Lincoln v. State

Citations: 882 A.2d 944; 164 Md. App. 170; 2005 Md. App. LEXIS 191Docket: 742, Sept. Term, 2004

Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; September 14, 2005; Maryland; State Appellate Court

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Leroy Lincoln, Jr. was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 25 years suspended. The appeal focused on the denial of his motion to suppress a statement made to police. The case stemmed from the 1995 murder of his father, Leroy Lincoln, Sr., which remained unsolved until Detective Tyrone Francis of the Cold Case Unit reopened the investigation in 2003. Key evidence included a statement from Lincoln's girlfriend, Monique Peterson, who indicated that Lincoln, Jr. had discussed plans to kill his father with his mother and a friend, John Ulrich. She also reported that Lincoln, Jr. claimed Ulrich killed his father with an ax handle, motivated by a desire for insurance money.

Lincoln, Jr. and his mother were arrested in North Carolina in 2002. During a police interview, he provided oral and tape-recorded statements after being advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. At the suppression hearing, Detective Francis testified that Lincoln, Jr. was not under duress, was not handcuffed, and had confirmed his understanding of his rights. The court ultimately affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the denial of the motion to suppress the statements.

Francis and Brown asserted that they did not threaten or coerce the appellant into waiving his rights or providing a statement during their one-and-a-half-hour interview. They made no promises to the appellant regarding his treatment by Maryland or North Carolina authorities, nor did they imply that he could gain release by cooperating. Throughout the interview, the appellant did not request bathroom breaks, medication, or food. 

At the start of the interview, Francis informed the appellant they were discussing the murder of Lincoln, Sr., and presented two large case files. The appellant initially denied any knowledge of the murder. Francis showed him three photographs, each with misleading handwritten notes on the back that appeared to be from others involved in the case but were actually written by Francis. The first photograph referenced a statement attributed to John Ulrich, the second to Monique Peterson, and the third to the appellant's mother, all suggesting knowledge of the murder.

Despite the misleading information, the appellant continued to deny involvement until Francis played excerpts from his mother's earlier tape-recorded statement, which did not implicate him. Francis then claimed that the appellant's mother had confessed to the murder and implicated him and Ulrich. This revelation visibly affected the appellant, prompting him to express a desire to discuss the murder. He subsequently recounted that he and Ulrich had gone to Lincoln Sr.'s house, smoked marijuana, and that Ulrich attacked Lincoln with a wooden ax handle. 

The appellant later provided a tape-recorded statement affirming that he spoke freely and voluntarily, without coercion or promises. This tape-recorded statement was submitted as evidence during the hearing.

The appellant's testimony regarding his police interview was largely discredited by the hearing judge. He claimed he requested a lawyer multiple times and was misled by Detective Francis into believing cooperation would lead to leniency. However, the court found his testimony lacking credibility, noting that he admitted to providing a statement voluntarily, under the impression that his role in the murder was minimal compared to another suspect, Ulrich. The appellant testified he believed certain writings on photographs related to him and Ulrich, but did not cite these writings as influencing his oral or taped statements. On cross-examination, he acknowledged a prior conviction for drug possession. The hearing court ruled after reviewing the tape-recorded statement and concluded that Francis's actions constituted a "form of a ruse" designed to create a false sense of security, but were not impermissibly coercive. The court determined that the appellant's will was not overborne, and thus his statement was voluntary.

In reviewing the motion to suppress, the standard of review is based on the suppression hearing record, considering evidence favorably to the State. The suppression court's factual findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous, while the ultimate determination of voluntariness is reviewed de novo. The appellant argued that police deception rendered his statement involuntary, but the State contended that the deception used was not excessively coercive. Under Maryland law, only voluntary confessions are admissible, which must comply with constitutional mandates and be freely made with the defendant's understanding of their implications.

The admissibility of a confession hinges on whether the accused's will was overborne at the time of confession or if it was the result of a rational intellect and free will. It is essential to determine whether the confession was made voluntarily, knowing, and intelligently. The State has the burden to prove that a confession was made freely and voluntarily, especially if challenged pretrial, and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. The totality of the circumstances is examined, considering factors such as the defendant's age, mental capacity, background, length of interrogation, and the presence of law enforcement officers. While some factors may carry more weight than others, a confession preceded or accompanied by threats or promises is deemed involuntary unless the State can prove those elements did not induce the confession. Conversely, an atmosphere deemed conducive to confession does not inherently render a statement involuntary, as exemplified in Rowe v. State, where the court rejected claims of psychological coercion despite friendly interrogation tactics. Similarly, in Fuget v. State, the court found that the officer's sympathetic demeanor did not amount to coercion.

The use of police deception is a relevant factor in assessing whether a defendant's will was overborne during interrogation. While trickery or deceit can be part of police tactics, it must not constitute an overbearing inducement. In Ball v. State, a defendant's confession was deemed voluntary despite claims of psychological coercion, as the police's presentation of two scenarios did not overpower his will. The Court emphasized that confessions are involuntary if they result from significant physical or psychological coercion, but acknowledged that individuals may be reluctant to admit guilt.

The Court of Appeals has cautioned against police deception regarding constitutional rights, as seen in Lewis v. State, where allegations of misleading statements about requesting a lawyer raised concerns, although the conviction was reversed on another ground. Various cases establish that confessions can still be considered voluntary despite police deception. In Hopkins v. State, a confession was upheld even after the officer falsely claimed an accomplice had implicated the defendant. Similar rulings were made in Frazier v. Cupp and Watkins v. State, where deceit about an associate's confession did not invalidate the confessions. In Finke v. State, numerous lies about evidence against the defendant did not render the confession involuntary. Most recently, in Whittington v. State, a confession was ruled voluntary despite a staged test meant to mislead the defendant regarding gunshot residue.

The defendant confessed 15 hours after a 'blow back' test, but the Court rejected his claim that police deception involving bogus scientific procedures automatically makes confessions involuntary. Instead, the Court applied the 'totality of the circumstances' test, concluding that the overall context, including the fake test and the time elapsed, indicated the confession was voluntary. The appellant acknowledged that some deception is permissible but argued that the officers' creation of false documents constituted a severe form of deception that should make his confession involuntary. He cited State v. Cayward, where deception involved fabricated scientific reports that misled a defendant into confessing to a serious crime. The Florida Court of Appeals ruled that while not all deception makes confessions involuntary, the use of manufactured documents requires a strict prohibition, as these documents can exert undue psychological pressure, violate public expectations of police conduct, and pose risks of misuse in legal proceedings. This precedent was referenced in State v. Patton, where the New Jersey court found a confession involuntary due to the use of police-created tangible evidence during interrogation.

An 'eyewitness' account presented in court was actually given by a police officer posing as a witness, recounting a version of events aligned with the police's beliefs from their investigation. To enhance credibility, the officer included accurate details about the defendant's prior bad acts, some against the same victim. Upon hearing a recording of this account, the defendant confessed. The appellate court overturned the conviction, citing improper psychological coercion that violated the defendant's due process rights, declaring the confession involuntary due to the use of police-fabricated documents. 

The court differentiated between general police deception and the fabrication of false documents, which it deemed unacceptable in the justice system. Other jurisdictions, however, have not uniformly adopted this strict rule. In State v. Von Dohlen, police misled a defendant by presenting a fabricated composite sketch and false evidence, yet the court concluded that the totality of circumstances did not support the claim that his confession was involuntary. Conversely, in Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, the police used a fake crime lab report during an interrogation, leading the trial court to suppress the defendant's statements. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed this decision, distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic falsehoods and emphasizing that the nature of deception, rather than its form (written vs. verbal), should determine the voluntariness of confessions. The Bessey court criticized the Cayward ruling for focusing too heavily on the medium of deception rather than its impact on the accused's willingness to confess.

Evidentiary rules aim to distinguish between authentic and fabricated documents, preventing false documents from being used in legal proceedings. In Bessey, the court determined that the detective's reliance on a falsified lab report impacted the strength of the evidence against the defendant, yet it found the confession voluntary when assessed under the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that the fabricated report did not create any undue pressure on the defendant beyond his own guilt or innocence. Similarly, in Arthur v. Commonwealth, although the police used fake reports to confront the defendant, he maintained his denial until the detective reframed the narrative, leading to a confession. The court in Arthur rejected the idea of a strict rule against the use of false documents, instead applying the totality of the circumstances test, finding that the fabricated reports did not critically impair the defendant’s self-determination.

The Maryland appellate courts have not addressed cases involving police-fabricated documents directly leading to confessions. In Whittington, there were significant distinctions from the Cayward case, where false test results induced a confession, whereas in Whittington, the defendant did not confess immediately upon learning of the test results. The Cayward court expressed concerns over the potential misuse of fabricated documents but noted that no documents were involved in Whittington, mitigating those concerns. The appellant in Whittington argued for a bright-line rule declaring that any use of fabricated documents renders confessions involuntary per se, but the court declined, stating that while fabricated documents are a relevant factor in assessing voluntariness, they do not automatically dictate the outcome. The court disputed the assumption that written false evidence exerts greater psychological influence than verbal falsehoods.

Police deception involving false statements about other suspects providing incriminating evidence does not automatically render a suspect's subsequent admissions involuntary. Relevant case law includes Hopkins and Watkins, as well as Commonwealth v. Jones and United States v. Velasquez, which illustrate that verbal misrepresentations do not inherently coerce confessions. However, if false information is presented in writing, it may be presumed coercive under the Cayward court's rule, but this presumption does not apply uniformly to all fabricated documents. The effectiveness of such documents can vary significantly based on their authenticity and the suspect's background, including education and past interactions with law enforcement. Thus, not all written deceptions exert the same influence on a suspect's decision-making. 

The primary legal objective is to ensure that confessions are voluntary and reflect the suspect's free will, rather than merely discouraging police deception. The Cayward rationale, which raises concerns about the potential misuse of fabricated documents in future cases, is deemed less persuasive. Instead, the Bessey court's approach is favored, which assesses the voluntariness of confessions based on the nature of the falsehood—specifically, whether it pertains to the crime or the evidence against the suspect. This approach aligns with the established totality of circumstances test. The Bessey ruling, supported by Holland v. McGinnis, emphasizes that the context of the deception matters significantly in evaluating whether a confession is coerced or voluntary.

No police report or eyewitness testimony was present in the case. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the defendant's claim that deception made his confession involuntary, stating that police trickery, particularly about a suspect's connection to a crime, is less likely to render a confession involuntary. While misrepresentations can lead to a confession, causation alone does not equate to coercion. The court emphasized that the key issue is the degree of coercion, which was deemed slight in this instance. The deception did not significantly distort the defendant's rational choice regarding confession, as it did not introduce extrinsic factors that would undermine his free will.

Under Maryland non-constitutional law, confessions can be deemed involuntary if they arise from factors extrinsic to the case's facts or the evidence against the suspect, such as threats of force or improper promises. The court noted that extrinsic considerations during interrogations can divert a suspect's rational thought process. The ruling clarified that using fabricated documents by police does not automatically render a confession involuntary. Instead, the totality of circumstances standard applies, considering the impact of such deception on the suspect’s decision to confess. Relevant factors include the document's type and authenticity, the supposed author, the information's nature, presentation manner, and the veracity of the information provided.

The hearing court evaluated the circumstances surrounding the appellant's interrogation to determine the voluntariness of his statements. Key issues included the police presenting fabricated witness statements to mislead the appellant into confessing. While the photographs shown to him were authentic, the handwritten statements on their backs were fakes, designed to resemble those of witnesses Peterson and Ulrich. These forgeries lacked the appearance of official authority, unlike scientific evidence, and were poorly executed, raising doubts about their authenticity.

The fabricated statements contained mostly accurate information obtained during the police investigation, intended to create the illusion that witnesses had implicated the appellant and Ulrich in a murder. Despite the deceptive tactics, the court found that these actions did not overpower the appellant's will to make a voluntary statement. He initially denied knowledge of the murder even after being confronted with the false statements, showing no change in demeanor.

It was only after hearing excerpts of his mother's recorded statement, which suggested his involvement, that the appellant admitted to being present during the murder. The interrogation lacked any coercive elements; the appellant was 26, a high school graduate, and had been informed of his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged. He stated that his confession was made freely and voluntarily, with no coercion, threats, or promises involved, and he was not under the influence of substances. Additionally, he had access to basic needs such as food and bathroom facilities during the interrogation.

The appellant had prior experience with the criminal justice system, and the police interview lasted 90 minutes with only two officers present. An independent review determined that the appellant's statements were made voluntarily, despite the presence of police-fabricated statements. The hearing court's decision to deny the motion to suppress these statements was upheld, affirming the judgment with costs assigned to the appellant. Notably, the jury acquitted the appellant of first and second-degree murder. Additionally, it was observed that Peterson had used aliases to evade arrest related to prostitution. The document also addressed spelling inconsistencies regarding the name "Ulrich," confirming the correct spelling. The legal framework discussed includes the principles of voluntariness related to confessions, referencing landmark cases such as Miranda v. Arizona and various Maryland cases that detail improper promises made by interrogators that could render statements involuntary. However, the court found that the issues of reliability and voluntariness did not intersect in this case.