People v. Smith

Citations: 566 N.E.2d 797; 207 Ill. App. 3d 1072; 152 Ill. Dec. 920; 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 70Docket: 5-89-0723

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 17, 1991; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Elisa Smith was charged with reckless homicide and subsequently filed a petition for discharge, claiming that her right to a speedy trial was violated because she was not tried within 120 days as mandated by Illinois law. The circuit court agreed, dismissing the charges against her. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court wrongly attributed delays to it rather than to the defendant. Specifically, the State identified four periods of delay it contended were caused by the defendant, which, if accepted, would demonstrate compliance with the 120-day requirement. Under Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State must bring a defendant to trial within 120 days unless delays are caused by the defendant, in which case the time period is suspended. The court emphasized that it is the defendant's responsibility to prove a statutory violation when filing for discharge and noted that considerable deference is given to the circuit court's determinations regarding delay attribution. The appellate court affirmed that absent clear abuse of discretion, the circuit court's findings on delay accountability would stand.

The State's appeal addresses the timeline of the defendant's proceedings following her custody for a reckless homicide charge. The defendant was unable to post bail and remained in custody since June 12, 1989. At a docket call on August 9, 1989, she expressed readiness for trial on August 14, 1989. However, on August 11, she requested a new public defender. The trial was postponed from August 14 to September 25, 1989. The State claims the delay from August 9 to September 25 is the defendant's fault due to her request for new counsel; however, the court found no evidence indicating the defendant caused this delay, as her public defender stated readiness for trial. The assistant State's Attorney mentioned scheduling conflicts but provided conflicting testimony about conversations with the defendant's counsel. Without clear responsibility for this delay, it was correctly not attributed to the defendant.

For the period from September 25 to October 6, 1989, the defendant conceded the delay was her responsibility due to her motion for a continuance, which the court properly attributed to her. The State also contends that the delay from October 4 to October 23, 1989, was attributable to the defendant because she agreed to the rescheduling at the October 4 docket call.

The State alleges that the defendant's supplemental discovery motions filed on October 2, 1989, caused delays in the trial. The defendant argues that the State waived this claim by not raising it in the circuit court and only presenting it on appeal. The court agrees, noting that during hearings, the State claimed the defendant accepted the trial date without mentioning the discovery motions as a cause of delay. Issues not raised in the circuit court are considered waived. Even if the argument had not been waived, the defendant's right to discovery and the time required for it do not count as attributable delays. The review of the defendant's discovery requests indicates they did not burden the State. 

The State also contends that the delay from October 4 to October 23, 1989, should be attributed to the defendant since she agreed to the trial date. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in determining that the defendant was not responsible for this delay. The record shows the State did not raise any speedy trial issues during the docket call on October 4, 1989, and the duty to raise such concerns did not fall on the defendant. Furthermore, the court ruled that the defense counsel's statement at the docket call did not constitute an agreement to the October 23 trial date. The court thoroughly reviewed the transcripts and concluded that there was no agreement on the continuance. When it is unclear if a continuance is attributable to the defendant, the court must investigate the circumstances surrounding the delay. The circuit court's determination on the allocation of delay is given considerable deference, particularly when the record does not clearly establish responsibility for the delay, and absent an abuse of discretion, the court's decision will not be overturned.

The court concluded that attributing the delay from October 4, 1989, to October 23, 1989, to the State was not an abuse of discretion. The State claimed a one-day delay from October 23 to October 24, 1989, was due to the defendant's motions in limine. However, the delay was actually caused by a lack of available jurors, as only eight jurors were present on October 23. The defendant cannot be held responsible for ensuring sufficient jurors for her trial, and her motions did not contribute to the delay. From June 12, 1989, to October 24, 1989, the defendant was incarcerated for 134 days, but after subtracting the 11 days attributed to her, 123 days remained. The State did not bring the defendant to trial within the mandated 120 days, leading to the court affirming the dismissal of charges against her for violating her right to a speedy trial. The judgment of the circuit court was thus affirmed, with Justices Howerton and Chapman concurring.