Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Oak Lawn

Citations: 377 N.E.2d 1152; 61 Ill. App. 3d 174; 18 Ill. Dec. 516; 1978 Ill. App. LEXIS 2812Docket: 77-1169

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 7, 1978; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Petitioners, consisting of nonprofit associations and individual homeowners, appealed a Cook County circuit court order that denied their request to intervene and file a motion for a new trial in a previously adjudicated case. The circuit court deemed their application untimely. The original lawsuit, initiated on July 15, 1976, by property owners and lessees, challenged the Village of Oak Lawn's denial of a site plan for a shopping center, asserting compliance with the Village's zoning ordinance and questioning the ordinance's constitutionality. The Village's Board of Trustees voted to defend against the lawsuit but, following a trial on May 3, 1977, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, directing the Village to approve the site plan.

After a change in the Village Board and president in April 1977, the new Board discussed whether to appeal the court's decision. Despite some petitioners urging an appeal, the Board ultimately voted not to pursue it, influenced by a proposed agreement with the plaintiffs concerning property development and easements. This agreement was approved by the trial court on May 27, 1977, stipulating that the original judgment would remain unchanged. The petitioners sought intervention on June 2, 1977, claiming they were previously unaware of their need to intervene, believing they were adequately represented by the Village.

The petitioners claimed that following the May 3 judgment favoring the plaintiffs, they expected the Village to continue resisting the decision, fearing a significant decrease in their property value. They submitted a motion for a new trial alongside their petition to intervene. The plaintiffs responded, asserting that the petitioners were aware of the trial and failed to timely intervene. They contended the petition was inadequate as it did not specify the property at risk. On June 9, 1977, the trial court denied the petition for leave to intervene, citing untimeliness and indicating that even if the intervention were allowed, the motion for a new trial would be without merit. 

Petitioners argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying their intervention, citing Section 26.1 of the Civil Practice Act, which allows timely intervention when existing parties inadequately represent an applicant's interests. They maintained reliance on the Village officials for adequate representation was justified until the Village's agreement on May 27, 1977, to forfeit its appeal rights. Petitioners expressed that the judgment jeopardized their homeowner interests, asserting the petition was timely despite being filed post-judgment. 

The plaintiffs countered that the petitioners were aware of the litigation well before seeking intervention, and since the issues were fully litigated, they could not contest the final judgment. They defended the Village Board's decision not to appeal, asserting it benefitted both the Village and the petitioners. The plaintiffs further contended the petition was untimely and that the Village's representation was adequate. 

The legal framework established that intervention must be timely filed, with discretion resting largely with the trial court. The Village Board's consistent policy to defend its position since shortly after the original suit was filed was cited, suggesting it was unreasonable for petitioners to anticipate any change in the Village's stance, particularly following a subsequent election.

Prior to the judgment on May 3 and the Board meeting on May 17, petitioners had no reason to doubt that the Village would adequately represent their interests. After May 17, the Board's decision not to appeal was contingent on executing an agreement by May 27, which was the point at which petitioners realized their interests would not be represented, prompting them to seek intervention. Petitioners filed their petition for leave to intervene on June 2, which was deemed timely. The trial court's denial of this petition was considered an abuse of discretion, as post-judgment intervention is permissible if it is necessary to protect the intervenor's rights. Citing relevant case law, the decision emphasized that until the Village withdrew from the case, petitioners' rights were adequately protected. The court noted that the existence of a trial did not change the representation dynamics, as petitioners reasonably believed their interests were safeguarded until the Village forfeited its right to appeal. The ruling asserted that a liberal interpretation of intervention statutes is warranted in zoning cases where municipal interests may conflict with individual homeowners' rights, contrasting cases involving private litigants, where reliance on another's representation is less justified.

A private party must act to protect their interests only when those interests diverge from the general public's. The cited Illinois cases involving public representation differ significantly from the current matter, particularly as three of them do not address the issue of timeliness. In County of Cook v. Triangle Sign Co. Inc., the petition was filed over a year post-judgment, contrasting sharply with the brief timeframe in the present case, thus not supporting claims of untimeliness. The trial court's denial of intervention based on the petitioners' purported lack of interest is questionable, as the judge expressed no concern regarding their interest. The petitioners' property location and alleged damages closely mirror a previous case where sufficient interest was recognized. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court considered the petitioners' motion for a new trial lacks merit, as the record shows petitioners were not allowed to argue this motion. Since the petition for intervention was timely, petitioners are entitled to a hearing on their motion for a new trial. Consequently, the circuit court's order denying intervention is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The opinion is supported by JIGANTI, P.J., and McGILLICUDDY, J.