Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.

Citations: 575 N.E.2d 734; 410 Mass. 706; 1991 Mass. LEXIS 392

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; July 23, 1991; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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Diane Kourovacilis appealed a judgment dismissing her complaint against General Motors Corporation and Avis Rent-A-Car, which included multiple product liability claims. The complaint comprised six counts against General Motors, alleging breach of warranty, negligence (two counts), deceit, and violations of Massachusetts General Laws chapters 93A and 231, section 85J. Four additional counts against Avis included similar allegations. The case stemmed from the plaintiff's purchase of a 1979 Monte Carlo sedan from Avis, which was destroyed by fire in 1985, allegedly due to a defect in the vehicle's electrical system, leading to personal injury and loss.

The Superior Court dismissed the claim against General Motors for violating c. 231, 85J, stating that no purchaser-seller relationship existed between Kourovacilis and General Motors, as she bought the car from Avis. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment to Avis on negligence and statutory violation counts, leaving only a breach of warranty claim. A third judge later ruled in favor of both defendants on remaining counts, explaining that the plaintiff could not prevail without demonstrating that the defect was present while the defendants had possession of the vehicle.

The judgment was affirmed, emphasizing that the plaintiff's burden of proof required showing the defect existed during the defendants' possession, supported by relevant case law. The defendants sought information regarding the plaintiff's expected testimony and expert witnesses to establish this burden.

The plaintiff initially provided unresponsive answers regarding expert testimony about the fire's cause. In later submissions, she indicated her intent to call Walter Grez and Lt. Colburn as experts, asserting that defective wiring at the time of manufacture caused the fire. The plaintiff submitted a report from the Springfield fire department, attributed to Lt. Colburn, stating the fire resulted from an "unspecified short circuit" related to "electrical failure" and ignited "electrical wire." The defendants did not present affidavits or materials disproving the defective wiring claim but relied on the deposition of Walter Grzebien, owner of Grez Automotive, and an affidavit from Lt. Colburn. 

Grzebien, in his 1989 deposition, stated he had no recollection of working on the plaintiff's vehicle and had not been retained as an expert witness. He confirmed he had no knowledge of the fire's cause and had never been contacted by the plaintiff or her lawyer regarding expert testimony. In Colburn's affidavit, he clarified that he was not a fire marshal and claimed his report's findings were based on guesses, as he had not examined the vehicle and lacked knowledge about its condition or any defects. Colburn asserted that he informed the plaintiff of this. The plaintiff's only response to Grzebien’s deposition and Colburn's affidavit was her own affidavit, denying that Colburn had suggested he was guessing in his report.

The plaintiff submitted an affidavit including a document claimed to be a sworn statement from Mr. Grzebien, asserting that a fire was caused by defective wiring present at the vehicle's manufacture. The motion judge correctly rejected this statement as it was not in proper affidavit form, referencing O'Brion, Russell Co. v. LeMay. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a signed duplicate of the statement three days post-hearing, which the judge also disregarded due to its late submission, consistent with Rule 56(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure requiring opposing affidavits to be served before the hearing date.

In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the motion judge determined they had met their burden by demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a defect in the vehicle at the time of purchase. The defendants provided an affidavit from Lt. Colburn and Grzebien's sworn deposition, indicating a complete failure of proof on a critical element of the plaintiff’s case. Consequently, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to present admissible evidence of a factual dispute, which she failed to do, leading to her inadequate response lacking competent evidence of any defect or causation for her damages. The court affirmed the motion judge's reasoning and conclusion, noting that while not obliged to adopt the standards set forth in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, it was sensible to align with that framework. The court highlighted that the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claims warranted the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Celotex, the defendant, argued for summary judgment by highlighting that the plaintiff, Catrett, did not identify any witnesses regarding the decedent's exposure to Celotex's asbestos products, despite being asked in interrogatories. Catrett provided three documents purporting to show such exposure, which Celotex claimed were inadmissible hearsay. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling, stating Celotex failed to provide affirmative evidence of non-exposure, relieving Catrett of the burden to respond, thus rendering the hearsay issue irrelevant.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that while a party seeking summary judgment must reference the materials listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), there is no requirement to submit affidavits or similar materials negating the opponent's claims. The Court emphasized that a summary judgment motion can be granted based on the existing record if it meets the criteria for summary judgment under Rule 56(c). In cases where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can rely solely on the pleadings and other filings. The Supreme Court underscored that a moving party must initially show an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, which cannot be satisfied merely by filing a motion or asserting that the opposing party has not provided necessary evidence. The motion must include materials that demonstrate the unlikelihood of proof for the essential elements of the nonmoving party's claim at trial.

The movant must meet the burden established by the Rules for summary judgment, which requires more than a mere assertion that the plaintiff lacks evidence. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Supreme Court determined that Celotex successfully demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by highlighting the plaintiff's failure to identify witnesses regarding exposure to its product. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to assess the adequacy of the plaintiff's countervailing materials. Dissenting justices acknowledged that a moving party could satisfy Rule 56 by either providing affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient. A simple assertion of lack of evidence is inadequate; the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate the absence of evidence. The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure align with this interpretation, emphasizing that a party may obtain summary judgment if it shows, based on material referenced in the rules, that the opposing party lacks a reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of their case.

To succeed in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party does not need to provide evidence negating elements of the opposing party's claim. The defendants demonstrated this in the case at hand, where the plaintiff bore the burden of proof regarding her personal injury and property loss claims related to a defect in her automobile. The defendants supported their motions by showing that the plaintiff relied on certain witnesses whose testimony was insufficient to support her case. They provided a deposition and an affidavit that indicated the plaintiff's reliance on these witnesses was unjustified, establishing that no genuine issue of material fact existed, thus entitling the defendants to summary judgment.

Due to the plaintiff's failure to present specific facts to counter this claim, as required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(e), the court found the summary judgment appropriate. The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Hopper v. Callahan, asserting it did not warrant a different outcome. Additionally, the plaintiff's argument that she could prove her case through res ipsa loquitur was deemed without merit, as common experience does not support that an unexplained fire in a car six years post-purchase indicates a defect from manufacture.

The defendants characterized the appeal as "frivolous" and sought damages under Mass. R. App. P. 25, citing the lack of merit in much of the plaintiff's argument. However, since the court had not previously addressed whether to adopt the rule from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, it refrained from labeling the appeal as frivolous and declined to award damages. The judgment was affirmed.