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Marchant v. Connelly
Citations: 140 N.E.2d 173; 335 Mass. 397; 1957 Mass. LEXIS 514
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; February 4, 1957; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
In the case of Philip G. Marchant vs. Catherine M. Connelly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addresses a tort action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Philip G. Marchant when he was struck by a vehicle operated by defendant Catherine M. Connelly. The incident occurred on June 2, 1952, at approximately 12:15 PM, as Connelly was backing her car out of her driveway on Sheldon Street. Connelly had looked for children before entering her car, saw none, and proceeded to back out slowly. After straightening her vehicle on the street, she noticed Philip and his brother on the sidewalk. Philip then crossed in front of her vehicle. As Connelly continued moving at about four to five miles per hour, she later heard something dragging under her car. Upon stopping, she discovered Philip lying under the vehicle. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant's motion for directed verdicts was denied. The court determined there was sufficient evidence of negligence to warrant the case being submitted to the jury, emphasizing that the plaintiff need not prove specific details of negligence but could rely on facts from which negligence could be inferred. The testimonies indicated that the defendant did not see Philip after he crossed in front of her car, which contributed to the determination of negligence. The jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant, having seen Philip, a young child, cross in front of her automobile, should have anticipated that he might attempt to recross the street to return to his home. Despite the narrow width of Sheldon Street, which is only twenty-two feet, the defendant was traveling in the center and appeared to give no further consideration to Philip after initially observing him. If Philip had attempted to recross, he would only need to move less than ten feet to reach the defendant's vehicle. The defendant's decision to drive approximately fifty feet before the impact suggests she should have seen Philip leaving the sidewalk, allowing her enough time to avoid the collision. Furthermore, had she noticed him in time, she could have stopped her vehicle before dragging him, exacerbating his injuries. The case aligns more closely with precedents such as D'Ambrosia v. Brest and others, rather than the cases cited by the defendant. Exceptions are overruled.