitehill v. Elkins, the court invalidated the same oath, citing its connection to a vague and overly broad statute regarding "subversive persons." The court raised concerns about the ambiguous phrase "in one way or another," questioning whether an individual's ignorance of a group's intentions could still implicate them under the oath. This ambiguity suggested that the oath could extend to prohibited associations under the First Amendment. 

The lack of a specific membership clause allowed for broad interpretation, leading to potential violations of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court's latest stance indicated that loyalty oaths should not infringe on protected speech or association. In Cole v. Richardson, the court emphasized the need for clarity in oaths, warning against vagueness that could deter lawful activities. The oath in question was deemed fatally flawed due to its imprecision and vagueness, making it applicable to both lawful and unlawful conduct, thus failing to meet constitutional standards.

The judgment has been affirmed, with judges Taylor and Kane concurring. The appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied on January 16, 1975. The legal context references Article XX, section 3 of the California Constitution, which requires individuals to affirm they do not advocate the violent overthrow of the U.S. or California governments, and outlines the necessity for a "specific intent" clause in related cases. The excerpt discusses various Supreme Court cases that have invalidated loyalty oath programs, citing theories like bill of attainder from cases such as United States v. Brown and others. It defines subversive actions and affiliations concerning loyalty oaths and provides examples from different jurisdictions, including specific oaths required of candidates and public employees in states like Massachusetts and Indiana, emphasizing their stance against advocating government overthrow by unlawful means.