People v. Cox

Citations: 693 N.E.2d 483; 295 Ill. App. 3d 666; 230 Ill. Dec. 354; 1998 Ill. App. LEXIS 210Docket: 4-97-0154

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; April 3, 1998; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Willie J. Cox was convicted of possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine following a bench trial on October 29, 1996, and sentenced to 30 months' probation, part of which included a concurrent nine-month jail term. Cox appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest and seeking a $5-per-day credit against a $400 fine. 

The appeal arose from the events of March 29, 1996, when Cox was arrested in a Pizza Inn parking lot. He claimed he was detained without a warrant or probable cause and testified that he was approached by police while trying to use a phone. He stated he complied with the officers' request to place his hands on the squad car and, while doing so, attempted to discard cocaine from his pocket, which the police seized. 

Conversely, Officer James Smutz testified that he received a dispatch about a robbery suspect described as a black male in a blue shirt. After observing Cox, who did not match the description, Smutz approached him and witnessed him pulling something from his pocket, leading to the discovery of the cocaine. 

Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court's decision, implying that the evidence obtained was not lawfully acquired.

Officer Smutz could not recall if he informed the defendant of the need to search him for evidence of a stolen wallet before the defendant reached into his pocket. However, he later testified that at the grand jury hearing, he stated they stopped the defendant prior to him pulling cocaine from his pocket and explained the reason for the stop, indicating they needed to check him for items taken from the wallet. Upon being told they needed to check him, the defendant immediately put his left hand into his pants pocket, which the officers assisted in retrieving. Smutz confirmed the defendant was wearing a blue and green shirt but could not specify the pattern. The trial court found the police had lawful grounds to detain the defendant to investigate his connection to the wallet theft, and deemed the defendant's action of retrieving the cocaine an 'intervening cause' leading to its discovery, resulting in the denial of the motion to suppress.

During the bench trial on October 29, 1996, Officer Smutz reiterated his earlier testimony, stating he and Officer Dicken approached the defendant, explained the theft in the area, and asked him to put his hands on the car. The defendant then quickly reached into his pocket and pulled out the cocaine. He was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and taken to the library for a show-up identification, where he was cleared of the theft charge. The trial court ultimately found the defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance.

The State argued that the defendant waived his right to appeal the motion to suppress by not raising the issue in a posttrial motion, referencing People v. Enoch, which established waiver rules but noted exceptions for constitutional issues. The court recognized the defendant's challenge to the motion to suppress as a constitutional issue, making it reviewable despite the lack of a written posttrial motion. The State also contended, supported by Terry v. Ohio, that the officers had lawful grounds to detain the defendant for investigation related to the theft. The court agreed with the State's position.

The State argues that the officers legally seized cocaine from the defendant under two grounds: first, that the cocaine was discovered during a lawful Terry frisk for weapons, and second, that the defendant exposed the cocaine to the officers' plain view by pulling it from his pocket. However, the conclusion is that the seizure was not valid for two reasons: the search for the proceeds of a theft surpassed the permissible scope of a Terry frisk, and the cocaine was not legally seized under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the cocaine must be suppressed as it is considered a fruit of an illegal search, violating the Fourth Amendment.

The Terry case established a standard for lawful "stop-and-frisk" encounters, allowing police to stop and question individuals based on specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, even in the absence of probable cause. Relevant Illinois law codifies this as allowing temporary questioning of individuals in public if officers have reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in a crime.

In this case, Officer Smutz justified stopping the defendant based on a general description that he believed matched a robbery suspect and the defendant's location. However, discrepancies arose since the defendant was significantly larger than described, wore a distinctly different patterned shirt, and did not display signs of recent exertion. The vague nature of the description did not provide a reasonable basis for the stop, as supported by precedent in People v. Washington, where a similar motion to suppress was denied despite claims of fitting a suspect's description.

Officers testified at trial that they stopped the defendant based on a radio dispatch describing a robbery suspect, but no details from the dispatch were provided. They claimed to have seen drugs in plain view inside the defendant's car. The trial court initially reconsidered a motion to suppress evidence but allowed the State to attempt to present additional evidence of the dispatch description later. The State's offer of proof indicated the suspect was a "male black wearing a blue coat and black hat" who had fled westbound into Chatham Park. The trial court allowed the motion to suppress, with the Washington court affirming that general descriptions were insufficient for an investigatory stop without specific details.

The Washington court noted that the defendant’s clothing did not match the dispatch description, and there was no evidence he was acting suspiciously. However, in this case, the suspect's description was more specific, including height and a short-sleeved blue shirt, and the defendant was found shortly after the robbery in proximity to the suspect's last known location. The absence of other individuals matching the description further supported the officers' belief that the defendant fit the suspect's profile, despite being taller than described. The court concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion for the stop under the Terry standard and related legal provisions. However, the court also determined that the subsequent search, which led to the discovery of cocaine, was not valid under Terry, emphasizing that a frisk for weapons is only permissible when there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous.

Section 108-1.01 of the Code authorizes peace officers to conduct a search for weapons during a temporary stop if there is a reasonable suspicion of danger. In the case at hand, Officer Smutz did not inquire about the defendant's involvement in the robbery or whether the defendant was armed. He failed to express any belief that the defendant posed a safety threat. The crime being investigated was non-violent and did not involve a weapon. Officer Smutz's testimony indicated he informed the defendant he would search for a stolen wallet, after which the defendant attempted to discard cocaine. The officer could not recall if the attempt to discard occurred before or after the warning about the search. 

The court highlights that the validity of a Terry frisk is based on an objective standard, although the officer's subjective feelings can be considered in evaluating the totality of circumstances. The search was deemed invalid because it was conducted in pursuit of evidence, not for officer safety, and the circumstances did not suggest the defendant was dangerous. This situation mirrors the precedent set in People v. Galvin, where the absence of articulable facts for the frisk led to the suppression of evidence. The State's argument that the police could have searched the defendant's fist was rejected due to the lack of evidence indicating that Officer Smutz believed the defendant had a weapon in that context, contrasting with the precedent in People v. Christensen.

The State argues that the cocaine discovered cannot be classified as fruits of an illegal search since no search had occurred prior to its discovery. The case is likened to instances where seizures were justified under the plain view doctrine following lawful Terry stops, where defendants discarded contraband visible to police. In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court explained that the legality of seizing property in plain view depends on the legality of the officer's prior intrusion. The Court ruled that the officer's actions did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment as the initial stop was lawful and the contraband was observed lawfully in plain view.

In contrast, the current case differs since the defendant attempted to discard the cocaine after being informed of a forthcoming search, which the court found violated the Fourth Amendment. This distinguishes it from cases like People v. Tribett and People v. Holman, where the police actions did not breach Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the plain view doctrine does not apply here, leading to a conclusion that the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was erroneous, resulting in the reversal of the conviction. The court noted that it need not address the issue of a credit against the defendant's fine, although the State acknowledged the defendant would be entitled to a credit of $150 per established precedent. The judgment was reversed, with Judges Knecht and Cook concurring.