State v. Keel

Citations: 512 N.E.2d 420; 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 3003Docket: 02A03-8701-CR-1

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; August 31, 1987; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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On July 14, 1985, John M. Keel's vehicle collided with a tree, resulting in the death of passenger Sherry Duff. Keel faced charges of reckless driving and driving while intoxicated resulting in Duff's death. After the State presented its case, Keel moved for a directed verdict on the intoxication charge, which the trial court granted, citing insufficient expert medical testimony linking the accident to Duff's death. The jury convicted Keel of reckless driving, sentencing him to one year in jail. The State appealed, arguing the trial court erred in requiring expert testimony on the cause of death. Although the appellate court found the trial court's requirement to be erroneous, it concluded that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause prevents the State from retrying Keel on the intoxication charge. Key witnesses included Kelly Williams, who observed Keel's speeding car before the crash, and paramedic Elizabeth Wolf, who pronounced Duff dead at the scene, attributing her death to severe trauma. Additionally, accident reconstruction expert Walter Stout estimated Keel's speed to be over 90 miles per hour at the time of the accident.

Stout testified that Keel admitted to drinking with Duff at Magilla's bar in New Haven before driving back to Fort Wayne, where the accident occurred. The court reviewed two issues: whether the trial court erred in requiring medical testimony to establish the cause of Sherry Duff's death and whether double jeopardy provisions prohibit retrial for driving while intoxicated resulting in death. The court found that the trial court erred in requiring medical testimony, stating that the jury could infer cause of death from the evidence presented. The court referenced previous cases, including Wilson v. State and Ray v. State, which support the notion that sufficient facts can allow a jury to infer causation without expert testimony. In the cited Ray case, the court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the accident logically led to the inference that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the victim's death. Similarly, in Fought v. State, the court noted that the absence of medical testimony did not prevent the jury from determining the cause of death based on the presented evidence.

The Supreme Court of Indiana determined that circumstantial evidence could lead a jury to reasonably infer that the defendant's actions caused the victim's death. In contrast, in the case of Reed, the evidence was inadequate for a conviction as there were insufficient facts for the jury to deduce that the accident caused the victim's injuries. Reed's passenger, Edna Finkbaum, was initially reported to have sustained only a minor knee injury and was not taken to the hospital immediately. She died later from a closed head injury, with no clear evidence linking the accident to her death. The pathologist's findings suggested the injury could have occurred prior to the accident, and the lack of hospital records or testimony from medical personnel further weakened the case.

In the current case involving Sherry, eyewitness accounts and testimony indicated that the defendant's vehicle was speeding and severely damaged, with Sherry's body found pinned in the wreckage. These factors led to the conclusion that Sherry's injuries were sustained in the accident, justifying the inference of causation for her death. The trial court's decision to direct a verdict on this issue was deemed erroneous.

Furthermore, regarding the possibility of retrial, the State argued that it should proceed based on prior case law (Webster v. State), which allows retrial if the evidence is not legally insufficient and the State has not been given a fair opportunity to present its case. However, the court clarified that Webster set a limited exception rather than a general rule, emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment does not generally prohibit retrial following a reversed conviction.

In North Carolina v. Pearce and subsequent cases, it is established that double jeopardy, as protected by the Fifth Amendment, prohibits retrial when an appellate court reverses a conviction due to insufficient evidence. The rationale is that such a reversal indicates the government's case was so lacking that it should not have gone to jury deliberation. Unlike cases of trial error, which do not imply a failure to prove guilt, a reversal for evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial because the prosecution has already had a fair opportunity to present its case. 

An acquittal based on insufficient evidence is an absolute bar to retrial, even if the acquittal is deemed erroneous. The doctrine of continuing jeopardy explains that if a jury cannot reach a verdict or if a guilty verdict is overturned, the defendant is not subject to double jeopardy, as the proceedings have not concluded. If a trial court directs a verdict, it terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant, ending jeopardy. In this case, the trial court's decision to require medical testimony regarding the cause of death was erroneous, and as the proceedings were terminated favorably for Keel, the State is barred from retrying him under double jeopardy principles. The judgment of the Allen Circuit Court is affirmed.