Cullison v. Medley

Citations: 570 N.E.2d 27; 1991 Ind. LEXIS 78; 1991 WL 65293Docket: 84 Sol 9104 CV 32

Court: Indiana Supreme Court; April 23, 1991; Indiana; State Supreme Court

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Dan R. Cullison, the appellant, challenges a trial court's summary judgment favoring the Medleys, the appellees, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Indiana accepted Cullison's petition for transfer, reversed the lower court's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The primary issue is whether the "impact rule" prevents Cullison from seeking damages for emotional distress based on alleged wrongdoings by the Medleys, including trespass, assault, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In reviewing the summary judgment, the court emphasized that evidence must be viewed favorably for the non-moving party, Cullison. The court found that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding three of the four counts in Cullison's complaint, necessitating jury consideration. Cullison's account details an encounter with Sandy Medley, during which he was subsequently confronted at his home by her family, including Ernest Medley, who was armed with a revolver. Cullison reported feeling threatened, particularly due to Ernest's behavior with the gun, which led him to believe he was in imminent danger. The court's ruling indicates that these factors warrant a jury's examination of the claims related to emotional distress.

Cullison experienced significant emotional distress after an encounter with Ernest Medley, who had previously threatened him while armed. Following this incident, Cullison sought psychological counseling for 18 months and psychiatric help, which impacted his ability to work in his construction business due to medication side effects. Cullison alleged trespass by the Medleys when they entered his trailer without permission, asserting that their unauthorized entry constituted an actionable claim. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the potential for trespass and the possibility of nominal damages but ruled that Cullison's claim for emotional distress was invalid without evidence of physical injury or malicious intent from the Medleys. The court cited Indiana's "impact rule," which traditionally allowed claims for mental anguish only when accompanied by physical injury, deeming such claims speculative otherwise. However, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that this rationale is outdated, asserting that a rightful occupier can recover for emotional injuries caused by intentional invasions of their premises, even without physical injury, provided that the emotional disturbance is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the trespass.

Juries are equally capable of assessing emotional injuries as they are of evaluating physical pain and suffering, and the presence of physical injury does not lessen the jury's responsibility in determining mental suffering. Concerns about a potential increase in mental damage claims should not prevent legitimate claims from being pursued. In this case, Cullison's complaint includes allegations of trespass, supported by his testimony, which the jury must evaluate to decide if the trespass occurred and if it caused emotional harm.

Regarding the assault claim, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ernest's threat to "jump astraddle" of Cullison, without removing his gun, did not constitute an assault as it lacked present intent to harm. The court also stated that Cullison did not demonstrate that the Medleys acted maliciously or that their actions foreseeably led to his emotional injuries. However, the definition of assault protects the right to be free from apprehension of harmful contact, and it can arise from actions that instill such apprehension, even without physical contact. The court referenced historical precedent indicating that assault can be a "touching of the mind," validating claims for mental trauma.

Cullison's testimony indicated that the Medleys surrounded him and threatened him while one was armed, creating a reasonable apprehension of harm. Thus, it was an error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the assault count. Lastly, Cullison's third count, initially framed as "harassment," was argued as invasion of privacy, and he contended that summary judgment on this count was also erroneous.

The Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff, Cullison, had waived his claim regarding invasion of privacy by failing to brief it at the trial court level. However, the court also concluded that the circumstances did not constitute "outrageous wrongful intrusion into one's private activities." The tort of invasion of privacy includes four forms, one being intrusion, which involves invading a person's physical solitude or seclusion. In this case, Cullison's testimony indicated that he had not invited the Medleys into his home, and their presence in his darkened living room could constitute an intrusive invasion of privacy. 

However, incidents where Cullison was allegedly harassed in public places, such as a restaurant or on the street, do not constitute actionable invasion of privacy, as individuals do not have a legal right to solitude in public spaces. Additionally, as the events inside the trailer also amounted to trespass, Cullison could not pursue both invasion of privacy and trespass claims simultaneously.

Regarding the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that this tort is not recognized in the state. The definition requires extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress. While Cullison suggested that the Medleys' knowledge of his aversion to guns implied intent to inflict emotional harm, the court found this insufficient to support such an inference. Consequently, the trial court's summary judgment on the emotional distress claim was upheld.

In conclusion, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, reversed the summary judgment on the counts of trespass and assault, affirmed the summary judgment on invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims, and remanded the case to the trial court. Justices Shepard, DeBruler, and Dickson concurred, while Givan dissented without opinion.