Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc.

Citations: 452 N.E.2d 847; 117 Ill. App. 3d 76; 72 Ill. Dec. 594; 1983 Ill. App. LEXIS 2147Docket: 4-82-0756

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; August 8, 1983; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc., the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff against several defendants for damages related to an addition to the nursing home. The plaintiff discovered damage to the roof and related structures by April 1978 but did not file suit until April 16, 1982. The court found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, which had been modified by a special statute that established a two-year limitation period from the discovery of the defect and a maximum of twelve years from the act or omission. A savings clause initially allowed claims based on acts occurring before the effective date of the new statute; however, this clause was repealed prior to the plaintiff's filing of the suit. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for a claim that was barred by the limitations period after the repeal of the savings clause, emphasizing that the retroactivity or prospectivity of a statute is determined by legislative intent.

The statute of limitations is set at twelve years for buildings constructed before 1979, with a two-year window for filing fees. Legislation allows these older buildings to be treated under the same provisions as those built post-1979, as established by Public Act 81-1169. The intent was to eliminate the savings clause that previously prevented immediate legal actions regarding design and construction defects for buildings constructed prior to 1979, which would otherwise be barred. The legislature's quick repeal of the savings clause indicates a desire for immediate effect. However, retroactive application of statutes must be considered for fairness and justice, avoiding unreasonable or oppressive outcomes. Courts weigh the impact on affected individuals’ expectations and the competing interests at stake. When a new statute of limitations is enacted without a savings clause, affected parties should be granted a reasonable period to file claims, as they may not have been aware of the impending deadline. Case law supports the notion that defendants might reasonably expect claims to remain viable until claimants have had time to act.

Claimants' interest in preserving their right to relief is typically prioritized over potential defendants' interest in immediate protection from a new statute of limitations. However, in this case, the current statute's savings clause did not apply immediately to the plaintiff's cause of action. Such clauses often preserve existing rights for a limited time, although this specific clause did not define its duration. The legislature had the authority to terminate the savings clause after a reasonable period. The plaintiff had over 21 months to act after the statute's effective date and 39 months after discovering the damage but failed to take any action during the savings clause's validity. This inaction allowed defendants to reasonably assume that the plaintiff intended to forgo claims, leading to a justified belief that the repeal of the savings clause eliminated their liability. Consequently, the defendants' interest in relying on the repeal outweighs the claimants' interest in pursuing delayed actions. The plaintiff's cited cases do not address the implications of repealing a savings clause. Thus, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.