Commonwealth v. Best

Citations: 410 N.E.2d 731; 381 Mass. 472; 1980 Mass. LEXIS 1297

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; September 5, 1980; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

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Mamie Ann Best and her son John R. McCown were indicted for the first-degree murder of Fayne Adams, Best's husband and McCown's stepfather, occurring on October 25, 1974. After a fourteen-day trial in April-May 1979, a Middlesex County jury found them guilty. They appealed on various grounds, including new claims under G.L.c. 278, § 33E. 

On the night of the murder, Officer Donald Haynes, responding to a report, discovered Adams' body in a four-door Ford Torino that had crashed into an embankment. The car's ignition was on, headlights illuminated, and a blood-covered crowbar was found inside, which could have been the murder weapon. The medical examiner indicated that Adams died from twenty-six head lacerations, suggesting he was killed elsewhere and placed in the vehicle. 

At the victim's residence, police found a significant pool of blood and bloodstains leading to the back entrance. Best, who answered the door, was informed of her husband's death and allowed to change clothes before police began questioning her about the evening's events. Best stated that Adams returned home at approximately 6:50 PM, after which he napped, had dinner, and made several phone calls until midnight. The court ultimately affirmed the convictions of both defendants.

At approximately 7:30 PM, Adams received a call indicating that a Pinkerton employee would not be working that night. A second call around 9 PM provoked an angry response from Adams, who expressed frustration and issued a directive regarding the contract. After hanging up, he made a comment about "those damn kids" driving him crazy. Adams left the house briefly and returned after about thirty minutes without explaining his absence. Later, around 11:30 PM, he informed Pinkerton Sergeant Raul Baez that he would not visit the plant he was supposed to check on due to oversleeping, instead opting to go directly to his midnight shift. 

The police later verified the first and third calls but could not confirm the second. At around 11:50 PM, Adams answered a doorbell ring and indicated he would be right out to visitors he expected to be Pinkerton trainees. Best, who was ironing clothes, did not see the visitors but noted their presence from the kitchen. After saying goodbye to Adams in the kitchen, she observed two pairs of legs outside leaning against a car. 

Following these events, Sergeant Marsell found two droplets of blood in the bathroom, and a blood test on Best revealed traces on her hand. When informed of the test results, Best questioned whether she had killed her husband, despite later claiming ignorance of his murder until November 6. However, she was seen searching her yard for blood or signs of struggle on October 26. The police, initially focusing their investigation on several Pinkerton employees, particularly Baez, who had previously argued with Adams, did not suspect Best due to her physical stature. 

Best was re-interviewed by the police on October 26, with McCown present, but they made no deductions regarding his relationship with her. On November 9, Best was again interviewed, and the police examined Adams' safety deposit box, which contained multiple life insurance policies. In February 1976, CNA Insurance investigator John J. Healy began looking into Adams' death, coordinating with Massachusetts authorities. He discovered that a car registered to McCown was parked at Logan airport from October 25 to November 18, 1974. Additionally, Kenneth Coldwell, a babysitter for Best, reported being at her house on October 25, where he took a call about the Marquis's arrival in Boston that evening.

The Marquis was encountered by three individuals at the baggage area after arriving from Charlotte, North Carolina. McCown, carrying a suitcase, claimed he had trouble finding the airport and indicated his car was nearby. Edward Shea later suggested that McCown may have arrived in Holliston before the murder. Shea recounted hitchhiking home on October 24, 1974, and being picked up by a man named "John" from South Carolina, although he could not identify McCown as the driver. Investigators uncovered a conversation between McCown and the Marquis, where the Marquis proposed to "knock off" Adams, which McCown reacted to animatedly. 

Healy interviewed McCown on April 14, 1976, where McCown claimed he had been informed of Adams' death by Best's sister and had flown to Boston on October 25. He denied having a car in Massachusetts and stated he used Best’s cars for the return trip. During a subsequent interview in July 1976, McCown admitted to lying about his arrival and recounted driving to Boston on October 24, arriving early on October 25, and checking into a motel without contacting anyone. He later learned of Adams' murder through the radio. 

Further investigation indicated McCown's timeline may not have been truthful, suggesting he could have arrived earlier and been involved in the homicide. On May 17, 1977, Samuel Joe Cole, McCown's partner after the Marquis, testified about a confession from McCown, who allegedly admitted to driving to Massachusetts with the intent to kill Adams, using a crowbar in the act. Cole's credibility was scrutinized during the trial, especially since he had accompanied McCown to police interviews.

In May 1977, Best reaffirmed McCown's earlier claim of having flown to Boston without a car. During this time, she provided a handwriting exemplar linked to multiple insurance policies taken out on Adams' life. The Commonwealth presented six policies at trial, five of which were issued after Best and Adams married in March 1971. Four policies were created within a year of Adams' death, with the latest effective less than a month prior. Notably, a National Service life policy issued before their marriage paid $20,000 upon death, while two policies from Mutual of New York provided $10,000 and $20,000 for accidental death. An Imperial Casualty Co. policy from April 1974 paid $25,000 under specific conditions, and a National Casualty Co. policy from May 1974 paid $5,000 for accidental death in aircraft or $10,000 otherwise. The largest policy, a CNA Insurance Co. policy for $50,000, was allegedly forged by Best, as testified by handwriting expert Elizabeth McCarthy. Best was the sole beneficiary of most policies, standing to gain around $101,000, of which approximately $78,000 had been collected by trial time, partly used to purchase a car for McCown.

At trial, Best claimed a loving relationship with Adams, but Baez, after initial reluctance, testified about an ongoing affair with Best, revealing her derogatory comments about Adams. The Commonwealth’s theory posited that Best and McCown were co-conspirators in Adams' murder. Although the evidence against Best was weaker than against McCown, the trial judge properly allowed the jury to consider her case. The jury could infer that Best had motives for the murder, including financial gain from the insurance policies and a desire to escape her relationship with Adams. It was suggested that Best may have signaled McCown to come to Massachusetts, where he killed Adams with a crowbar, and that the body was moved to avoid implicating Best. Best was positioned near the crime, suggesting her potential complicity in the murder.

A narrative was recounted to divert suspicion from Best and McCown regarding events on October 24. Their coordinated account was disproven by compelling evidence, leading to their potential guilt in the premeditated murder of Adams. Best received insurance proceeds that benefited McCown, indicating a shared intent in the crime. Although the evidence against Best was circumstantial, it was deemed sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as circumstantial evidence can form a convincing case through probable inferences. Best contended that the evidence could also imply her status as an accessory after the fact, which would absolve her of legal guilt. However, evidence of forgery and other factors contradicted this defense. Best argued that mere indications of "consciousness of guilt" were inadequate for conviction, but the Commonwealth’s case presented more substantial evidence.

Regarding preindictment delay, Adams was murdered on October 25, 1974, but indictments were not issued until June 16, 1978. Motions filed by Best and McCown claimed that the delay prejudiced their defense due to unavailability of key evidence and witnesses, but these motions were denied. The court emphasized that the burden of proving a due process violation due to delay is significant and must show substantial prejudice and intentional tactical advantage by the prosecution. The defendants’ pretrial motions lacked factual support, as no affidavits were submitted nor was an evidentiary hearing requested. General assertions were insufficient for the severe remedy of dismissal. Even if later evidence was considered, the judge's initial conclusion regarding the complexity of the case would remain valid.

An investigation among Pinkerton employees initially suggested the defendants were wrongly implicated, particularly considering discrepancies in accounts of McCown's arrival in Boston. By July 1976, the Commonwealth recognized inconsistencies but lacked sufficient evidence for an indictment. In August, Cole disclosed McCown's confession to South Carolina authorities, complicating Massachusetts's ability to act until May 1977, when Cole's statement was finally secured. Best's handwriting sample gathered in May 1977 was crucial for linking her to the crime. The prosecution's subsequent task involved evaluating circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the defendants, where some delays in the process were deemed justifiable.

Claims of prejudice due to delays were largely unconvincing. Although certain records were lost, there was no evidence that this significantly harmed the defense. Witnesses who had died or were absent at trial were not shown to have had a substantial impact on the case. The trial judge found that the Commonwealth was not responsible for the delay from October 1974 to June 1978, and the defendants' memory issues alone did not warrant due-process protections.

Best sought to sever her trial from McCown's, citing potential prejudicial statements he made that could implicate her. The Commonwealth proposed that with careful witness instruction, the issue could be mitigated, and the judge concurred after reviewing the statements in camera.

The court mandated that any statements made by Mr. McCown that could implicate Mrs. Best be excluded from the testimonies of witnesses Burns, Healy, and Cole. Specifically, these exclusions included references to McCown’s motives for killing Adams, any agreements regarding financial gains from Adams' death, and any correspondence between McCown and Best related to these matters. The judge required the prosecutor to ensure the witnesses adhered to these limitations and conducted a voir dire to confirm their understanding. Although Best's counsel acknowledged the judge's handling as "exemplary," they had previously objected to the denial of a severance request. 

Best raised three main issues during the trial indicating a need for severance. First, while Bell's testimony was not redacted as it did not implicate Best, the prosecutor's closing argument linked Bell's statements to Best’s alleged motive concerning a forgery, which Best claimed violated a limiting instruction, though no objection was made at trial. The court noted that the prosecutor could argue distinct motives, which the jury was reminded of through a final charge.

Second, Best contended that her close relationship with McCown hindered her ability to mount a defense that placed blame on him for the murder while portraying herself merely as an accessory after the fact. However, this issue was not raised during the trial, and the judge likely would not have found it persuasive had it been.

Third, Best argued that the joint trial affected her counsel's ability to cross-examine Cole effectively, as they pursued inquiries into Cole's bias and credibility, including his reactions to McCown's marriage and his animosity towards Best. Despite these efforts, the court allowed for some exploration of Cole's character and past events, including McCown's acquittal of a separate murder charge.

Cole previously pleaded guilty to being an accessory before and after the fact and testified as a prosecution witness in McCown's trial. During cross-examination, Cole's credibility was challenged by suggesting he murdered McGee and falsely implicated McCown to facilitate their imprisonment together. The judge restricted inquiries that would directly implicate McCown in the murder of Diane to prevent undue prejudice, despite objections from Best, who did not renew her motion for severance. The judge's discretion in controlling the scope of cross-examination, particularly regarding witness bias, was upheld as reasonable. McCown's counsel also expressed concern over questions suggesting McCown's involvement in the McGee homicide, with numerous objections raised during cross-examination. Some questions regarding Cole's actions and statements were objected to and sustained, while others were allowed, indicating a complex interplay of procedural objections and the judge's rulings aimed at balancing fair cross-examination with protecting McCown's rights.

McCown contends that the extensive references made during the cross-examination of Cole by Best's counsel negatively impacted his case. However, the court found that these references did not significantly distract from the main case, and McCown failed to assert any claim of cumulative prejudice during the trial. The court noted that there was no justification for McCown's trial counsel's failure to object, citing precedents such as Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald and Commonwealth v. Adams. McCown admitted that his counsel should have objected sooner, but the Commonwealth suggested that the lack of objection may have been intentional, as it was believed that the counsel did not mind the attacks on Cole until they directly threatened McCown. The judge's rulings on objections were generally found to be appropriate, with most responses from Cole being innocuous.

Additionally, the court addressed the issue of whether McCown's interview with law enforcement constituted a custodial interrogation, as he had not received Miranda warnings. The trial judge denied a motion to suppress evidence from this interview. The court described the events leading up to the interview, noting that officers Healy and Burns were in the area to speak with McCown and sought permission from the local sheriff's office. After an unsuccessful attempt to find McCown at his trailer, they were informed by deputy sheriffs that McCown was likely inside. The next day, McCown was located when he was seen leaving with Cole, leading to the officers identifying themselves when they pulled over Cole's vehicle.

McCown recognized Healy during an April interview and, along with Cole, was heading to the sheriff's office to ascertain the situation. Cole inquired if McCown was under arrest, to which Burns replied negatively. Upon arrival, Cole stayed in the waiting area while McCown entered an interview room with Healy, Burns, and Deputy Sheriff Harkless for about an hour, without any recording equipment. Although the door was closed, Cole entered to offer McCown a drink, and when Harkless attempted to ask a question, McCown declined to respond. Burns stated that McCown was free to leave and was not considered a suspect, although the interview ultimately focused on him.

After the interview, McCown left without issue and agreed to meet Healy and Burns for a lie detector test, which he did not attend, with no follow-up occurring for over two years until his arrest. Defendants argued that the car chase and trip to the sheriff's office indicated coercion; however, the judge found that both McCown and Cole felt relieved upon realizing their pursuers were a police officer and an insurance investigator, not hostile individuals. The judge concluded that McCown had intended to go to the sheriff's office voluntarily, and any coercive implications from the chase dissipated with the disclosure of identities and the confirmation that McCown was not under arrest.

The voluntary nature of McCown's travel to the police station suggested a noncustodial investigation, despite the interview's location. The judge characterized the interview as informal, with McCown having significant influence over its direction, stating he could terminate the interview at any time. The judge's findings were accepted as warranted by the evidence, and the conclusion that the interrogation was noncustodial was deemed sound, contrasting with a previous case where coercion was evident.

Haas was determined to be under custodial interrogation from the outset. McCown objected to Bell's testimony regarding a conversation between McCown and the Marquis, where McCown seemed enthusiastic about a suggestion to eliminate Adams. While McCown claimed the conversation was light-hearted, Bell described it as jovial. The judge allowed the jury to hear this testimony, focusing on its relevance to McCown's state of mind, concluding that the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. The decision aligns with precedent, emphasizing the court's discretion in admitting relevant evidence.

Regarding McCown's choice not to testify, the judge informed him that he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege concerning the McGee murder charge due to double jeopardy protections. The judge indicated that questions related to McGee would be permitted only if shown to be relevant, a determination that would occur at trial. After initially expressing a desire to testify, McCown ultimately chose not to, and on appeal, he claimed that the judge's comments discouraged him from taking the stand. The court found no error in the judge's conduct, stating that McCown's counsel was adequately present to advise.

Concerning jury instructions, the defendants did not object to the judge's charge on reasonable doubt, which was deemed sound. However, they argued that remarks about balancing societal safety with the rights of the innocent diluted the reasonable doubt standard. They cited prior cases where similar comments compromised the presumption of innocence, but the court did not find sufficient grounds to order a retrial based on the judge’s instructions.

The judge cautioned that requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt could undermine law and order, a remark inspired by prior case law. Critics argued that this comment highlighted negative consequences of a standard not suggested in the case at hand. While the judge's observations were not direct instructions, they could mislead jurors about applying the reasonable doubt standard in favor of the defendant without similarly cautioning against bias toward the prosecution. Concerns arose regarding whether the judge's language could diminish the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the overall charge, which included clear references to this standard, mitigated any potential confusion. The charge was deemed fair to the defendant, and the judge's emphasis on a firm approach to crime did not suggest a lower standard for conviction.

Best argued that the judge should have provided instructions on "accessory after the fact," implying that the joint venture charge was inadequate without it. However, the joint venture instruction was found to be correct and clear, and there was no basis for reversal due to the lack of an additional instruction. After reviewing the entire record, the court found no justification to order a new trial or alter the verdict, affirming the judgments. Additional notes referenced the context of the case, including the victim's condition and Best's inconsistent accounts of the events.

Best reiterated his account during the trial, noting that the benzidine reagent test could yield a false positive in the presence of vegetable pulp, which was relevant as he claimed Adams had cut himself shaving that evening. The police informed Best of Adams' murder only on that day, and there is no record of Best viewing Adams' body. Baez was briefly suspected due to his car resembling one seen speeding by Officer Haynes. The trial did not reveal the content of a significant communication, and Marquis, associated with the case, died in April 1977. The defense highlighted inconsistencies regarding McCown’s relationship with his parents and his timeline of events, particularly concerning a call from Best's house to McCown's number on October 23, which could indicate McCown left for Holliston prior to the alleged encounter with Shea. Cole testified about McCown's confession to him in 1976, but South Carolina authorities did not act on it, complicating Massachusetts' investigation due to ongoing prosecutions. The defense introduced a handwriting expert who could not determine the author of a CNA application. Best denied an affair with Baez, although affectionate letters from Adams to Best were presented. The jury considered murder charges based on "extreme atrocity or cruelty" due to evidence of twenty-six lacerations inflicted with a crowbar, which supports the murder theory and potential complicity. The conclusion regarding McCown's motion to suppress rendered further exploration of Best's interests unnecessary.

Defendants sought to suppress statements made to Healy on April 13-14, 1976, but did not contest the judge's denial of these motions on appeal. There was ambiguity regarding which party bore the burden of proving the custodial nature of the interrogation; the judge indicated it was the defendant but did not clarify this in his findings. Regardless, sufficient evidence existed to support the judge's conclusions, assuming the Commonwealth had the burden. The judge deemed the police "chase" egregious but it did not alter his assessment of the interview's nature. The judge also admitted eight autopsy photographs of the victim’s head into evidence, despite defendants' objections that they were inflammatory and offered minimal evidential value. However, these photographs were pertinent to the charge of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty and could indicate premeditation, leading to the conclusion that their probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. The document emphasizes the necessity of impartiality in the justice system, urging jurors to disregard biases related to race, religion, or social status to ensure that both the innocent are protected and the guilty are convicted, as failing in either duty undermines the value of human life.