Commonwealth v. Fidler

Citations: 503 N.E.2d 1302; 23 Mass. App. Ct. 506; 1987 Mass. App. LEXIS 1692

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; February 17, 1987; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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John Fidler was indicted for the stabbings of Julie Greene, John Hennessy, and Stephen Celata, facing three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and three charges of armed assault with intent to murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of assaulting all three victims and of armed assault with intent to murder against Greene, while being acquitted for that charge concerning Hennessy and Celata. Fidler received a sentence of fifteen to twenty years for the armed assault against Greene, alongside concurrent terms of five to seven years for the other convictions.

Fidler's main arguments on appeal included claims of error regarding the trial judge's denial of motions for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again after all evidence was presented, particularly concerning the counts involving Hennessy and Celata. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decisions.

The events occurred on the night of July 14, 1983, when Lisa Buccieri and her friends went to several bars, including Shawn's in Boston, where they interacted with Hennessy and Celata. During the night, Hennessy received a threatening remark from a man described as short and thin, and Buccieri encountered another man who was offensive in his advances. Witnesses from Shawn's corroborated the presence of Fidler and two other men, establishing their connections and activities at the bar that night.

Fidler, the defendant, was present at a bar despite being underage. At approximately 1:45 A.M., as Shawn's bar was closing, Lisa Buccieri and Gail Crosby left with Dennis Miller and another man, walking west on Chatham Street to Chatham Row, which leads to State Street. They crossed into a lighted parking lot, where they stood near a parked car. Julie Greene and her friends left shortly after and headed towards the State-Broad Street intersection, intending to reach Broad Street. Without warning, they were violently attacked by a group of five to seven men in a poorly lit area. Celata was struck multiple times with a sharp object, falling to the ground. Hennessy attempted to assist him but was also attacked, suffering multiple stab wounds. Greene, witnessing the assault, confronted the attacker but was stabbed three times and collapsed after seeing blood. Buccieri and Crosby observed the incident from the parking lot, initially thinking it was a staged fight. They later saw two attackers fleeing the scene, with one covering his face. Dennis Miller witnessed the incident, reported it, and sought medical help. Greene, Celata, and Hennessy were all taken to hospitals in serious condition following the attack.

On the Tuesday following the incident, Greene, who had just been released from intensive care, was interviewed by Detectives Carroll and Gleason. She identified John Fidler as her attacker during this interview and again three days later through a photo array, as well as in a courtroom setting. The defense rigorously cross-examined witnesses to challenge the credibility of the police investigation, the testimonies of Buccieri and Crosby, and Greene's reliability as a witness. Greene admitted to being under the influence of alcohol and sedative medication at the time of her initial identification of Fidler. 

The defendant argued a lack of evidence linking him to the crimes, claiming the judge erred in denying his motions for not guilty findings. However, the evidence included Fidler being identified among a group that attacked victims with knives. Fidler was implicated in multiple assaults, including stabbing Greene and being near Hennessy during his stabbing. The court noted that Fidler's involvement indicated he was not merely present but an active participant in the assault.

Regarding the charges against Hennessy and Celata, while it was unclear if Fidler wielded the knife, he was considered an accessorial participant in a joint venture. The jury was instructed on accessorial guilt, affirming that individuals who aid or encourage a crime while sharing the necessary mental state can be charged as principals. The defense did not object to this instruction, and the court referenced prior rulings that support this legal doctrine. The appeal raised a question about the necessity of an antecedent agreement for a joint venture; however, the court clarified that the essence of conspiracy is the agreement itself, independent of subsequent criminal acts.

The court differentiated between conspiracy and accomplice liability, noting that liability in joint ventures can exist without prior planning, as long as the parties acted together in committing the crime. Mutual assent is necessary at the time of the offense, but an anticipatory agreement is not required. In the case concerning Fidler's assault on Julie Greene, the court affirmed the jury's guilty verdict for armed assault with intent to murder, noting that the evidence supported Fidler's direct responsibility. The jury acquitted him of similar charges against Hennessy and Celata, indicating a probable reliance on direct evidence in Greene's case. The judge's jury instructions on specific intent to kill were criticized for potentially misleading the jury, as they did not adequately clarify that malice referred to the intent to kill. Despite this, the defense did not object to the jury charge, leading the court to evaluate whether the misdirection created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. Citing prior cases, the court concluded that since the primary issue was the identity of the gunman, not the intent to kill, the erroneous instruction did not pose a substantial risk of injustice. Evidence suggesting the assailant's intent to kill was present but not contested, further supporting the court's decision.

Key considerations regarding intent in the case involve the weapon used, the nature of the wounds inflicted, and the deliberation shown by the assailant. The weapon, presumably a knife, was deemed 'deadly' as it caused significant injuries to the victim, Greene, including three stab wounds—two in the upper right abdomen and one below the left breast. One wound punctured her gall bladder and led to its removal, while another resulted in a collapsed lung requiring surgery. Greene lost a third of her blood volume within two hours and spent eleven days in the hospital, some in intensive care. The attack was characterized as deliberate; the assailant, Fidler, approached and targeted Greene, indicating intent to kill. The jury's conviction of Fidler for this offense, but not for others, suggests recognition of a heightened purpose beyond mere wounding.

Regarding the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence, a tape recording of Greene identifying Fidler was lost due to storage changes in the district attorney’s office. Although the defense claimed this evidence could have been exculpatory, both the judge and defense counsel acknowledged the prosecutor's diligent efforts to recover it. While the tape was material to the identification, there was no proof it would have been exculpatory or that the defense faced prejudice from its loss. The defense had opportunities to challenge Greene's identification and introduced a psychiatrist to question her credibility. Consequently, the loss of the tape did not warrant a remand for further findings.

Additionally, the defense objected to the judge's restriction on cross-examining Hennessy about his marijuana use on the assault night. The judge prohibited inquiry into a nurse's note in Hennessy’s medical record stating he smoked marijuana, deeming it irrelevant to the case at hand.

The defense argued for separate trials for the alleged crimes against Greene, Hennessy, and Celata to prevent confusion; however, no such motion was presented to the judge. The related charges warranted a joint trial under Mass. R.Crim. P. 9(a)(1)(3). The judge's decision against separate trials would be discretionary, and denial would not likely be considered an abuse of discretion. There was no indication that the joint trial harmed the defendant. The testimonies included statements from detectives, victims, and personnel from the bar where the incident occurred. A judge assessing a motion must determine if, viewing the evidence favorably for the prosecution, a rational jury could find the crime's essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge's ruling on the motion was justified, as the evidence had not deteriorated. Additionally, involvement in a violent attack implies an awareness of the potential for lethal intent among participants. Other jurisdictions recognize that the use of a weapon can infer intent to kill.