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People v. White
Citations: 555 N.E.2d 1241; 198 Ill. App. 3d 641; 144 Ill. Dec. 722; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 882Docket: 4-88-0954
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 15, 1990; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Defendant Randall D. White was convicted following a jury trial for aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential burglary, and unlawful restraint. On appeal, he argued that the court erred by admitting testimony regarding out-of-court statements made by the four-year-old alleged victim, S.G., and requested resentencing due to the inclusion of inadmissible evidence concerning his past criminal behavior. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. S.G. did not testify during the trial; instead, five witnesses provided testimony about statements she had made to them. Key witness Tony DeVore, S.G.'s babysitter, recounted being alerted by S.G.'s screams and testified that S.G. described the defendant's actions, including details about being choked and touched inappropriately. DeVore's recounting of S.G.'s statements was allowed as spontaneous declarations, an exception to the hearsay rule. Other witnesses included S.G.'s mother, a police officer, a nurse, and a doctor, all of whom contributed to the understanding of the incident that occurred in S.G.'s home when she was being babysat. The court's decision to affirm the convictions was based on the admissibility of the testimony provided by these witnesses and the nature of S.G.'s statements. Defense counsel's objection to Grigsby's testimony regarding S.G.'s statements was overruled, similar to an earlier ruling concerning DeVore's testimony. Grigsby recounted that S.G. described waking up to Randy in the room, who covered her mouth and threatened her with violence if she screamed. S.G. indicated that Randy had touched her inappropriately. Grigsby observed that S.G. appeared scared and agitated, and she noticed bruises or red marks on S.G.'s neck that were not present earlier. Following their conversation, Grigsby called the police, and Officer Terry Lewis arrived shortly thereafter. He spoke privately with S.G., initially discussing cartoons to ease her tension. S.G. disclosed that her underwear was wet and clarified that she did not wet herself; she stated that Randy was responsible and described how he had touched her. Lewis noted fresh scratches on S.G.'s mouth and neck, which she attributed to Randy. A Polaroid photograph of these injuries was taken and admitted into evidence. Emergency room nurse Cheryl Reents later interviewed S.G. for medical purposes, and her statements were also challenged by the defense but were deemed admissible as spontaneous declarations and for medical treatment under the relevant legal statute. The court overruled an objection regarding testimony from Reents, who recounted that S.G. indicated she was touched on her genital area by a male, using the term "front part" to refer to her labia majora and surrounding tissue. S.G. clarified that the male used his mouth for the contact, but denied any other forms of touching or coercion. She mentioned a prior incident when she was cold but stated that it did not hurt her at that time. Initially, S.G. avoided eye contact and fidgeted with her ID bracelet, but later became more cooperative with Reents' open-ended questions, during which Reents observed bruising on S.G.'s neck. Dr. Michael Meinzen, the emergency room physician, testified about his interaction with S.G. shortly after 8 a.m., emphasizing the importance of patient history in diagnosis. He recounted that S.G. described being awakened by "Randy" and reiterated that he touched her mouth and neck, as well as her genital area with his mouth. When questioned about pain or further abuse, S.G. did not report any pain in her genital region and denied that anything was inserted into her. Meinzen’s questioning aimed to ensure S.G. understood the questions, and he used child-friendly terminology to facilitate this. S.G., the alleged victim, described an incident where the defendant placed his mouth over her external genitalia but did not testify further or indicate any reciprocal actions, such as touching or oral contact. A physician noted that S.G. appeared "calm and comfortable" during their conversation. The State's case relied primarily on witness testimonies regarding S.G.'s statements. The defendant challenged the admissibility of these testimonies on three evidentiary grounds: 1) the validity of spontaneous declarations as exceptions to the hearsay rule; 2) statements made to medical personnel under section 115-13 of the Code; and 3) the requirement for the prosecution to present the declarant for cross-examination or prove unavailability for the hearsay exceptions to apply. The spontaneous declaration exception allows statements made under the stress of excitement from a startling event to be admissible as reliable evidence. This principle, articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Poland, holds that such utterances occur when the declarant is overwhelmed by the event, rendering their statements trustworthy due to the lack of reflective thought. Three criteria must be met for a statement to qualify: 1) the event must be sufficiently startling; 2) there must be no time for fabrication; and 3) the statement must relate directly to the event. The Illinois Supreme Court has reaffirmed this exception in recent cases, emphasizing the reliability of spontaneous declarations made in immediate response to traumatic events. In the case reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant, Nevitt, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a three-year-old child, J.B. A central issue was whether a five-hour gap between the alleged abuse and J.B.'s out-of-court statement to his mother qualified for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. J.B.'s mother bathed him in the morning and found no abnormalities. Upon picking him up from daycare, she noticed he was withdrawn and unresponsive. After arriving home and not eating his snack, J.B. spontaneously stated, “Teacher Tony bit my dingdong,” and demonstrated the act. His mother and grandmother observed a pinkish coloration around J.B.'s genital area, and he reacted in pain when touched. Despite the initial conviction based on the mother's testimony and the defendant's written admission, the appellate court reversed the conviction, ruling that there was insufficient foundation for the mother's identification of the defendant. The State appealed this decision. The defendant contended that J.B.’s statement did not meet the requirements of the excited utterance exception due to the elapsed time and the child’s lack of spontaneous declaration. The Supreme Court noted that while the time gap typically affects admissibility, exceptions can apply when statements exhibit sufficient reliability despite hearsay constraints. The court reaffirmed the importance of the absence of time to fabricate as a factor in assessing hearsay statements. The trial judge's determination that three-year-old J.B.’s statement was reliable and qualified as an excited utterance under the hearsay rule was upheld, without abuse of discretion. Factors influencing this decision included the nature of the event, the child's mental state, and the time elapsed since the incident. J.B.’s behavior—being quiet and withdrawn rather than affectionate, and his first statement to his mother upon being picked up—suggested that his declaration was a spontaneous response to an upsetting event. His mother's question prompted an unreflected statement, which was deemed credible despite being in response to her inquiry. The absence of any motive for fabrication further supported the statement's reliability. In contrast, while the defendant acknowledged that S.G.'s statements to her babysitter DeVore qualified as spontaneous declarations, he contested the admissibility of S.G.'s statements to her mother, Grigsby, and Officer Lewis. The court addressed only the statements to Grigsby and Lewis, noting that S.G.'s statements to DeVore occurred immediately after witnessing the defendant flee the crime scene. S.G. informed Grigsby shortly after, who then quickly contacted the police, leading to a timely conversation with Officer Lewis in a private setting. The court affirmed the validity of S.G.’s statements based on their timing and context. Three statements made by S.G. shortly after her sexual assault are under scrutiny. The defendant contends that S.G.'s statement to Grigsby was not spontaneous, claiming she had "calmed down" and was influenced by Grigsby's prompting. Similar arguments are made regarding S.G.'s statements to Lewis. The court references People v. Harris, which outlines that the spontaneity of a statement is a preliminary question for the trial court, requiring consideration of the event's proximity and the declarant's circumstances. The court emphasizes that the time lapse and distance from the event are significant but not decisive in assessing spontaneity. Additionally, responses to questions do not inherently negate spontaneity. The court also cites People v. Bitler, noting that for young children, special circumstances must be considered to rule out the possibility of reflection and fabrication, as children are less likely to construct false narratives about sexual abuse. Wisconsin case law supports that children's statements regarding trauma are typically unfabricated due to psychological factors. The court concludes that the victims lacked the opportunity to fabricate their statements, thereby dismissing the defendant's arguments as unpersuasive. The trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of statements as spontaneous declarations, and its decisions are upheld unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. In this case, the court found that S.G.'s statements to DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis were spontaneous declarations and therefore admissible. Additionally, the court allowed Nurse Reents and Dr. Meinzen to testify about statements made by S.G., despite defense objections citing hearsay. The State argued these statements were admissible under section 115-13 of the Code, which allows for statements made by a victim to medical personnel for diagnosis or treatment purposes to be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Section 115-13, effective January 1, 1988, specifies that such statements, including descriptions of symptoms or causes, are admissible in certain criminal prosecutions. The precedent set in People v. Rushing illustrates that details relevant to a victim's medical condition, including threats and specifics of the alleged offense, are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment, affirming that such statements are admissible under section 115-13. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind this section is to allow a liberal interpretation of what constitutes pertinent descriptions for medical evaluation. A restrictive interpretation of the phrase in question would conflict with legislative intent. Testimonies from Nurse Reents and Dr. Meinzen affirm that the statutory criteria for a new hearsay exception were satisfied, with Dr. Meinzen specifically underscoring the necessity of patient history for accurate diagnosis and treatment decisions. The defendant contends that S.G.'s statements to the medical professionals do not qualify under the treating-physician exception to the hearsay rule, referencing *People v. Walton* to assert that a physician can only testify about a patient's current bodily conditions, not details of the offense. However, this interpretation is rejected, as section 115-13 was enacted to relax previous case law restrictions on physician testimony concerning patient communications relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment, thereby implicitly overruling *Walton*. The defendant also argues that for the out-of-court statements to be admissible as hearsay exceptions, the declarant must be either "unavailable" or produced for cross-examination, citing *Ohio v. Roberts*. He claims this requirement was not met, thus infringing on his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The argument is weakened by the omission of *United States v. Inadi*, which clarified that unavailability is not always necessary for admitting out-of-court statements when they meet established hearsay exceptions. The *Inadi* Court overruled the necessity for demonstrating unavailability in certain contexts, which the defendant's counsel failed to address, indicating a misunderstanding of current legal standards regarding hearsay and confrontation rights. Roberts does not mandate that all out-of-court statements require a showing of the declarant's unavailability for admissibility. The decision in Roberts specifically addressed the constitutional validity of introducing preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who was not present at the defendant's trial, without proposing a general standard for other hearsay situations. It emphasized that the Confrontation Clause analysis applies when the prosecution seeks to admit prior judicial testimony instead of live testimony, requiring proof of the declarant's unavailability in those specific contexts. The discussion of hearsay exceptions unrelated to the case at hand was unnecessary and may be considered obiter dicta. It is important to clarify that the unavailability of an out-of-court declarant is irrelevant to the admissibility of statements under other hearsay exceptions, except in cases like Roberts. Subsequent decisions, such as Inadi, reinforced that Roberts should not be interpreted as establishing a broad rule, and courts have often misapplied its implications. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court later limited Roberts to its particular facts, allowing for the admission of statements from available declarants in different circumstances. No definitive standard exists regarding when the admission of hearsay evidence infringes on a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. In the case of Nelson, concerning a sex offense, Judge Flaum expressed disagreement with the majority view that the complainant's unavailability was not essential for admitting her out-of-court statements against her father. He contended that the prosecution must demonstrate the complainant's unavailability to comply with the confrontation clause, which he ultimately believed had been satisfied. Judge Flaum noted that many courts interpreted the language from Roberts as necessitating a showing of the declarant's unavailability for most hearsay statements. However, he questioned the validity of this interpretation in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Inadi, which suggested that unavailability is only a relevant constitutional factor for hearsay involving preliminary hearing testimony. Flaum argued that Inadi does not reject the unavailability requirement from Roberts but instead clarifies that it is not universally applicable. The dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall in Inadi criticized the majority for narrowing Roberts' principles. Notably, Justice Blackmun, who authored Roberts, sided with the majority in Inadi, which raises questions about the interpretation of the unavailability doctrine. Flaum expressed confusion over the reasoning behind the assertion that Inadi did not repudiate Roberts and challenged those who disagree to identify stronger language that could effectively accomplish such a repudiation. Additionally, he rejected the ruling in People v. Rocha, which upheld the unavailability doctrine of Roberts, highlighting the statutory provisions allowing certain out-of-court statements for victims under 13 in sexual offense cases. A child may be deemed unavailable as a witness in legal proceedings under two conditions: if the child testifies or if there is corroborative evidence of the act in question when the child cannot testify. The Second District Court in Rocha examined this statutory requirement alongside the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, endorsing the "unavailability" doctrine from the Roberts case and affirming that Illinois statute 115-10 meets the criteria established in Roberts. However, the court acknowledged uncertainty regarding Roberts' applicability beyond its specific context, especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Inadi, which questioned the relevance of Roberts in broader situations. The Rocha court's reliance on the Illinois Supreme Court case People v. Bastien was criticized; in Bastien, the court found a statute unconstitutional that allowed a child-victim's taped statement to be admitted when the victim was available for cross-examination. The current analysis contends that Roberts retains validity only in particular circumstances, contrary to Rocha's broader interpretation. The position aligns with views from the Third District Appellate Court in People v. Unes and is supported by a recent decision from Washington's Supreme Court in State v. Palomo, where significant details about a violent incident were presented, but the victim did not testify at trial. The prosecutor's case relied solely on the testimony of the arresting officer, which included the alleged victim's statement. Defense counsel objected to this as hearsay, but the objection was overruled. The defendant did not testify. Following the evidence presentation, the defense sought dismissal, arguing that admitting the hearsay statement violated the defendant's confrontation rights due to the alleged victim's unavailability not being established. This argument was rejected, leading to the defendant's conviction for attempt (rape). On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled that the hearsay statement's admission without proof of the declarant's unavailability violated the defendant's confrontation rights. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed this ruling and noted that the trial court had admitted the officer's testimony under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, which does not require a showing of unavailability. The court clarified that the precedent set in Ohio v. Roberts, which requires unavailability for prior testimony admission, does not apply to excited utterances. It emphasized that the excited utterance exception is valid regardless of the declarant's availability, as the urgency of the event often results in more sincere and spontaneous statements. The court reaffirmed that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated, as the out-of-court statement was admissible without proof of the declarant's unavailability. The summary also referenced a similar ruling in People v. Ingram, which rejected the argument that unavailability must be shown for spontaneous declarations. Roberts should be interpreted narrowly and does not establish a requirement that all out-of-court statements must demonstrate unavailability for admissibility. In Illinois, for a spontaneous declaration to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, it must meet three criteria: it must stem from a sufficiently startling occurrence, be made before the declarant had time to fabricate, and relate to the event in question. The defendant contends that Roberts altered state law by necessitating unavailability and reliability for spontaneous declarations from unknown sources, urging the court to overrule McNeal, which he argues is inconsistent with Roberts. In McNeal, a witness's testimony about an unknown declarant advising the defendant not to act before a shooting was deemed admissible as it satisfied the excited utterance criteria. The court concludes that Roberts, as interpreted by Inadi, does not require changes to McNeal's principles. Regarding sentencing, the defendant received concurrent prison sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault (10 years), residential burglary (6 years), and unlawful restraint (2 years). Aggravated criminal sexual assault is classified as a Class X felony, with a sentence range of 6 to 30 years; residential burglary is a Class 1 felony with a range of 4 to 15 years; and unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony with a range of 1 to 3 years. During sentencing, a sheriff's investigator testified about a conversation with a seven-year-old victim, detailing the defendant's actions, which the defense objected to as hearsay without corroboration. The defendant claims this evidence was unreliable and prejudicial, but the court decides it does not need to evaluate the admissibility of the investigator's testimony given the overall circumstances of the case. A remand for resentencing was deemed unnecessary because the record did not demonstrate that any complained errors influenced the imposed sentence. The defendant, 36 years old at the time of the November 1988 hearing, had a significant criminal history, including four felony convictions and two misdemeanors, along with prior probation and a three-year sentence. Despite this, he received only a 10-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault, which was only four years above the statutory minimum and 20 years below the maximum. The defendant's specific crime involved the sexual assault of a four-year-old child after unlawfully entering the home of a former girlfriend. The court concluded that it was improbable a sentence of less than 10 years could be justified given the defendant's history and the nature of the crime. Any alleged evidentiary errors during the sentencing were determined not to be prejudicial, leading to the affirmation of the judgment and sentence. Further, Justice McCullough concurred, agreeing with the majority that certain testimonies were admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, as well as under section 115-13 of the Illinois statutes. He argued against the need to discuss the issues of unavailability and confrontation, stating that once the evidence is deemed admissible under the relevant exceptions, those factors become irrelevant. The admissibility of the statements made under the spontaneous declaration exception and for medical diagnosis or treatment was affirmed, reinforcing that the unavailability of the declarant does not affect admissibility under these exceptions.