Petrongola v. Comcast-Spectacor, LP

Citations: 789 A.2d 204; 2001 Pa. Super. 338; 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3455

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; November 27, 2001; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Perry and Mary Margaret Petrongola appealed a decision from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania regarding the liability of Comcast-Spectacor, L.P. and related entities after Perry was injured by an errant puck during a Philadelphia Phantoms hockey game. The court examined whether the Appellees owed a duty to protect him from such an incident and whether they had assumed any duty by installing a plexiglass shield around the ice. The court found that the occurrence of pucks entering the spectator area is a common risk associated with hockey games, and the Appellees did not deviate from safety customs that would establish liability. The court ruled that the plexiglass shield did not imply an assumption of duty, and the "assumption of the risk" defense was appropriately applied in granting summary judgment to the Appellees. The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, despite previously denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings, was also upheld. The appeal was affirmed, confirming that the Appellees had "no duty" to protect the Appellant from the injury sustained.

Appellant raises multiple issues on appeal regarding the trial court's ruling, specifically questioning the application of the "no duty" rule, the assumption of duty by Appellees under the Restatement of Torts (Second) 324, the reliance on the assumption of risk defense, and whether the denial of Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings precluded the trial court from granting their motion for summary judgment on the same issue. 

Summary judgment procedures in Pennsylvania require that a motion can be made post-pleadings if there is no genuine issue of material fact or if a party fails to produce necessary evidence after discovery. A proper summary judgment is contingent upon an evidentiary record that either shows undisputed material facts or insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The non-moving party must provide sufficient evidence to support any contested material issues. The court must view the record favorably to the non-moving party, resolving any doubts against the moving party.

In the appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court incorrectly applied the "no duty" rule, asserting that the design and maintenance of the hockey playing area were directly linked to his injuries from a speeding puck. To support this claim, Appellant submitted expert opinion evidence, the ASTM's Standard Guide for Ice Hockey Playing Facilities, and the Official Rules for the A.H.L.

Mr. Bernheim asserts that Appellees failed to adhere to ASTM standards in maintaining the Spectrum hockey facility, specifically that the bench area lacked a necessary plexiglass shield extending six feet above the dasher board panel. He cites ASTM standard F1703-96, section 5.4.4, which requires plexiglass around players' boxes, and claims that a gap in the plexiglass contravenes a league rule designed to protect spectators. Bernheim argues that the configuration at the Spectrum deviated from established customs, leading to his injuries, and contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees.

To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty, caused injury, and that actual loss occurred. Determining whether a duty exists involves legal considerations, assessing the relationship between parties, the nature of the risk, and public interest. Duty, in this context, is a conclusion of liability influenced by public policy factors.

The document references various precedents regarding the duty of care owed by hockey arena owners to patrons, highlighting a spectrum of rulings from "no duty" to an ordinary duty of care. For instance, some cases indicate a limited duty to provide protected seating or delineate circumstances under which a duty may not apply, such as spectators assuming certain risks inherent in the game. Ultimately, the text emphasizes that the determination of duty is complex and context-dependent, influenced by historical and societal values.

In Pennsylvania, sports facilities are not required to protect spectators from risks that are common and expected, as established in Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp. However, liability may arise if a facility's design significantly deviates from established safety customs. In Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that a patron struck by a baseball while using an interior walkway could sue because the injury resulted from a unique opening in the stadium, which was not an inherent risk of baseball. 

Subsequent cases have further clarified this liability framework. In Telega v. Security Bureau, Inc., the court declined to apply the "no duty" rule when a spectator was assaulted by fans chasing a football, emphasizing that such attacks are not inherent risks of the game. Conversely, in Pestalozzi v. Philadelphia Flyers, a spectator struck by an errant puck was deemed to have assumed the risk, as it is a common occurrence in hockey, even when sitting behind protective glass. 

The current case parallels Pestalozzi, as the appellant was struck by a puck while seated during play at a hockey game, a risk considered inherent and expected for attendees, particularly since he was a regular season ticket holder aware of such risks. The partial protection of the seats does not change the classification of the risk as common and foreseeable.

The legal standard established in Jones requires that a facility's design must significantly deviate from established custom for liability to be considered. The ASTM standards, which were not adopted until 1996, aim to ensure safety in the design of new ice hockey rinks and do not mandate the immediate reconfiguration of existing arenas, such as the Spectrum, which has a hockey configuration approximately 30 years old. The ASTM guide applies to new and renovated facilities, but does not establish customs for pre-1996 designs. The AHL rules state that players must be separated from spectators by protective glass, but do not address spectator safety standards specifically. Therefore, the Appellant must demonstrate that the Spectrum deviated from established customs regarding spectator protection, a requirement they failed to meet. Furthermore, the "no duty" rule applies to common situations, and courts have determined that evidence of deviation from established custom is essential for the case to proceed to a jury. The Appellant's second argument claims that the Appellees assumed a duty of care by installing a plexiglass shield but failed to act reasonably. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Appellant asserts that this creates a material fact issue. However, the legal precedent indicates that mere assumption of duty does not automatically impose liability if reasonable care is exercised. Thus, the Appellant's claims do not provide grounds for relief.

The homeowner assisted the appellant after he was knocked unconscious, but failed to inform the appellant's wife about the incident until the next day, resulting in the appellant suffering permanent brain damage. The trial court dismissed the appellant's complaint, but a higher court reversed this decision, citing the homeowner's duty to assist in a reasonable manner as outlined in Section 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, the appellant could not demonstrate that the appellees had assumed a duty to protect him, as he voluntarily attended the hockey game and was capable of caring for himself. The appellees did not take charge of the appellant, and the hockey venue had not changed since his prior visits. The court clarified that sports arenas do not have a legal obligation to protect fans from inherent risks, such as being hit by a puck. The appellant's claims regarding the assumption of risk were found to be unfounded; the trial court concluded that spectators assume the risks associated with attending games. Additionally, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment after previously denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing it established the "law of the case." The court disagreed, stating the two motions addressed different legal standards.

The coordinate jurisdiction rule states that judges of the same court cannot overrule each other's decisions; however, this rule does not prevent a judge from granting summary judgment after previously denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This principle aims to maintain judicial economy and efficiency by ensuring pretrial finality. A motion for summary judgment can evaluate not only pleadings but also discovery materials, such as depositions and affidavits. Different types of motions (e.g., preliminary objections vs. summary judgment) allow for a judge to rule favorably on a later motion despite prior denials, provided there are intervening changes in facts or law justifying a reevaluation.

In the present case, the same judge ruled on both motions, and the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not inhibit this judge from granting summary judgment after denying judgment on the pleadings. The trial court, upon reviewing the motions for summary judgment, had access to additional information beyond the complaint and answer, including depositions and expert opinions, which supported the conclusion that the Appellees did not have a duty to protect the Appellant. Thus, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment was justified based on the expanded record.

Appellees owed no duty of care to Appellant, precluding any negligence action against them. The trial court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the no-duty rule, affirming that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court appropriately granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment despite previously denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellees had no obligation to protect Appellant from a puck entering the spectators' area, as such occurrences are typical at hockey games. The Spectrum facility adhered to established safety customs, and the installation of a plexiglass shield did not create a duty of care. The trial court's reliance on the "assumption of the risk" defense was not improper. Consequently, the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees was affirmed. Additionally, Appellant's wife, Mary Margaret Petrongola, is also a party to the case, but her claims depend entirely on Appellant's claims. The court confirmed that the gap in the plexiglass shield was five feet, not twenty-five feet as claimed in parts by Appellant. The same judge presided over both motions for judgment and summary judgment.