Turner v. Kight

Citations: 957 A.2d 984; 406 Md. 167; 2008 Md. LEXIS 518Docket: 5, September Term, 2008

Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; October 7, 2008; Maryland; State Supreme Court

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The Court of Appeals of Maryland is addressing whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County improperly dismissed Sherri A. Turner's complaint due to statute of limitations issues. This determination relies on the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which allows for the tolling of state statutes of limitations for state-law claims initially brought in federal court but later dismissed without jurisdiction by that court. 

Turner initially filed a 19-count complaint in U.S. District Court on May 15, 2001, involving 12 counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to alleged violations of federal constitutional rights and 7 counts concerning Maryland constitutional or common law rights. The claims stemmed from an arrest warrant execution and treatment during custody on April 19 and 21, 2000. 

On March 26, 2002, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most federal claims and dismissed the state-law claims. A subsequent reconsideration motion led to the reopening of the case, but by August 20, 2003, the court again granted summary judgment on the remaining federal claim. After appealing to the Fourth Circuit, which upheld the District Court's decisions, the federal action concluded on March 21, 2005.

Turner then filed her current action in the Circuit Court on March 11, 2005, seeking to revive her state-law claims. Some defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on limitations, leading to the present appeal. The Court of Appeals intends to interpret how § 1367(d) applies to Turner's case and whether the dismissal was warranted.

The defendants argued that the statute of limitations for the petitioner's claims was three years under Maryland law, and since the claims arose in April 2000 but were not filed until March 2005, they were time-barred. They cited Maryland Rule 2-101(b), which states that if a state-law action filed in U.S. District Court is dismissed, a subsequent filing in Maryland Circuit Court must occur within 30 days to be considered timely. The petitioner contended that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) interrupted the statute of limitations during her federal case, allowing her less than thirteen months to elapse before the dismissal. The Circuit Court rejected this interpretation, ruling that the limitations period had expired while the case was in federal court and that the petitioner had failed to file within the necessary timeframe after dismissal. The court dismissed the claims against the served defendants and denied a motion for reconsideration. A consent motion led to a final judgment under Maryland Rule 2-602, as some defendants remained unserved. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling, stating that § 1367(d) extends the limitations period until 30 days after dismissal but does not suspend it. The case raised three issues for certiorari: (1) whether § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period or merely extends it; (2) when the 30-day grace period begins; and (3) whether Maryland Rule 2-101(b) aligns with § 1367(d). The conclusion reached was that § 1367(d) suspends the statute of limitations until 30 days after all federal proceedings are concluded and can be harmonized with Rule 2-101(b). Additionally, § 1367 was designed to clarify the jurisdiction of U.S. District Courts regarding supplemental claims.

Section 1367 outlines supplemental jurisdiction for U.S. District Courts, specifically addressing subsections (a), (c), and (d). Subsection (a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over claims related to those within the original jurisdiction, asserting they form part of the same case or controversy. Subsection (c) details conditions under which a District Court may decline to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction, including the dismissal of all original jurisdiction claims, which applies in this case. Subsection (d) states that the limitations period for claims under subsection (a) is tolled while the claim is pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

The primary legal questions revolve around the interpretation of the phrase "shall be tolled" and what "while the claim is pending" means. The established canon of statutory interpretation emphasizes that Congress’s intent should be derived from the statutory language itself, and if that intent is clear, no further analysis is needed. However, if the language is ambiguous—defined as having multiple reasonable interpretations—further interpretation is required.

The term "tolled" is recognized as having different meanings by various courts, indicating ambiguity in its interpretation under Section 1367(d). The Supreme Court has noted that tolling can refer to suspending the statute of limitations, requiring plaintiffs to file within the remaining time after the tolling period ends.

Renewal of the limitations period grants the plaintiff a new period equal to the original. Alternatively, a fixed filing period (e.g., six months or one year) can be established, independent of the original limitations duration or remaining time at tolling's commencement. The term 'tolling' has multiple interpretations in legal contexts, leading to varied judicial interpretations regarding its application under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). In Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., the Minnesota court identified three potential interpretations: 

1. **Substitution approach**: The federal statute replaces the state limitations period with a fixed period after federal dismissal.
2. **Single span approach**: The state limitations period is extended to include the federal claim period plus a specified duration post-dismissal, effectively merging the timelines.
3. **Suspension approach**: The state limitations period is paused while the federal claim is adjudicated, with an additional period allowed post-dismissal.

Judicial consensus is lacking, with courts diverging on the correct interpretation. The intermediate appellate courts in North Carolina, New Jersey, California, and the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands have predominantly favored the extension approach, which has also been implicitly supported by decisions in Alabama and Florida. The Court of Special Appeals in this case aligns with the extension theory.

Three courts in Minnesota, California, and Pennsylvania have adopted a suspension approach regarding the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which pertains to tolling of state statutes of limitations for pendent state-law claims. The Minnesota court in *Goodman* viewed the statute as requiring tolling in all cases, emphasizing that the limitations period "shall be tolled" while the action is pending in federal court, without conditions. In contrast, the California court in *Kolani* criticized the suspension approach as unreasonable, arguing that 30 days is sufficient time for a diligent plaintiff to refile claims without undermining statutory limitations. The New Jersey court in *Berke* similarly rejected any interpretation that would excessively prolong the limitations period, aligning with the policy favoring prompt prosecution of claims. The North Carolina court in *Huang* expressed that the suspension approach contradicts this policy of timely legal action. The California *Bonifield* court, opposing the extension approach from *Kolani*, relied on the general definition of "tolling," likening it to a stopped clock that resumes time without extending the total duration for filing claims. Thus, these courts demonstrate differing interpretations on how tolling should affect the limitations period for claims, reflecting a broader legal debate on the intent of Congress in enacting § 1367(d).

To toll the statute of limitations means to suspend its running, allowing the remaining days to be counted after the tolling period ends. Section 1367(d) stipulates that the statute of limitations is tolled while a federal claim is pending and for 30 days after it is dismissed, unless state law provides a longer tolling period. Thus, the remaining days in the limitations period start counting on the 31st day post-dismissal. This interpretation aligns with the definition of a "tolling statute" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary and is consistent with precedents established by the Supreme Court, including Chardon v. Soto, which clarifies that the statute of limitations ceases to run during the tolling period. The discussion references several cases affirming this suspension approach, including American Pipe Construction Co. v. Utah and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker. The court emphasizes that Congressional intent must be gauged by the language used, which implies a suspension rather than an alternative mechanism that could have been less intrusive on state interests. The second issue addressed is the duration of the suspension when a District Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; specifically, whether the 30-day grace period starts upon dismissal of the claims or at the end of the appellate process. This question has been examined in only a couple of California cases, one being Kendrick v. City of Eureka, where federal claims were resolved before state claims were dismissed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed a dismissal in June 1998, leading the plaintiffs to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court, which was denied in February 1999. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in State court that was dismissed due to statute of limitations issues, a decision upheld by the California appellate court. The court analyzed the term 'pending' as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), noting no clear precedent but observing a general agreement that a matter stays pending in federal court at least through an appeal as a matter of right. However, there was no consensus regarding the impact of certiorari on federal tolling statutes. The court concluded that since appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court are discretionary and do not affect the finality of judgments, the certiorari petition did not toll the state statute of limitations. Consequently, the plaintiffs' state action was deemed untimely, as it was not filed within 30 days after the U.S. Court of Appeals' mandate. Although the Kendrick court's observations regarding tolling during appeals were technically dicta, they were later adopted in Okoro v. City of Oakland, which supported the view that matters remain pending throughout the appellate process. The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) lacks clarity regarding the meaning of 'pending,' particularly since its structure emphasizes District Court proceedings and does not address appeals. The statute suggests tolling ends 30 days post-dismissal, potentially conflicting with its purpose and legislative intent, which favors broader interpretations aligned with the Supreme Court's understanding of judicial proceedings.

The legislative history of 1367 highlights its purpose to facilitate access to federal courts for plaintiffs with federal and state law claims sharing a common nucleus of facts, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Jinks v. Richland County. Prior to 1367(d), plaintiffs faced limited options that often resulted in the risk of state law claims being time-barred. Section 1367(d) addresses this issue by ensuring that state-law claims under 1367(a) do not become time-barred while pending in federal court. The statutes of limitations vary by state, typically ranging from two to six years. If a case is filed promptly and handled quickly by the U.S. District Court, tolling under 1367(d) may only be necessary during an appeal. If an appeal occurs and 1367(d) does not extend tolling, plaintiffs may have to file a new state court action, risking further complications.

Appeals from District Court decisions under 1367 can focus on the dismissal of federal claims, with state-law claims remaining viable if the federal claims' dismissal is reversed. Appeals may also contest the decision to exercise or decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, which is reviewable for abuse of discretion. If tolling ends 30 days post-dismissal of pendant claims, plaintiffs must file a protective state court action, hoping for a stay while the federal appeal is pending. However, state courts may be reluctant to keep cases open indefinitely, leading to potential litigation in both federal and state systems and the risk of inconsistent rulings.

Congress aimed to ensure that the tolling of limitations under 1367(d) continues throughout the appellate process, as supported by the legislative history. The statute originated from the Federal Courts Study Act, established in 1988 to address issues within the Federal courts. A Federal Court Study Committee was formed to analyze these challenges and proposed recommendations, including the authorization for federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction without an independent federal basis. To reduce conflicts between state and federal courts, the Committee suggested dismissing state claims under certain conditions.

Subsequently, two law professors drafted a statute to implement these recommendations, which was forwarded to Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier and included in the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 as § 120, now known as 1367. The original draft proposed tolling limitations while a non-federal claim was pending in district court and for 30 days after dismissal, but the final version modified this to toll the limitations while the claim is pending in federal court more broadly. The House later amended the language to remove the specific reference to federal court, allowing tolling while the claim is pending generally and for 30 days post-dismissal, which was subsequently enacted into law without further changes. This legislative history indicates a deliberate choice to apply a broader interpretation of tolling, aligning with the intent to facilitate the statute’s purpose.

Section 1367(d) suspends the state statute of limitations for a state-law claim filed in U.S. District Court until 30 days after either a final judgment dismissing those claims or the U.S. Court of Appeals issues a dismissal or mandate regarding an appeal. The tolling period includes any remaining time when the claims were initially filed, plus an additional 30 days. The current case was filed within this timeframe. The petitioner argues a conflict between Maryland Rule 2-101(b) and Section 1367, but it is determined that while the Rule yields to the federal statute, there is no actual conflict. The Rule allows for actions dismissed in federal or out-of-state courts to be refiled in state court within 30 days, treating them as timely. The Rule is significant since it applies to cases outside of federal jurisdiction, unlike Section 1367(d). The judgment from the Court of Special Appeals is reversed, with instructions to reverse the Montgomery County Circuit Court's judgment and remand for further proceedings, with costs to be borne by the respondents. Additionally, the specifics of the complaints in both courts reveal that the state-law claims are essentially the same, despite differing counts. It is noted that no entry of judgment was necessary under Rule 2-602, as all claims against served parties were resolved.

The Rule 2-602 order in the case of Scottish Development Co. Inc. was deemed unnecessary, as an appeal could have been pursued without it, rendering it superfluous. The terms "supplemental," "pendent," and "ancillary" jurisdiction are discussed, highlighting that under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, these terms are effectively synonymous. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. is referenced, noting that pendent jurisdiction expands federal-question cases to include related state-law claims, while ancillary jurisdiction primarily addresses matters in diversity cases. The Supreme Court has recognized no significant distinction between these doctrines. Section 1367 includes exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction, which are not relevant in this case, and allows the district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction under specific circumstances, such as novel state law issues or predominance of state claims. Section 1367(d) is noted for potentially overriding state statutes of limitation, raising constitutional debates, with some state supreme courts declaring it unconstitutional. However, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the statute's constitutionality in Jinks v. Richland County, affirming Congress's authority to legislate on such matters. The discussion concludes by acknowledging the contributions of Diana Gribbon Motz to the related legal framework.