Munson v. County of Menominee

Citations: 124 N.W.2d 246; 371 Mich. 504; 1963 Mich. LEXIS 334Docket: Calendar 34, Docket 50,141

Court: Michigan Supreme Court; November 4, 1963; Michigan; State Supreme Court

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In Munson v. County of Menominee, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained due to alleged negligence by the defendant. The circuit court dismissed all three counts of her claim, with the plaintiff appealing the dismissals of the second and third counts. The second count contended that while employed by the Michigan Department of Social Welfare, the plaintiff was injured when a defective window shade in the courthouse fell on her head. The county's motion to dismiss was based on the assertion that operating the courthouse was a governmental function and that the payments made by the state were not rent but assistance for maintenance and alterations. The circuit judge agreed, concluding that the payments did not constitute rent and dismissed the second count. 

The third count claimed the county was aware of the window shade's prior defects, constituting a nuisance. This count was dismissed as it essentially repeated the allegations of negligence in the second count. The plaintiff argued that the determination of whether the county acted in a proprietary or governmental capacity should have been resolved as a factual issue at trial. At the time of the dismissal, Michigan Court Rule No. 18, pertaining to motions to dismiss, was in effect.

Section 3 outlines the court's authority regarding motions involving disputed facts. If the opposing party presents affidavits or proof countering the allegations, the court may hear evidence and decide on the motion. However, if there are disputed factual issues, particularly in legal actions where a jury is requested, the court may deny the motion without prejudice. In this instance, the trial judge allowed testimony concerning a defense of immunity raised in a motion to dismiss, as no jury demand was made. The judge’s decision to consider witness testimony was deemed appropriate, supported by precedent from Case v. City of Saginaw, where the court upheld a trial court's discretion to take proofs on factual issues during a motion to dismiss.

In Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority, a motion to dismiss was reversed because the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to present evidence supporting the proprietary nature of the defendant's actions. Here, the plaintiff was allowed to present such evidence. The case raises the issue of whether the evidence presented supports the defendant's claim of engaging in a governmental function related to its arrangement with the State welfare department for office space in the county building. The relevant social welfare act established the State department of social welfare and outlined the responsibilities of county departments. Testimony indicated that both the State and Menominee county agencies operated within their designated roles, with the county agency processing local applications for assistance while the State agency managed broader welfare programs. The act also mandates the creation of county social welfare departments, which include a board and necessary personnel for operations.

The county board of supervisors is responsible for providing office accommodations, equipment, and supplies for the newly established county department, which may operate as a full-time board. The board will determine the salaries and expenses of its members based on their time commitment to their duties. One member may be designated as the department director. Subject to supervisory approval, the county board will select personnel, establish qualifications, and set compensation for employees involved in relief programs not jointly funded by state and federal sources.

Members of the county board will be appointed during the annual October session and must take an oath of office by November 1, 1939. Until the new board is operational, existing welfare agencies will continue to manage relief work under current laws. Cities with populations over 300,000 may be excluded from county social welfare jurisdiction.

The act outlines the establishment of a county social welfare board and details the selection process for its members. It indicates the legislature's intention to create a local authority capable of providing relief at the county's expense, clearly distinguishing between state and county functions. The requirement for the supervisors to provide suitable office space aligns with the overall purpose of the act, acknowledging that modifications to county facilities may be necessary. 

Financial arrangements between the state and county regarding office space include a shared payment structure, with the state covering approximately half of the costs for five years, followed by a reduction in payments. Payments of $194.04 are to be made semiannually, without the expectation of profit for the county. The arrangement is based on correspondence recognizing that the state agency serves the county's residents in fulfilling state responsibilities.

The arrangement between the county and the State for office space occupancy implies a proprietary function if it involved compensation. The specific amount or method of determining this compensation is not critical. 'Rent' is defined broadly, encompassing any form of compensation for the use of real estate, including money, services, or goods, and is not altered by stipulations regarding its application. In the current case, there was no explicit agreement that payments would be used for specific purposes related to the county building, indicating that the payments should still be regarded as rent. Previous case law, such as Ryerson v. Quackenbush, supports that the intended use of rent does not change its character or enforceability. The county’s provision of office space to the State’s welfare department is characterized as a proprietary function rather than a governmental one, as the State's use does not affect this classification. Furthermore, case precedents like Sawaya v. Tucson High School District No. 1 demonstrate that entities can be liable for negligence when operating in a proprietary capacity, as opposed to a governmental function. Similar conclusions arise from Dohm v. Township of Acme, confirming that leasing arrangements can be deemed proprietary if they do not involve governmental functions.

The trial judge erred in concluding that providing space in the county building to the State welfare department constituted a governmental function. The defendant was not fulfilling a public duty but was acting under a contractual obligation. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the third count, which alleged a nuisance known to the defendant, should have been denied, as this nuisance did not arise from a governmental function. The question of whether the situation constituted a nuisance remains a factual matter for trial. Prior case law, including Brown v. Nichols, Dahl v. Glover, and Bluemer v. Saginaw Central Oil Service, was referenced to support these principles. The case is remanded to the circuit court to reinstate counts 2 and 3 of the plaintiff's declaration for further proceedings. Concurrences were noted from DETHMERS, KELLY, SOURIS, and SMITH, with BLACK and KAVANAGH concurring in the result and O'HARA not participating.