Alekseev v. CITY COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA

Citations: 976 A.2d 1253; 2009 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 760; 2009 WL 2194304Docket: 1564 C.D. 2008

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; July 24, 2009; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Stan Aleskeev and the Homeowner's Association of Philadelphia (HAPCO) appealed two orders from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that denied HAPCO's motion for summary judgment and granted the City Council of Philadelphia's (Council) cross-motion for summary judgment. HAPCO claimed the Council's practice of soliciting public comment only during special meetings, while excluding it from regular meetings, violated the Sunshine Act (65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716). HAPCO also argued that limiting public comment in special meetings to specific legislative subjects contravened the Act's requirement for public input on any concern.

The case involved uncontested facts, including HAPCO's representation of property owners in Philadelphia and their claims regarding a bill passed by Council concerning housing inspection license numbers. HAPCO members alleged a lack of opportunity to address Council during the related regular meeting, while asserting that a special meeting held in March 2007, where public comments were taken, did not meet the Act’s public participation requirements.

The trial court concluded that the Council did not violate the Sunshine Act, citing a special meeting exception that allowed for public comment without a quorum present. The court found that Council complied by holding a special meeting specifically for public comments and that HAPCO members had the chance to voice their concerns, some of which were addressed in amendments to the bill.

On appeal, HAPCO maintained that the definitions within the Act necessitate a quorum for meetings to comply with public participation requirements and criticized the limitation on comment topics during special meetings. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the Council acted within the legal framework of the Sunshine Act, and thus the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Council was appropriate.

HAPCO contends that the trial court erred by not mandating a quorum of the Council during special meetings for public comment, arguing that the Act defines a 'meeting' as requiring a quorum and that a 'special meeting' is simply a type of meeting scheduled outside the regular meeting schedule. HAPCO claims that public participation should occur before the entire legislative body, and therefore, limiting public comment to committee meetings violates the Act. HAPCO further argues that allowing committees of less than a quorum to be the sole venues for public comment undermines the Act's intention for meaningful public participation in Council decisions. 

However, the court disagrees, stating that a straightforward interpretation of the Act indicates that special meetings do not necessitate a quorum. It emphasizes that when statutory language is clear, it should not be altered to pursue an assumed spirit of the law. The Act specifies that public comment must be allowed at advertised regular and special meetings, but makes an exception for those councils that had established a practice of holding special meetings solely for public comment before January 1, 1993. Additionally, the definitions of 'meeting' and 'special meeting' in the Act do not impose a quorum requirement for special meetings, and thus the court refuses to add such a requirement. The court also dismisses HAPCO's policy concerns, asserting that the Act's plain language prevents the scenario of legislative bodies forming one-member committees to circumvent public participation.

The Act restricts exceptions for special meeting policies to those in effect before January 1, 1993, a condition that the Council satisfies. This limitation is designed to prevent potential abuse by ensuring that legislative bodies cannot bypass public participation with new special meeting policies. HAPCO argues that the Council's restriction of public comment to specific proposed legislation violates the Act, which mandates that the public has the opportunity to comment on any governmental issue. However, judicial precedent, particularly Baravordeh v. Borough Council of Prospect Park, establishes that subject matter limitations on public comments are permissible and do not violate the Act. The court affirmed that the Council's policy of limiting comments to the proposed legislation is reasonable and aligns with the Act's requirements. The Council's special meetings for public comment do not necessitate a quorum and comply with public participation mandates. HAPCO's interpretation of the Act's definition of "agency" is rejected, as it overlooks that the Council and its committees are considered separate agencies authorized to conduct official business. Consequently, the court upheld the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County affirming the legality of the Council's practices.