Town of Merrillville Board of Zoning Appeals v. Public Storage, Inc.

Citations: 568 N.E.2d 1092; 1991 Ind. App. LEXIS 441; 1991 WL 44444Docket: 45A04-8911-CV-495.1

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; March 28, 1991; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Public Storage, Inc. sought a special exception from the Town of Merrillville Board of Zoning Appeals to construct a public storage facility on a commercially zoned C-3 parcel. The Board denied the application after hearing objections from local residents. Public Storage subsequently petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the trial court granted. The Board appealed the trial court's decision, contesting the legality of its judgment.

The zoning ordinance outlines specific criteria for granting a special exception, including that it must not harm public welfare, injure neighboring property values, impede local development, ensure adequate infrastructure, provide proper access to minimize traffic congestion, and conform to district regulations. During the Board's hearing, Public Storage provided evidence of compliance with these criteria, but the Board ultimately denied the application based on resident remonstrances.

The case highlights the difference between variances, which allow deviations from zoning laws, and special exceptions, which permit specific uses under defined conditions. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, indicating that the Board's denial was contrary to law.

A variance is granted at the discretion of boards of zoning appeal, while a special exception must be granted if the petitioner complies with statutory criteria. The review of board decisions for both types is similar; reversal requires proof of abuse of discretion, lack of substantial evidence, or legal error. Boards' actions are presumed correct, and courts do not substitute their judgment but review findings of fact. The trial court's findings must be supported by evidence, and a reversal occurs only if there is a firm conviction of error.

In the case at hand, the trial court found that Storage met the requirements for a special exception under the Municipal Code. The Board's findings indicated the storage facility was aligned with the comprehensive plan and did not detrimentally affect health, welfare, morals, or safety, as it was better suited for an industrial area. No evidence was presented to suggest adverse effects on the community.

Regarding property values, the Board claimed Storage failed to prove the facility wouldn't diminish them. However, evidence indicated the facility would have a neutral or positive effect on neighboring properties, while concerns from remonstrators were unsupported by evidence. As Storage sufficiently demonstrated compliance with the requirements, the trial court determined the Board’s denial was an abuse of discretion.

Storage demonstrated that its proposed use would not hinder the development of surrounding properties in the district. The Board's contrary conclusion was based solely on claims that the facility was inconsistent with nearby uses and should be relocated to an industrial area to promote office and retail growth along Broadway. However, evidence—including testimonials and photographs—showed that Broadway in that vicinity is a typical urban strip, featuring gas stations and fast food restaurants, contradicting the Board's perception of it as an exclusive area. The Board's finding lacked evidential support, leading to the trial court's conclusion that it constituted an abuse of discretion.

On the matter of infrastructure provisions, the Board failed to provide a determination, stating "no comment." Evidence indicated that Storage had agreed to modify its design per planning office requests and contribute $5,000 for storm drainage projects. Additionally, plans for an access road, landscaping, on-site security, and compliant facade materials were established, with no opposing evidence presented. Although typically such inadequacies warrant remand for further findings, the Board acknowledged that Storage met the infrastructure requirements, negating the need for remand.

Regarding ingress and egress, the Board claimed Storage did not adequately address traffic management. Conversely, Storage had submitted a plan featuring secured access, a frontage road, and limited turning points from Broadway, alongside potential deceleration lanes. The Board's decision was again inconsistent with the evidence, leading the trial court to determine it was an abuse of discretion.

Lastly, the Board ruled that Storage did not demonstrate a public necessity for its use, noting the lack of evidence indicating that public storage units are essential. This conclusion reflects a misunderstanding of the definition of public necessity.

The concept of 'public necessity' is not explicitly defined in the Code, but it is related to IND. CODE 8-2-7-15, which pertains to common carriers' applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity. Although the issues at hand involve zoning ordinances and local boards, the principles from certification cases are relevant due to the similarities in administrative action and review, and both are afforded similar deference. Indiana courts and legislation have not provided a precise definition of 'public necessity,' acknowledging its inherent ambiguity. Consequently, the evidentiary standards for public convenience and necessity largely rely on the discretion of the relevant agency.

In this case, the local legislature requires a public necessity prerequisite for special exceptions, but this does not grant the Board unrestricted authority to deny permits. Public necessity must be interpreted in an economic and social context, indicating it does not equate to absolute necessity. The Board is also mandated to provide a rational connection between its findings and conclusions, along with a clear explanation for its decisions.

The Board failed to meet these requirements. Although evidence of market need was presented by Storage, the Board incorrectly differentiated between economic need and public necessity, interpreting the latter as absolute necessity. This interpretation risks making special exceptions unattainable, as it would require proof that the community's health, welfare, safety, and morals would suffer without the proposed use. The Code allows for special exceptions per IND. CODE 36-7-4-918.2, and the Board's discretion cannot negate these provisions. Furthermore, the Board's conclusion regarding adverse effects on property values was unsupported and mischaracterized the evidence presented.

Evidence presented indicates that while personal storage facilities may deteriorate if unprofitable, this is applicable to many commercial entities, and does not substantiate the Board's assertion of inevitable rapid depreciation and deterioration of such structures. Zoning ordinances, which limit common law rights, should be interpreted to favor land use; thus, extending restrictions through implied interpretations is not permissible. Allowing the Board's interpretation of public necessity could excessively limit land use by making a statutory criterion for special exceptions nearly unattainable. Zoning ordinances should be construed to uphold their validity, and the Board’s overly broad interpretation lacks a guiding standard, undermining the 'public necessity' requirement. Administrative agencies must operate with clear standards to remain valid. The evidence demonstrates that Storage fulfilled all statutory requirements for a special exception, warranting the court's affirmation of the exception. Judges Miller and Shields concur.

The case was reassigned on January 2, 1991. The Board failed to issue findings of fact on Storage's application for a special exception within the mandated five-day period as per Indiana Code 36-7-4-919, which the trial court deemed gross negligence. The Board contested this finding. However, it was determined that the late entry of the findings was a harmless error since no party was prejudiced by the delay and the trial court did not base its decision solely on this late entry. The findings were submitted just four days late, and while no harm resulted, the importance of adhering to legal timelines was emphasized, warning other boards against justifying delays based on this case.

The document distinguishes between types of special exception ordinances: those that allow discretion, akin to variance ordinances, where a petitioner must demonstrate no injury to public health or welfare; and strictly regulatory ordinances, which require petitioners to meet specific criteria, compelling the board to grant the exception upon compliance. The ruling referenced past cases affirming these distinctions. Additionally, it clarified that remonstrators are not obligated to provide contrary evidence, although a board can choose to disbelieve a petitioner's testimony with valid reasons. In this instance, the Board incorrectly noted that Storage provided no evidence, whereas Storage had presented expert testimony indicating that the proposed facility would not negatively impact property values.