Jones v. Jackson County Department of Public Welfare

Citations: 436 N.E.2d 849; 1982 Ind. App. LEXIS 1290Docket: 1-281A54

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; June 24, 1982; Indiana; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves the termination of the parent-child relationship between Darla Jones and her parents, Rossie E. Jones, Jr. and Darlene Reed Jones, with the Jackson County Department of Public Welfare as the petitioner. The Indiana Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for essential findings regarding the provision of reasonable services to assist the parents in meeting their parental obligations. The appellate court found errors in the trial court's conclusions, particularly regarding the assessment of services offered by the Department of Public Welfare. 

The trial court's findings indicated that Darla Jones became a ward of the Department on September 27, 1974, and had minimal contact with her parents, with no visits since January 1977. A significant incident occurred during a December 1974 visitation when Darla was removed from the Department's control without consent, resulting in her being returned with minor injuries. The Joneses have lived in various residences since the removal of their child and have not demonstrated consistent efforts to regain custody. The appellate court raised two primary issues: the sufficiency of evidence supporting the termination judgment and whether the trial court's conclusion regarding reasonable services provided by the Department was legally sound based on the findings presented.

The respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Jones, currently reside in a one-bedroom home with their two young children. Mr. Jones has experienced multiple job changes and has been unemployed for approximately six months. The Jackson County Department of Public Welfare has directed the Joneses to secure stable housing and employment and to keep the department informed of their whereabouts. However, the respondents have failed to provide a stable living environment for their child, Darla Jones, and have not maintained consistent communication with the department.

If the court approves the termination of parental rights, the Department plans to place Darla for adoption with her current foster parents, who have had custody since February 1975. The foster father is employed and the family is ready to adopt Darla. 

Legal conclusions indicate that the conditions leading to the child's removal are unlikely to improve, reasonable services were offered to the Joneses which they did not effectively utilize, and terminating their parental rights is in the child's best interest. The Department has a satisfactory plan for Darla's future care post-termination.

Additional findings reveal that the Joneses received multiple counseling sessions from the Department aimed at securing stable housing and employment. Despite Mr. Jones's employment history with several employers and odd jobs, the Joneses frequently moved without notifying the Department, resulting in a lack of communication. The current caseworker had not been able to contact the Joneses since October 1978 due to their unavailability, and the initiation of termination proceedings was only made possible by chance.

Prior to 1977, the Department of Public Welfare provided assistance to Mr. and Mrs. Jones, including help with medical bills and temporary food stamps. The Department lacked parent aid skills training but referred the couple to Quinco Consulting Center for such training and offered homemaker services for household management and childcare. Despite attempts to maintain contact, the Department faced challenges due to the Joneses' frequent relocations, lack of steady employment, and failure to inform the Department of their whereabouts. Consequently, in 1977, the Department ceased assistance, notifying the Joneses that their parental rights were being terminated and that further visitation with their child would not occur. Following this communication, there was no further contact from the Joneses with the Department.

The Department asserts that it provided reasonable services to assist the Joneses in addressing issues related to employment and housing, while the Joneses claim that adequate services to remedy the problems leading to the removal of their child, Darla, were not offered. Darla was reportedly removed due to unexplained bruises, though the specific reasons for her removal remain unclear. The parents argue that the trial court's findings were unsupported by evidence, which in turn undermined the court's conclusions and judgment. The Department contends that reasonable services were offered but were either ineffective or rejected by the Joneses.

Ind. Code 31-6-5-4 outlines the procedure for the involuntary termination of parental rights, specifying that a petition must be filed by the county department's attorney or prosecutor, alleging that: the child has been removed for at least six months, there is a reasonable probability that conditions leading to removal will not be remedied, reasonable services were offered or provided but not accepted or were ineffective, termination is in the child's best interests, and there is a satisfactory care plan for the child.

Determining the validity of the findings in this appeal hinges on whether evidence supports the requirements of Ind. Code 31-6-5-4(3), which the court finds lacking. Key juvenile law principles emphasize that parental rights can only be terminated when it serves the child's best interest and that efforts should be made to assist parents in fulfilling their obligations (Ind. Code 31-6-1-1(5) and (6)). Previous cases, such as In re Leckrone (1980), illustrated that the responsible agency must encourage parents to address issues leading to custody loss. In Leckrone, despite the agency providing substantial support services and assistance to the parent, the parent did not utilize them, indicating that reasonable services were offered.

In In re Fries (1981), the court ruled that the Department's obligations to provide services are negated if the parent refuses to cooperate or attend scheduled meetings. The court affirmed that the Department had fulfilled its duty under the circumstances, and the parent's noncompliance constituted a refusal of services.

In In re Myers (1981), the court examined whether reasonable services were provided, concluding that varied factual circumstances dictate what constitutes "reasonable services." The Department's referral to counseling, provision of a mothering class, and establishment of a rehabilitation contract demonstrated that reasonable services were indeed offered. Overall, the conclusion is that the evidence does not support the findings necessary for the termination of parental rights, as the Department did provide reasonable services under the statute.

In In re Puntney, the court addressed whether the Department provided sufficient reasonable services to assist parents in meeting their parental obligations. The parents claimed that the Department's offered services—including homemaker assistance, public health nursing, food stamps, and caseworker visits—were inadequate. The trial court upheld that reasonable services had been provided but were refused by the parents. The Court of Appeals agreed, emphasizing that parents must make an effort to accept assistance. However, the appellate court found that the Department merely informed the parents of required corrections for their child's return without offering adequate assistance, which is essential under legal standards.

The Department's failure to assist the parents in securing stable housing and employment was highlighted, contrasting with a previous case, Leckrone, where such support was effectively provided. The Department's medical assistance was limited and reactive, only provided after requests from the parents, rather than proactively offered. Testimonies regarding the services provided were vague and unsubstantiated, lacking clear evidence of reasonable efforts made by the Department. The court noted that the Department's inability to maintain contact with the parents stemmed from the parents' instability, but the absence of substantial services could not be construed as a refusal by the parents to accept help. Ultimately, the court ruled that the Department failed to meet its burden of proof for terminating parental rights, leading to a reversal of that decision.

A relationship must exist between the reasons for parental rights removal and the services provided to assist parents in meeting their obligations. It is unreasonable to require the Department to address unrelated parental issues. In Santosky v. Kramer, the U.S. Supreme Court mandated a clear and convincing standard of proof in cases of parental rights termination to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The review of evidence will be conducted under this standard to assess support for findings. 

Following remand, the Department did not submit briefs or petitions, leading to the presumption that their arguments remain unchanged. Evidence will be viewed favorably towards the trial court’s judgment, with reversal occurring only upon demonstrable error. 

Indiana Code 31-3-1-7(e) allows various parties, including parents and legal guardians, to file petitions for termination of parental rights in conjunction with adoption proceedings. The petition must be filed before adoption proceedings commence, though the court may permit filing during such proceedings. Notice of the hearing must be provided to relevant parties, and the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable services were offered to the parents to address the issues leading to custody deprivation. The effectiveness of these services must be shown, along with evidence that the original issues persist despite the offered assistance.