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People Ex Rel. Foster v. Louder
Citations: 423 N.E.2d 1272; 97 Ill. App. 3d 1104; 53 Ill. Dec. 468; 1981 Ill. App. LEXIS 2933Docket: 80-394
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 30, 1981; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Mary Foster initiated proceedings under the Paternity Act to collect child support arrearages from Wesley Louder, Jr. The trial court awarded her less than the full amount sought and granted attorney's fees. Louder appealed, arguing that equitable estoppel should prevent the award of arrearages, that the attorney's fees were excessive, and that Foster lacked standing. Foster cross-appealed for the full amount of arrearages. The court affirmed part of the trial court's decision but reversed in part. Foster and Louder had a relationship from 1960 to 1975 and had three children. Louder admitted paternity and was ordered to pay $74 per month in child support, which he reportedly paid until February 1966. After Foster expressed the need to move due to space constraints, Louder offered her a rent-free apartment in a building he purchased, contingent on her not enforcing the support orders. Foster moved into this apartment in January 1967 and lived there until October 1979, paying rent only twice during that period. The court examined whether the award for arrearages was appropriate, considering Louder's claim of estoppel based on his conduct and Foster's reliance on that conduct. The court noted that estoppel requires clear evidence and cannot be based merely on the failure to demand payment or the passage of time. Petitioner failed to demand child-support payments for an extended period, which, combined with other significant factors, created an estoppel against her claim for arrearages. For 12.5 years, petitioner and the children lived in a rent-free apartment owned by respondent, who could have collected over $20,000 in rental income. Respondent's decision to forgo rent was based on an agreement with petitioner not to pursue him for arrears, a claim petitioner did not explicitly deny. During this time, respondent also provided financial support to petitioner for the children's needs. While individual factors may not establish estoppel, collectively they necessitate that petitioner be barred from claiming any arrearages. The trial court's application of estoppel was incorrect, as it only credited respondent $8,000 against the claimed $14,793, leaving $6,793 as arrearages. The entire claimed amount should have been estopped. Regarding attorney's fees, the trial court awarded petitioner $200 less than requested, and respondent argued that a hearing was necessary to determine the fees. However, if no request for such a hearing is made, an award supported by the record should not be reversed solely for the lack of a hearing. In this case, respondent did not request an evidentiary hearing on the fees, so the court's award will not be overturned based on that argument. The amount of attorney's fees must be substantiated by the record, not merely by a request for them. Expert testimony or an evidentiary hearing is not required to support the award of attorney's fees; the trial court can rely on the record, including the attorney's reported hours, normal billing rate, community standards, and the complexity of the case. In this instance, after the trial, the petitioner's attorney requested a specific amount for attorney's fees, and the judge inquired about the attorney's experience and time spent on the case. The respondent did not object to this process but doubted the claimed hours. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $200 less than requested, indicating it had sufficient information to determine the fee without a hearing. Additionally, the respondent argued that the petitioner lacked standing under the Paternity Act, asserting that only the Attorney General or State's Attorney could initiate such actions. This argument was rejected, as the Paternity Act allows a mother to seek relief through private counsel, providing an alternative to government representation. Consequently, the order for arrearages was reversed, while the order for attorney's fees was affirmed, with Judges McNamara and White concurring.