Trask v. Devlin

Citations: 2002 ME 10; 788 A.2d 179

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; January 17, 2002; Maine; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Keith Trask and Todd Trafton appealed a Superior Court judgment favoring game wardens Patrick Devlin and Michael Morrison in a malicious prosecution case. They contended that the court erred by granting summary judgment, arguing that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the wardens' probable cause for charging them with possession of a deer killed at night, in violation of 12 M.R.S.A. 7406(10). Additionally, they claimed that a prior federal summary judgment ruling, which found an adequate state remedy and dismissed their federal action, should support their malicious prosecution claim under res judicata or collateral estoppel.

The case's background involved an incident on November 23, 1995, in East Corinth, where the chief of the Maine State Police heard a gunshot near Trask's home. The following morning, he observed Trask and Trafton dragging a deer back to the residence. After being notified, several game wardens, including Devlin and Morrison, investigated and concluded the deer had been killed outside of legal hunting hours based on various indicators, including the condition of the deer's body and temperature readings taken during the investigation. Trask and Trafton were charged with possession of a deer killed at night and Trafton with false registration. The wardens' expert analysis indicated the deer had died between 10 PM and 2 AM the previous night, contradicting Trafton's claim of a morning kill. The court ultimately found no merit in Trask and Trafton's claims and affirmed the judgment in favor of the game wardens.

Warden Devlin consulted with an Oregon expert who estimated the time of death for a case at between 4 A.M. and 8 A.M. on November 24. This critical information, along with the fact that an initial computer program used for testing had been deemed invalid, was not disclosed to the defense. After the first day of a jury-waived trial, the defense learned of this expert's contact and the favorable information, prompting a motion for a mistrial, which was granted by Superior Court Judge Kravchuk due to the State's failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence under M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C). The State subsequently dismissed the charges under M.R.Crim. P. 48(a). Trask, Trafton, and their wives filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Devlin and others, but the U.S. District Court ruled in favor of the wardens, finding no due process violations and that there was an adequate state remedy. Following this, Trask and Trafton initiated a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wardens, asserting that while Devlin and Morrison were not entitled to qualified immunity, Trask and Trafton failed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause for their prosecution. The court specified that to succeed in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant acted without probable cause, with malice, and that the proceedings ended favorably for the plaintiff. The court's focus was on whether there was a genuine dispute regarding probable cause, which is defined as having reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed the charged offense. Probable cause relies on a reasonable belief in the facts supporting the charge, not necessarily on the actual truth of those facts.

Material facts indicate that wardens reasonably believed: (1) A gunshot was heard near the Trask residence around 10:45 P.M. on November 23, 1995; (2) A witness heard no shots during legal hunting hours on November 24, 1995; (3) Trask and Trafton were seen walking toward the woods at approximately 7 A.M. and returned shortly after with a deer; (4) No gunshot was reported at 6:40 A.M., the time Trafton claimed to have shot the deer; (5) The condition of the deer on November 24 indicated it had not been shot during legal hunting hours, as evidenced by its lack of body heat and onset of rigor mortis. 

While malicious prosecution cases involve mixed questions of fact and law, the material facts here are undisputed, allowing the court to determine the existence of probable cause as a legal question. Trafton admitted to shooting the deer, and circumstantial evidence suggested Trask assisted in its removal. The combination of a nighttime shot, the absence of shots during legal hours, and the deer’s condition justified a calm person's belief that Trafton and Trask committed the offense of possessing a deer killed at night. Circumstantial evidence suffices to support charges or convictions, regardless of expert opinions on the time of death.

The court found that probable cause existed independently of any undisclosed exculpatory evidence, as the evidence presented was largely undisputed. The potential withholding of exculpatory evidence may lead to sanctions but does not negate probable cause. The court appropriately ruled that material facts established probable cause for prosecuting Trask and Trafton, leading to a grant of summary judgment. The court also noted that Trask and Trafton's argument regarding res judicata or collateral estoppel based on a federal ruling was not warranted. 

Judgment affirmed, with Todd Trafton listed as an appellant, and Donna Trask and Tammy Trafton as plaintiffs in the Superior Court not part of this appeal. The criminal charges against Trask and Trafton pertained to illegal possession rather than night hunting, defined under 12 M.R.S.A. 7406(5) and (10).