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Hope's Financial Management v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.
Citations: 172 S.W.3d 105; 2005 WL 1870671Docket: 05-04-00796-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 6, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court
In the case 172 S.W.3d 105 (2005), Hope's Financial Management and ME Okere, the appellants, contested a summary judgment favoring Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. regarding ownership of a Dallas residential property. The dispute originated in 1996 when Victor Okere bought the property, which was mortgaged by Chase Manhattan. After a foreclosure in 1997 due to a default on the loan, the property was sold and subsequently deeded back to Chase Manhattan by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs in 2003. ME Okere recorded a deed in 2003 claiming to convey the property back to Hope's Financial, alleging that the VA's deed to Chase Manhattan was fraudulent and asserting that they were the rightful owners. Chase Manhattan counterclaimed for trespass, unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, leading to the trial court granting a summary judgment in favor of Chase Manhattan, awarding damages and attorney's fees. The appellants' appeal was hampered by inadequate briefing; they failed to adequately argue or support several issues, resulting in those issues being waived. Additionally, the appellants claimed the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief due to the non-joinder of the VA and Victor Okere as parties, as mandated by Texas law. The appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment. Appellants failed to provide any discussion, authority, or record citations to substantiate their claim that the omission of certain parties constituted reversible error, leading to a waiver of this complaint under TEX.R.APP. P. 38.1(h). In addressing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, appellants allege that the evidence presented raised material fact issues, primarily concerning property ownership. They reference a filed title and an abstract of title, and assert that Chase Manhattan's acknowledgment of selling the property to the VA, along with claims of a fraudulent deed, indicate disputed issues. Additionally, they argue that a 1999 VA letter negated any interest in the property, and they claim that affidavits from Chase Manhattan are fraudulent. Chase Manhattan asserted multiple grounds for its summary judgment, including evidence of its chain of title and arguments of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which would bar appellants from contesting ownership due to prior litigation. The court emphasized that, in the absence of a specified basis for the trial court's ruling, appellants must challenge all possible grounds for summary judgment. Since they did not address Chase Manhattan's arguments regarding res judicata, collateral estoppel, or bona fide purchaser status, they failed to demonstrate that their evidence warranted a reversal. Regarding their affirmative defenses raised in issues eight and ten, the appellants did not present sufficient evidence to counter the summary judgment. They are obligated to direct the court to specific evidence in the record supporting their claims, which they did not do. Consequently, the appellate arguments concerning these defenses were also waived. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.