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New Albany-Floyd County Education Ass'n v. Ammerman

Citations: 724 N.E.2d 251; 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2674; 2000 Ind. App. LEXIS 109; 2000 WL 144335Docket: 22A01-9905-CV-153

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; February 10, 2000; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The Court of Appeals of Indiana evaluated an appeal by the New Albany-Floyd County Education Association against the trial court's summary judgment rulings. The dispute centered on a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) obligating non-member teachers to pay a fair share fee for union representation. The Association pursued legal action to enforce this provision for the 1996-1997 school year. The trial court had granted summary judgment to Ronald Holman, a defendant, while denying the Association's motion. Holman's defense included claims that the fair share fee violated First Amendment rights and was voided by Indiana law effective January 1, 1997. The appellate court found that Holman failed to prove the absence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the fair share fees. Conversely, the Association demonstrated entitlement to fees up to December 31, 1996. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision on Holman's summary judgment and partially reversed the denial of the Association's motion, remanding for further proceedings on fees due after December 31, 1996. The court emphasized the non-retroactive nature of statutory amendments affecting the CBA and noted procedural improprieties in Holman's representation, impacting the motion's validity.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Fair Share Fee Provisions

Application: The court found that the Association successfully demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact concerning its fair share fee calculations and was entitled to the fees from the Teachers for the 1996-1997 school year through December 31, 1996.

Reasoning: The Association successfully demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact concerning its fair share fee calculations and was entitled to the fees from the Teachers for the 1996-1997 school year through December 31, 1996.

Effect of Indiana Code on Collective Bargaining Agreements

Application: The court determined that the amended IND.CODE 20-7.5-1-6 did not include retroactive applicability language, thus it does not affect contracts made prior to July 1, 1995.

Reasoning: The amended IND.CODE 20-7.5-1-6 did not include retroactive applicability language, thus it does not affect contracts made prior to July 1, 1995.

Pro Se Representation and Unauthorized Practice of Law

Application: Holman's motion for summary judgment was questioned due to its filing by a nonlawyer representing multiple defendants, potentially constituting unauthorized practice of law.

Reasoning: The Association questions whether Holman's motion for summary judgment is invalid due to its filing by a nonlawyer representing multiple defendants, potentially constituting unauthorized practice of law.

Retroactive Application of Statutory Amendments

Application: The court held that 1995 Ind. Acts 199 could not retroactively affect contract rights established prior to July 1, 1995, as amendments cannot retroactively change existing rights or obligations.

Reasoning: It was agreed that 1995 Ind. Acts 199, 1 could not retroactively affect contract rights established prior to July 1, 1995, as amendments cannot retroactively change existing rights or obligations.

Summary Judgment Standards under Indiana Law

Application: The appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court when reviewing motions for summary judgment, assessing whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Reasoning: When reviewing motions for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court, assessing whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.