Scalabrino v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad

Citations: 356 N.W.2d 258; 135 Mich. App. 758; 1984 Mich. App. LEXIS 2801Docket: Docket 58128

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; June 28, 1984; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the case Scalabrino v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, where the plaintiff appealed a jury verdict awarding him $1.4 million for injuries sustained in a collision with a freight train. The jury reduced the award by 95%, citing the plaintiff's comparative negligence. The critical issue on appeal was whether the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury by using a flawed Standard Jury Instruction regarding negligence and statutory violations at railroad crossings. The plaintiff's testimony indicated he did not see warning signals or hear the train whistle, while several witnesses testified they did observe these warnings. The plaintiff alleged the defendant was negligent for excessive speed, lack of automatic gate guards, and inadequate lookout by the crew. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's failure to stop at the crossing was the sole cause of the accident. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the plaintiff violated a statute requiring a stop at the crossing, he was negligent as a matter of law, and they needed to determine if this negligence contributed to the accident. Following jury instructions, a brief recess was taken due to an external event unrelated to the case. The Court found that the incorrect jury instruction constituted reversible error and remanded the case for a new trial.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to jury instructions regarding the implications of the plaintiff's failure to stop at a crossing, arguing the jury should only infer negligence from that failure. The trial judge did not address the objection, and after the jury's verdict, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied, leading to an appeal. Both parties acknowledged that the judge used an outdated Michigan Standard Jury Instruction (SJI). The correct instruction allows for inferring negligence if the plaintiff violated a statute at the time of the incident. The parties disagreed on the review standard; the plaintiff cited the Javis standard for automatic reversal of instructional errors, while the defendant contended that the issue was not reviewable due to the lack of a timely objection before jury deliberations. Michigan law mandates adherence to applicable and accurate SJIs, with strict standards presuming prejudicial error for omissions or deviations from them, provided appropriate objections were made during trial. However, in this case, the trial judge's error stemmed from using an inaccurate SJI rather than an omission or deviation. The Javis standard is not applicable here, and instead, the general requirements for objections govern. The court noted that a timely objection is necessary for review under subrule 516.2, but it can review errors sua sponte to prevent manifest injustice. The court determined that failure to review the plaintiff's claim would result in manifest injustice.

Plaintiff objected to jury instructions shortly after deliberations began, attributing the delay to a recess for updates on President Reagan's condition following a shooting. It remains unclear if the plaintiff's counsel realized the jury had resumed deliberations during this recess. Both parties subsequently recorded their objections. The court indicated a reluctance to apply subrule 516.2 strictly, noting that the trial judge could have rectified the situation by addressing the plaintiff's objection and reinstructing the jury. The judge's failure to respond constituted an error, which excused the plaintiff's late objection.

Additionally, the trial court misrepresented the law regarding the implications of the plaintiff's statutory violation on negligence, potentially skewing the jury's verdict. Given that the incorrect instruction was central to the case, a review was deemed necessary to prevent injustice. The court emphasized that jury instructions must be considered as a whole, with reversible error arising from unlawful or contradictory instructions on material issues. In this case, the erroneous instruction on negligence was fundamentally defective, warranting a reversal and a remand for a new trial. The court chose not to address the plaintiff's other allegations due to this ruling.

The relevant statute requires drivers to stop at railroad crossings under specific conditions, emphasizing the responsibility to proceed safely. Changes to jury instructions stemmed from the Supreme Court's ruling in Zeni v Anderson, which clarified that violations of the Motor Vehicle Code only create a rebuttable presumption of negligence, rather than an automatic conclusion of negligence. This principle was further applied in Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc.