Lockett v. Board of Education

Citations: 555 N.E.2d 1055; 198 Ill. App. 3d 252; 61 Educ. L. Rep. 212; 144 Ill. Dec. 536; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 715Docket: 5-88-0461

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 11, 1990; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Christopher Lockett, a minor, sustained a severe eye injury resulting in complete vision loss while riding a school bus after school on April 13, 1981. He, along with his mother, filed a lawsuit against the Board of Education for School District No. 189 and Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc. A jury awarded Lockett $110,000 but reduced it by $44,000 due to a finding of 40% fault on Lockett’s part. The plaintiffs' post-trial motions were denied, and the court affirmed the jury's verdict despite the plaintiffs arguing it was inconsistent. They cited previous cases where verdict inconsistencies necessitated a new trial. However, the court found no legal inconsistency in the jury's findings. In open court, the jury confirmed that their verdict was solely against Vandalia Bus Lines and not the School District, thus resolving any concerns about the verdict's clarity. The court upheld the jury's decision, affirming the judgment.

Upon receiving an irregular verdict, courts may examine the complete record to ascertain the jury's intent, requiring a reasonable basis for their findings. In a case where plaintiffs sued two defendants, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs against one defendant, the Bus Lines, confirming this through the court's inquiry. The jury intended to attribute liability solely to the Bus Lines, negating the need to amend the verdict form.

The plaintiffs challenged the court's decision to direct a verdict for the Bus Lines concerning allegations of negligence in failing to instruct students on safe bus riding practices, as mandated by the State Board of Education and the Illinois School Code. They argued that the Bus Lines was contractually obligated to fulfill this requirement based on a contract with the School District, which stated that the Bus Lines must comply with all relevant laws and regulations.

However, the court determined that the contract's language was clear and unambiguous, indicating that while the Bus Lines had to adhere to safety regulations, it was not responsible for the School District's statutory obligations regarding curriculum instruction. Consequently, the obligation to teach safe bus riding practices fell solely on the School District, and not the Bus Lines.

In loco parentis protections for discipline applicable to teachers do not extend to school bus drivers, as established in *People v. Davis*. The court is not inclined to interpret paragraph 10 of the plaintiffs' complaint as imposing section 27-26 obligations on the Bus Lines. Plaintiffs argue the Bus Lines had a contractual obligation to teach safe bus-riding practices and that the court wrongly directed a verdict on paragraph 8(a), asserting a common-law duty of care for transporting children. However, paragraph 8(a) only claims a violation of statutory or regulatory duty, with common-law arguments addressed in the context of paragraph 8(c).

Paragraph 8(c) alleges the Bus Lines was negligent for failing to adequately supervise students, which plaintiffs argue contributed to the injury of Christopher Lockett. It is asserted that bus drivers must exercise the highest degree of care in supervising children. Testimony from bus driver Geraldine McCall indicated she was attentive to safety and followed protocols for allowing children to exit the bus. The court concluded that McCall's actions did not constitute negligence, affirming the directed verdict for the Bus Lines on paragraph 8(c). Despite this, the plaintiffs still secured a verdict against the Bus Lines, but they contend that the jury's deliberation on the stricken allegations could have influenced the degree of fault attributed to them.

The plaintiffs did not provide supporting authority for their claims, leading the court to conclude that no error occurred. The cross-appeal from the Bus Lines contests the verdict based on three primary arguments: 1) insufficient evidence to demonstrate foreseeability of the danger to Christopher Lockett; 2) failure of the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of Lockett's injury; and 3) that the stop-line regulation was not designed to prevent objects from being thrown into the bus. Under Illinois law, a common carrier is liable for injuries from third-party missiles only if such incidents could have been reasonably foreseen and avoided. Testimony revealed no prior injuries from thrown objects, although witnesses acknowledged that children regularly threw rocks at the buses. Notably, the bus driver had not experienced issues with projectiles before Lockett's injury, despite being aware of the potential for objects to enter through open windows. The Bus Lines referenced a precedent case (Schwartz v. Chicago Rys. Co.) where the court ruled that prior incidents of stone throwing were not sufficient to establish foreseeability. However, the current case was differentiated due to additional contextual factors, such as children shouting and standing with open windows at the time of the incident, which heightened the danger. The jury's role in evaluating evidence and witness credibility was emphasized, indicating that the bus driver's lack of awareness prior to the incident was not determinative.

Different conclusions by the jury do not justify setting aside the verdict, as established in Lode v. Mercanio. Sufficient evidence indicates that the Bus Lines should have anticipated potential harm. The Bus Lines argued that plaintiffs did not sufficiently show foreseeability due to a lack of evidence regarding the specific locations of prior object-throwing incidents. However, unlike the circumstances in Sue v. Chicago Transit Authority, where the size and scope of the transit system affected foreseeability, the testimony from Robey and Lockett about incidents occurring on the same bus route during the school term supports foreseeability in this case. Although the bus driver was unaware of prior incidents, the jury is tasked with weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility.

The Bus Lines also claimed that plaintiffs did not prove any act or omission by the driver was a proximate cause of the injury, arguing that the evidence did not demonstrate that closing the window at the stop line would have prevented Lockett's injury. The driver’s testimony indicated that broken glass was found above the window, suggesting the object was thrown through the upper portion of the open window. Furthermore, there was no evidence that an injury from splintered glass would not occur even if the object was thrown below the stop line. The defendant maintained that the open window was merely a condition, not a cause of the injury, absolving the Bus Lines of liability.

Proximate cause involves both cause in fact and legal cause. The plaintiffs argued that if the window had been closed as per regulations, the injury would not have occurred. The jury could reasonably conclude that the "but for" test is met, indicating it is more likely than not that had the window been closed to the stop line, the object would not have entered the bus, thereby preventing the injury to Lockett.

The proximate cause analysis examines whether the Bus Lines should be liable for the plaintiff's injury, particularly considering if an intervening act, such as a third party throwing an object, absolves them of responsibility. A defendant is accountable for all foreseeable consequences of their actions. The jury found sufficient evidence to conclude that the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable result of having the bus window open beyond the stop line. 

The Bus Lines' cross-appeal raises questions about their obligations concerning the stop-line regulation. While a breach of a safety statute typically indicates negligence, not all violations are automatically negligent if the statute does not address the specific harm. The relevant regulation mandates that bus windows not be lowered below a stop line, but lacks a clear rationale for its existence. The Bus Lines reference Illinois safety standards which state that windows should allow for emergency egress while preventing children from hanging out. Testimonies from safety officials and school district personnel indicate that children are instructed not to open bus windows without permission for their safety, aiming to prevent the risk of limbs or objects being thrown out. 

Despite the regulation’s general language, the accompanying testimonies suggest it was indeed aimed at preventing the type of harm experienced by the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by permitting the Bus Lines' witness to testify about the stop-line regulation while excluding their own witness on the same matter. The Bus Lines' witness asserted that the regulation's purpose was to prevent children from extending their heads and limbs outside the bus.

Dennis Streif, vice-president of the Bus Lines, was called as a witness by the plaintiffs. When questioned about the purpose of the stop-line regulation—specifically regarding its role in preventing objects from being thrown through open windows—the court upheld a defense objection, preventing Streif from answering. The plaintiffs argue that had Streif been allowed to testify, he would have confirmed that the regulation aimed to keep children from hanging out of windows and to prevent objects from being thrown into the bus. They contend that the court's exclusion of Streif's testimony and allowance of Paul Stewart's opinion testimony undermined their case by effectively removing a key allegation from their complaint, leading to a disproportionate assignment of fault to Lockett by the jury.

Paul Stewart, who served as the State director of school transportation for West Virginia for 11 years and held various positions promoting safety in school transportation, provided expert testimony. The plaintiffs challenge his qualifications, claiming he lacked the expertise to comment on the Illinois stop-line regulation. However, the court found Stewart possessed specialized knowledge greater than the average layperson, and thus allowing his testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that Streif had sufficient expertise to opine on the stop-line regulation's purpose, affirming the decision to exclude his testimony. The overall assessment concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in both matters.

Sufficient evidence was lacking to establish that the individual possessed the necessary expertise in school transportation regulations to qualify as an expert or to form an expert opinion. The plaintiffs raised two issues on appeal regarding jury instructions. The court accepted plaintiffs' instruction No. 17, which outlined the duty of Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc. to exercise the highest degree of care in transporting students. However, the plaintiffs argued that the term "highest degree of care" was technical and required further definition, which the court declined to do, reasoning that conventional terms do not need explanation unless they are technical or obscure. The court found that further clarification could lead to confusion, affirming that it did not err in this regard.

Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed the trial court erred by not allowing an instruction for the jury to draw adverse inferences due to the Bus Lines' failure to produce an accident report. Evidence showed that the bus driver had prepared a handwritten report but was uncertain if it had been submitted to the Bus Lines or the School District. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the adverse inference instruction based on the presented facts.

Lastly, plaintiffs contended that the court improperly restricted their inquiry into whether Lee Ray King was designated by the School District to ensure compliance with transportation regulations. Although an objection was sustained regarding the comprehensive inquiry into all rules, the plaintiffs were still able to ask related questions that the court allowed. The trial judge maintained discretion over cross-examination scope, and the court found no abuse of discretion. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.