Schilling v. State

Citations: 271 N.W.2d 631; 86 Wis. 2d 69; 1978 Wisc. LEXIS 1237Docket: 76-526-CR

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; November 28, 1978; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court

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Defendant Schilling was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery, receiving a life sentence for the murder and a concurrent five-year term for the robbery. This appeal examines whether Schilling knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights during police interrogation. The court determined that Schilling's confession was admissible, as he understood his right to counsel and voluntarily waived it, despite not signing a statement or allowing his oral confession to be recorded, which indicated potential misunderstanding of the law but did not negate the waiver's intelligence. The court ruled that the police confrontation with incriminating evidence did not amount to trickery, and the interrogation's length did not render the confession involuntary. The appeal did not challenge the sufficiency of the trial evidence, but the state acknowledged that the confession was crucial for the jury's verdict, and its exclusion would have led to prejudicial error. Schilling was initially taken into custody as a witness related to a drug transaction involving the murder victim, Michael Posthuma, and received Miranda warnings upon his arrest at 12:01 a.m. on June 13, 1975, although he was not initially informed of his right to stop answering questions. After being returned to Dane County, he was properly advised of this right but did not invoke it.

Officer JoAnne Platte informed Schilling of his rights before any interrogation, reading the full Miranda warnings and confirming his understanding of each right, including the ability to halt questioning. Schilling signed a waiver acknowledging he understood his rights, was willing to answer questions, did not want a lawyer, and was not subjected to coercion. He cooperated during questioning from 2:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., admitting involvement in a marijuana sale. Detective Thomas J. Kretschman later re-advised him of his rights, to which Schilling again expressed his understanding and continued to answer questions.

Despite Schilling's earlier concerns for his safety leading to his detention, he showed no reluctance to speak during subsequent interrogations, including one between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m. on June 13, where he was not re-read his rights. Later that day, he informed Kretschman that he had spoken with Attorney Robert A. Christensen, who advised him to refrain from discussing matters with the police. However, Assistant District Attorney John Burr did not communicate this representation to the sheriff's office. When informed by Kretschman that he could stop talking, Schilling chose to continue the conversation, seeking clarification on court procedures, and provided further information about the drug transaction.

On June 14, Schilling was again fully advised of his Miranda rights and, after confirming his willingness to speak, participated in a tour of the locations related to the drug transaction, answering questions throughout.

At approximately 1:20 p.m., Schilling declined to permit his statement to be tape-recorded. After being returned to the sheriff's office, questioning resumed later in the afternoon, during which he requested that his attorney be notified before providing any written or taped statement. No further requests for such statements were made, and no statements were recorded. Throughout the interrogation, Schilling was offered food, which he declined, but he accepted a glass of Seven-Up and later requested aspirin.

Questioning continued until about 7:50 p.m., with a break of approximately 45 minutes. Detective Charles Lulling provided Schilling with complete Miranda warnings, confirming his right to counsel and to remain silent. Schilling indicated he understood his rights and did not mind continuing the interrogation. Lulling testified that he sought to ensure Schilling comprehended his rights, noting Schilling's composure at that time.

During the interrogation, Lulling suggested inconsistencies in Schilling's statements and informed him that Posthuma's wallet was found at a McDonald's, where Schilling claimed to have met his wife on the night of the drug transaction. This led Schilling to exclaim his guilt, confessing to stabbing Posthuma. He later described the murder events but claimed Posthuma was already dead from previous blows inflicted by another assailant. 

Additional detectives were brought in to hear Schilling's admissions, and he made further incriminating statements during a phone call to his wife. Although he exhibited signs of distress, he did not request to terminate the interviews. By around 10:30 p.m., after regaining composure, he inquired about the penalty for first-degree murder. Later that evening, he visited the murder site and again confirmed his involvement in the stabbing but refused to provide a written or videotaped confession until he could contact his attorney.

Prior to trial, a hearing on a motion to suppress Schilling's oral confession was held, resulting in the court denying the motion and concluding that Schilling had been informed of his rights and had voluntarily waived them.

Defendant was aware of his right to counsel before the June 14 interrogation, yet his attorney was not informed or allowed to attend. Throughout the interrogation, the defendant was consistently informed of his rights, including the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the potential use of his statements against him. He acknowledged understanding these rights and expressed a desire for counsel if any statements were to be recorded. Despite indicating a willingness to continue the interrogation, he never requested to contact his attorney. Most of his statements were exculpatory concerning the homicide, aimed at deflecting police suspicion from his involvement in the robbery and homicide.

The officers who conducted the interrogation testified consistently at the trial, and medical evidence confirmed the victim's death resulted from a knife wound, with multiple defensive wounds present. During the interrogation, the defendant received Miranda warnings multiple times, although one initial warning was incomplete. The court found that sufficient Miranda warnings were provided at critical moments, and the defendant's understanding of these rights was assessed throughout the process.

On appeal, the Public Defender argued that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated, referencing Massiah v. United States and Miranda v. Arizona. The state contended that the right to counsel had not attached since adversarial proceedings had not begun; however, this was deemed irrelevant as the defendant had a clear right to counsel during interrogation under Miranda. The court emphasized that the standards for waiving counsel rights under the Sixth Amendment and Miranda are equivalent. The primary issue to resolve was whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and his right to remain silent during interrogation, with the state bearing the burden to prove such a waiver, as established by prior case law. The court reiterated its commitment to maintaining high standards for the waiver of constitutional rights in custodial settings.

The State bears the responsibility of proving the conditions under which an interrogation occurs, particularly regarding the provision of warnings during incommunicado interrogations. The mere silence of a suspect after receiving warnings does not equate to a waiver of rights, nor does responding to certain questions imply such a waiver if the right to remain silent has been invoked. Lengthy interrogations can indicate a lack of valid waiver, and any evidence of coercion in obtaining a waiver undermines its voluntariness. The Miranda requirements necessitate that warnings and waivers are not treated as mere formalities; they must be established as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

In *State v. Hernandez*, the court affirmed that the State must demonstrate that the defendant was informed of, understood, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights as per Miranda, and this must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A prima facie case for admissibility of statements arises when the State shows that the defendant was informed of his rights and acknowledged understanding them. The review standard by the court is whether the trial court’s findings were contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

In the current case, the State proved that the defendant received comprehensive advisement of his Miranda rights on four occasions, including a warning prior to his confession, and he consistently indicated his understanding and willingness to speak. Although there was a defective warning regarding the right to stop questioning, it did not lead to further interrogation. The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, despite defense attempts to argue otherwise. The appellate court will now evaluate the validity of the trial court’s decisions in light of the raised arguments.

Counsel argues that the defendant's subsequent statement to police is constitutionally inadmissible due to the prosecutorial authorities' knowledge of the defendant's legal representation and explicit instructions not to discuss the case. It is contended that the defendant's refusal to provide a written or recorded statement, while being willing to make oral admissions, reflects a misunderstanding of his legal rights, undermining the validity of any waiver. Additionally, counsel claims that the waiver was not voluntary, alleging that police comments aimed to manipulate the defendant into confessing. The lengthy custody period of 45 hours, from June 13 to June 14, 1975, is presented as further evidence of the involuntary nature of the waiver.

While the Public Defender does not advocate for a per se exclusionary rule regarding statements made in the absence of counsel, he emphasizes that the state bears a heavy burden to demonstrate an intentional and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Reference is made to the New York case People v. Tompkins, which relies on the precedent set in People v. Hobson, asserting that a valid waiver requires the presence of a lawyer once legal representation has been established. The Public Defender's position appears inconsistent with the prevailing view among U.S. courts, which allow for waivers under certain conditions. Cases such as United States ex rel. O’Connor v. New Jersey and United States v. Smith acknowledge the possibility of waiving counsel, provided the waiver is clear and intelligent. However, the Seventh Circuit rulings in United States v. Durham and United States v. Springer clarify that there is no absolute rule against statements made without counsel's knowledge, but they stress the necessity for a clear waiver. Ultimately, Wisconsin law maintains that the waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Seventh Circuit has rejected a per se rule regarding the right to counsel during interrogations, allowing for a defendant to waive this right in the absence of counsel. In the case of U.S. ex rel. Chabonian v. Lief, the court granted habeas corpus despite a prior conviction, emphasizing that statements made by a defendant could be admissible if there is a clear and explicit waiver of the right to counsel. The majority opinion held that a defendant's waiver of counsel at interrogation does not necessitate automatic exclusion of statements, provided the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

In this context, the waiver standard aligns with Miranda, imposing a "heavy burden" on the state to prove the waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant in the current case was informed of his rights multiple times by police, understood these rights, and chose to speak, despite counsel's advice to remain silent. The court found that an explicit waiver of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent was established. The Public Defender's argument that the defendant misunderstood the law, believing only written statements could be used against him, was refuted by the record, which confirmed he was repeatedly warned that any statement could be used against him. The defendant's subsequent inquiry about the penalty for first-degree murder indicated he understood the implications of his confession. The court concluded that any alleged mistake of law did not invalidate the waiver.

The Public Defender references Frazier v. United States, which was overruled by United States v. Frazier, where the court concluded that a defendant's mistaken belief about the law does not necessitate legal advice from police or the exclusion of a confession. The D.C. Circuit emphasized that police have fulfilled their obligations after providing Miranda warnings and are not required to ensure the defendant's wise decision-making regarding rights. The Fourth Circuit echoed this view, asserting that once Miranda warnings are given, police have no further duty, regardless of the defendant's understanding. The Public Defender argues the waiver of rights may not have been voluntary due to an officer's mention of a wallet containing possible fingerprints, but the court found this did not constitute trickery or coercion. The officer speculated about fingerprints rather than misrepresenting evidence, and such suggestive questioning did not invalidate the defendant's confession. The Public Defender also claims that the length of interrogation may indicate involuntariness or a lack of valid waiver, citing that extensive questioning or isolation before a confession could suggest invalid waiver, as noted in precedent.

The individual's eventual statement was influenced by the interrogation process, indicating it was not a voluntary relinquishment of rights. While the length of the interrogation is a factor in assessing whether a waiver of rights is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it is not definitive. The waiver occurred shortly after the defendant's custody began, with repeated Miranda warnings provided. The trial court noted that there were breaks in questioning, during which the defendant received food and drink. Importantly, the defendant initiated further discussions despite being told he could cease communication. Although the overall interrogation lasted several hours, it was not continuous and involved two separate crimes. There was no evidence of coercion, and the total circumstances indicated that the confession was voluntary. The court found that Schilling knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, affirming both the conviction and the denial of postconviction motions. The only significant error claimed was the admission of the confession, which was ruled properly admitted. The judgment and order were affirmed.