Catina v. Maree

Citations: 447 A.2d 228; 498 Pa. 443; 1982 Pa. LEXIS 549

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; June 28, 1982; Pennsylvania; State Supreme Court

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On November 19, 1968, Lawrence Catina, while a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Alfred E. Maree, resulting in severe injuries. A trespass suit was initiated against Maree and Burke Chevrolet Sales, Inc. The jury trial, which began in May 1976, resulted in a verdict favoring the defendants. The appellants’ motion for a new trial was denied by the court en banc in August 1978, a decision later upheld by the Superior Court in November 1979. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the appellants' appeal in March 1980, ultimately reversing the Superior Court's decision and ordering a new trial.

The core dispute during the trial was the location of Catina at the time of the accident—whether he was on the road or on the berm, with the appellants claiming he was off the road and the appellees asserting he was on it. Witness Louis Jakubczyk testified he observed Catina standing approximately five to six feet from the road before the accident, but his prior statement indicated Catina was actually fifteen to twenty feet south of him near the edge of the highway. The appellants attempted to impeach Jakubczyk's credibility regarding this detail, and during redirect examination, defense counsel had Jakubczyk read his prior statement, which supported the defendants' position regarding Catina's location at the time of the incident.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to the reading of a witness's entire statement, asserting it had not been properly introduced through prior testimony. The court allowed the reading, noting that most of the statement had been previously read without objection. The witness described seeing the victim struck by a vehicle, asserting it was not speeding. Plaintiff's counsel sought to strike this part due to lack of foundation regarding the speed. The court indicated that since this part of the statement had been offered, the witness could continue reading. Plaintiff's counsel renewed the motion to strike based on earlier objections. The appellants argued that permitting the entire statement was erroneous, as it exceeded the prior examination's scope and included an improper opinion on speed. The document referenced legal principles indicating that a party must present all desired testimony during direct examination, and redirect examination should only address matters drawn out in cross-examination. Pennsylvania law permits the introduction of relevant portions of a prior statement for rehabilitation after impeachment, but those portions must directly relate to the prior testimony. The court noted that the defense did not dispute the speed statement's irrelevance to previous testimony and rejected the argument that the entire statement was necessary for context, stating it lacked merit.

The reading of the witness statement regarding the vehicle's "not traveling at excessive speed" was deemed irrelevant to the circumstances surrounding the statement and did not aid in addressing the impeachment of the witness. The court found that this portion of the statement exceeded the permissible scope of redirect examination, as it did not pertain to the witness's location or observations relevant to the case. Furthermore, the statement violated the opinion evidence rule, as lay witnesses can only provide numerical estimates of speed, while terms like "fast" or "excessive" lack evidentiary value.

The trial court had previously disallowed similar testimony, and the Superior Court agreed that allowing the testimony about the vehicle's speed was improper, although it deemed the error harmless. However, given the case's focus on witness credibility and the potential impact of the testimony on the jury's perception of the vehicle's speed and the incident, the Superior Court's assessment of harmlessness was not accepted.

Regarding the timeliness of objections to the testimony, appellants' counsel objected immediately before and after the speed statement was read, preserving the issue for appellate review. The lower court's claim that the objections were untimely due to the timing of the objection was rejected, as longstanding rules allow for objections made prior to the introduction of objectionable evidence to be considered timely.

Consequently, the Opinion of the Superior Court was reversed, and a new trial was granted. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Roberts and Nix, who argued that the remand for a new trial was unwarranted and that the objection to the testimony was not timely made.

Appellant introduced a statement during the examination of Mr. Jakubczyk but did not object when defense counsel requested that the entire statement from November 19, 1968, be read. Appellant only objected after three-quarters of the statement had been read, which reinforced information already presented during recross-examination. Even if the objection were considered timely, its overruling was not deemed reversible error. The full statement, while exceeding the bounds of recross-examination and including improper opinion testimony, did not prejudice the appellant. As impeachment evidence, it supported the appellant's argument that Jakubczyk's trial testimony was inconsistent—specifically, his prior assertion of witnessing the victim being struck by a vehicle conflicted with his trial claim of not seeing the impact. The statement also contradicted the defendant's testimony about his driving lane. Given that Jakubczyk recanted his earlier statement during trial, the jury likely gave little weight to his prior claims, particularly regarding the vehicle's speed. The record did not provide grounds to overturn the jury's verdict in favor of the appellee, leading to the recommendation to affirm the Superior Court's decision. In dissent, Justice Nix argued that allowing the reading of the entire statement was not prejudicial error, highlighting the trial court's discretion in determining the scope of redirect examination and referencing legal principles that allow for adjustments in customary procedures.

In Kline v. Kachmar, the court examined the boundaries of re-direct examination following cross-examination but found no relevant guidance from the case. McCormick's Evidence indicates that judges may allow parties to introduce relevant material during re-direct that was inadvertently omitted during direct examination. In this case, the witness, Louis Jakubczyk, testified under oath that he did not witness the accident, and any contradictions in his prior statement only affected his credibility, not the appellant's position. The court concluded there was no prejudice against the appellant and determined that the trial judge did not abuse discretion, thus supporting the Superior Court's decision. Additionally, notes clarify discrepancies in a witness's name and address issues regarding circumstantial testimony and its relevance, which were not addressed due to the resolution of the primary issue. Federal courts also apply similar principles regarding evidence as noted in multiple cases.