Foster v. McFadden

Citations: 30 Cal. App. 3d 943; 106 Cal. Rptr. 685; 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 1221Docket: Civ. 40039

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 28, 1973; California; State Appellate Court

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Allen Foster appeals a judgment favoring the County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County and its employee John McFadden in a personal injury case. The court ruled that Foster did not comply with the Governmental Claims Act, specifically Government Code sections 900 et seq. The key legal issue is whether a letter from Foster's attorney, mistakenly addressed to "John McFallon," which was sent to the district office and received within the 100-day filing period, constituted sufficient compliance with the claims act. The court concludes that it does, warranting a reversal of the judgment.

The case stems from an incident on December 30, 1967, when McFadden, operating a bulldozer as an employee of the district, injured Foster. The attorney's letter, dated December 29, 1968, provided details about the accident and requested McFadden to communicate with his insurance if insured, or contact the attorney otherwise. A copy was sent to the district, which then responded with details of its insurance carrier, advising further correspondence should be directed there.

Foster seeks reversal based on three arguments: substantial compliance with the claims act, estoppel of the district from claiming noncompliance, and waiver of insufficiency in the claim. The court finds that the letter does not meet the claims act's requirements and that Foster was not misled about the necessity of filing a claim, as he had already submitted a claim to the City of Los Angeles before receiving a response from the district. The court emphasizes the importance of section 910.8, which mandates that if a claim is found insufficient, the board must notify the claimant within 20 days, or else the public entity waives its defense regarding the insufficiencies.

The letter in question, although not explicitly labeled as a "claim" and lacking the word "claim," indicates to McFadden and the district that the plaintiff was injured in an accident involving McFadden during his employment with the district. The attorney for the plaintiff sought either for McFadden to refer the letter to his insurance or to inform the attorney if he was uninsured. The district interpreted the letter as a claim, responding by providing information for contacting its insurance carrier. The letter effectively notified the district of the accident, fulfilling the primary functions of a claim by allowing for prompt investigation and potential settlement. Consequently, the court ruled that the letter should be regarded as a claim under sections 910.8 and 911 of the claims act, leading to a reversal of the judgment.

In dissent, Acting Presiding Judge Schweitzer argued that the plaintiff's attorney did not intend for the letter to be a claim and that the district’s subsequent actions did not change this intent. The dissent emphasized that the letter was specifically addressed to McFadden, requesting him to forward it to his insurer or to notify the attorney if uninsured, thus lacking sufficient detail to constitute a claim under the claims act.

"McFallon" was not identified as an employee of the district in a letter addressed to him at the district's office, which also had a copy sent to the district. While one might infer his involvement in an accident could relate to his employment, the letter did not explicitly state that he was acting within the scope of employment nor did it present a claim or demand against the district. Instead, it merely informed the district of an incident involving "McFallon." Section 910.8 applies only to situations where a defective claim is made against a governmental entity, and there is no indication that it encompasses cases where no claim has been presented, as in this instance. The court referenced the case of Stromberg, Inc. v. L.A. County Flood etc. Dist., asserting that without a claim filed, the county had no obligation to notify the plaintiff regarding the insufficiency of the claim. The majority's argument that the "McFallon" letter served as a claim is disputed, as it lacked direct demands on the district and was not intended as a claim. The district’s response to the letter did not classify it as a claim; it simply provided information regarding its insurance carrier and suggested future correspondence be directed there. The minimal response from the district did not alter the letter's nature from an inquiry to a claim. Therefore, since no claim was filed, the district had no duty to notify the plaintiff about the insufficiency of the claim, and the defense of noncompliance with the claims act was not waived. The judgment should be affirmed.

The document outlines the legal requirements for presenting a claim under the Government Code, specifically referencing sections 910 and 910.2. It includes a letter dated February 29, 1968, from attorney Donald T. Sterling, representing client Allen Foster regarding an accident at Mission Canyon-Sepulveda Landfill on December 30, 1967. The letter requests that Mr. McFallon forward it to his insurance carrier and provides instructions for contacting the attorney.

Section 910 stipulates that a claim must include the claimant's name and address, the desired address for notices, details of the incident, a description of the injury or damage, the names of any public employees involved, and the amount claimed. The letter fails to include items (d) and (f) and is also deficient in items (a) and (c).

Section 910.2 mandates that claims must be signed by the claimant or a representative. Proposed sections 712 and 713 allow local public entities to notify claimants of substantial deficiencies in their claims within 60 days, requiring a response within ten days. If a claim is found to comply substantially with the requirements despite defects, it cannot be dismissed based on those deficiencies unless proper notice was not provided. Additionally, failure to include the claimant's address may result in automatic waiver of any defenses based on the claim's insufficiencies.

Sections 712 and 713 outline the protocol for local public entities regarding claims that do not substantially meet the requirements of Section 711. If a claim is deemed insufficient, the governing body must provide written notice detailing the specific defects or omissions within 50 days of the claim's presentation. This notice can be mailed to the address indicated in the claim or, if absent, to the claimant's listed address. The governing body must refrain from taking action on the claim for 20 days following the notice. If the court finds that the claim substantially complies with Section 711, any failure to amend the claim does not serve as a defense against legal action. Furthermore, if the governing body does not send a notice of insufficiency regarding a defect, that defense is waived unless the claim fails to include an address for notices. 

Sections 910.8 and 911 similarly require boards to notify claimants within 20 days if a claim fails to meet the requirements of Sections 910 and 910.2, or the relevant form under Section 910.4. The notice must specify the defects and can be delivered personally or mailed to the address provided in the claim. The board cannot act on the claim for 15 days post-notice. Like Section 712, defenses concerning the claim's sufficiency are waived if no notice is given, except when no address is provided in the claim. Additionally, it is noted that the district employed "John McFadden," not "John McFallon," who later became a defendant in the case.