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Stumpf v. Hagerman Construction Corp.
Citations: 863 N.E.2d 871; 2007 WL 1031554Docket: 02A03-0606-CV-251
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; April 2, 2007; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Nathan and Sarisa Stumpf appealed the Allen Superior Court's summary judgment favoring Hagerman Construction Corporation and D.A. Dodd, Inc. The Stumpfs raised two main issues: whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and whether it incorrectly struck the deposition of expert witness Frank Burg. The Court concluded that Hagerman and Dodd had assumed a contractual duty of care to the Stumpfs, affirming part of the lower court’s ruling and reversing in part, remanding for further proceedings. The case originated from a work-related accident on December 17, 2002, when Nathan Stumpf, an employee of Performance Contracting Incorporated (subcontracted by Dodd), fell from a ladder while installing insulation at Purdue University. He sustained permanent brain injuries. No OSHA violations were cited in connection with the accident. The Stumpfs filed a negligence complaint against Hagerman, later adding Dodd as a defendant. Summary judgment motions were filed by Hagerman and Dodd, along with a motion to strike the expert witness deposition. The trial court granted both motions, leading to the Stumpfs' appeal. In reviewing the summary judgment, the Court applied the standard that it must consider facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and ensure that no genuine issues of material fact existed. The non-movant must demonstrate that the summary judgment was erroneous to succeed in their appeal. In summary judgment cases where no facts are disputed and the issue is purely legal, the court reviews the matter de novo. Cross-motions for summary judgment do not change the review standard; each motion is considered independently to assess if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Stumpfs argue that the trial court incorrectly granted Hagerman and Dodd's summary judgment motion, asserting that a duty of care existed between them and that a factual dispute exists regarding its breach. Negligence claims consist of three elements: a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, and injury to the plaintiff caused by the breach. While summary judgment is generally uncommon in negligence cases, a defendant can succeed if undisputed facts negate any claim element. Under Indiana common law, an employer typically has no duty to supervise independent contractors, thus avoiding liability for their negligence. However, five exceptions to this rule exist: performing intrinsically dangerous work, a legal or contractual obligation to perform a specific duty, creating a nuisance, potential injury to others without precautions, and illegal acts. The Stumpfs assert that the second exception applies here, claiming Hagerman and Dodd had a contractual duty to ensure safety during renovations. Determining the existence of a duty is a legal question for the court, as a lack of duty precludes negligence recovery. The court will analyze the contract to ascertain if it establishes a duty of care, interpreting it to reflect the parties' intent at execution and harmonizing its provisions. A contract that clearly demonstrates intent to assume a duty of care can lead to actionable negligence based on that contractual obligation. This duty is considered non-delegable, meaning that a principal can be held liable for the negligence of a contractor due to the significant societal importance of the responsibilities involved. The Stumpfs reference a specific provision in the contract between Hagerman and Purdue University, which mandates that the contractor take necessary safety precautions and comply with all relevant safety laws, indicating that Hagerman and Dodd intended to assume a duty of care for all project employees, including those of subcontractors. They compare this contractual language to prior cases, such as Perryman v. Huber, Hunt, Nichols, Inc., where the court found that a general contractor had a duty of care for all employees on-site based on the contract's explicit safety obligations. Similarly, in Harris v. Kettelhut Construction, Inc., the court concluded that a provision requiring the contractor to ensure the safety of all employees encompassed subcontractor employees. The contract with Hagerman contains comparable language requiring precautions for the safety of all employees on the work site, suggesting a clear intent to establish a duty of care. Hagerman was contractually obligated to designate a responsible individual for accident prevention and to comply with the Construction Safety Act and the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The contract indicates that Hagerman has a duty of care for the safety of all employees on the project, including subcontractors. This case differs from Helms v. Carmel High School Vocational Bldg., where the general contractor was not found to have a duty to provide a safe worksite due to lack of specific safety provisions. In contrast, Hagerman’s contract explicitly assigns it the responsibility to ensure safety and compliance with OSHA regulations, including appointing a safety administrator. The court noted that similar to Perry v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Hagerman's appointment of a safety administrator signifies an assumption of supervision over safety, thus creating a duty to act with reasonable care. The trial court found that the Stumpfs could not prove a breach of duty or proximate cause, as they failed to identify specific OSHA violations. However, on appeal, the Stumpfs cited various OSHA regulations allegedly breached by Hagerman. The court determined that the duty to supervise safety extends beyond mere compliance with OSHA, requiring Hagerman and Dodd to oversee subcontractors’ safety practices reasonably. Allegations against Hagerman and Dodd include inadequate supervision regarding fall equipment and ladder training, with the determination of whether they breached their duty and caused injuries being a factual issue for the jury. The trial court struck the deposition of expert witness Frank Burg, determining it was irrelevant to the claims, included impermissible legal conclusions, and lacked personal knowledge of the worksite during Nathan’s fall. The admissibility of expert testimony is at the trial court's discretion and can only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion. A party challenging the exclusion of evidence must demonstrate prejudice and that the error was material or significantly affected the parties' rights. The Stumpfs argue that Burg's testimony regarding OSHA's responsibilities for general contractors and safety training for ladder use should have been admitted as it would aid a trier of fact unfamiliar with OSHA standards. They also contend that Burg’s opinions about fall protection requirements and OSHA's multi-employer and general duty rules were improperly excluded. Citing Vaughn v. Daniels Co., the Stumpfs assert that expert opinions on reasonable care are admissible, but the court concluded that interpreting OSHA standards does not pertain to whether Hagerman or Dodd exercised reasonable care or caused Nathan's injury. The court emphasized that determining the duty to exercise care is a legal question, not one for expert testimony. In the case of Interim Healthcare of Fort Wayne, Inc. v. Moyer, the court addressed the admissibility of expert witness testimony regarding duty of care. The court referenced a prior case, Merrill, where an expert's assertion of a defendant's responsibility for a defective condition was ruled inadmissible. Similarly, expert Frank Burg's claims that Hagerman and Dodd had a duty under OSHA to ensure ladder safety were deemed legal conclusions, improperly invading the court's role. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion by striking Burg's affidavit. The court concluded that Hagerman and Dodd had contractually assumed a duty of care to subcontractor employees, determining that the trial court erred in granting them summary judgment. The ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with a remand for further proceedings. Additionally, the court granted the Appellants' motion to publish its Memorandum Decision as a matter of legal interest and precedent. The Stumpfs' argument regarding the denial of a motion to amend their complaint based on new precedent was acknowledged but not addressed due to a subsequent reversal of that precedent by the supreme court. The court also noted that a duty under OSHA regulations cannot be established solely by those regulations. Finally, it admonished Appellants' counsel for failing to properly cite contract provisions in their brief, emphasizing adherence to Indiana Appellate Rules in future filings.