Com. v. Haag

Citations: 562 A.2d 289; 522 Pa. 388; 1989 Pa. LEXIS 323

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; July 10, 1989; Pennsylvania; State Supreme Court

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Randy Todd Haag was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping in a jury trial held in Berks County, with the murder conviction resulting in a death sentence and a consecutive ten to twenty-year sentence for kidnapping. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the appeal, focusing on the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder conviction. The Court determined that the evidence was adequate to affirm the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key evidence included witness testimony from Steven Grynastyl, who recounted a conversation where Haag expressed a desire to kill Richard Good and offered money for the act. Grynastyl indicated that Haag believed Good owed him and another individual money for cocaine. On the night of Good’s disappearance, his daughter testified that he left to meet a man named Slote, who had arranged a drug deal, but he never returned. Additional testimony from Van Scott Peters, a drug runner for Haag, confirmed Haag's presence at Slote's house shortly before Good was expected to arrive. The Court found no errors in the trial proceedings and upheld the sentences.

Peters recalled that the appellant expressed dislike for Good and claimed that Good owed him money. Upon Good's arrival, Slote led him to a bedroom where Sands pointed a rifle at him. The appellant then took the rifle from Sands and began to assault Good with it, yelling and punching him until Good fell. Appellant, Weisman, and Slote subsequently restrained Good and moved him to the basement. Appellant instructed Peters and Sands to ensure Good did not escape. 

Later, around midnight, while Good was still alive, appellant gave Peters money, cocaine, and keys to Good's Corvette, directing him to drive to Florida. Peters and Sands left immediately, storing the car in Hollywood, Florida. On July 20, 1982, Good's body was discovered in the Susquehanna River, bound and weighted down. 

Peters testified that upon returning to Berks County, the appellant and Weisman warned him about police interest in him due to sightings of the Corvette. They coached Peters on what to tell the police regarding his whereabouts. Appellant criticized Weisman for inadequate weight on Good's body and instructed Peters to dispose of a concrete block and carpet scraps used in the crime. 

Weisman suggested purchasing a new chain to avoid suspicion from a recent hardware store purchase linked to the binding of Good's body. Peters also noted another individual, Bruce Ream, was present in the home but did not participate in the attack. Ream testified that he went to bed early that night and heard noises, including Good's voice and a car arriving. He recalled hearing the appellant say, "You're going swimming," followed by sounds of commotion and a gunshot shortly thereafter. Ream returned home the next evening and overheard a meeting involving appellant, Slote, and Weisman.

Appellant was advised by Slote and others to remain silent regarding their involvement in a crime. Slote requested "double payment" for being the "trigger man" before discussing the matter privately with appellant. Appellant instructed Ream to keep quiet and later engaged in further conversations with Slote, during which he provided two ounces of cocaine, promising further payment. Months later, while police investigated Good's death, appellant expressed a desire to blow up a police barracks and mentioned four officers involved in the case, suggesting they should be disposed of. He claimed that Weisman was responsible for Good's body being discovered, stating he was only supposed to manage the financial aspects.

A cashier testified that Weisman requested the destruction of a charge slip for materials similar to those found with Good's body. A former car dealer noted that the carpet in his dealership, sold to appellant prior to Good's death, matched the carpet found around Good's body. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Mihalikis determined Good died from a shotgun blast, likely between July 14 and July 16, 1982. Ream noted that Slote owned a shotgun at that time, but it was no longer seen after July 14. Police found shotgun shells in Slote's bedroom that matched the pellets recovered from Good's skull.

Testimony from a forensic toxicologist indicated that food found in Good’s stomach had likely been eaten shortly before his death, aligning with Miss Good's account of making him a sandwich on the evening of July 14. The cumulative evidence established appellant's guilt in Good's kidnapping and murder beyond a reasonable doubt, contradicting appellant's claims of contradictory evidence. Additionally, appellant argued that the trial court erred in not changing the venire due to potentially prejudicial articles published shortly before jury selection, which discussed the charges and context of Good's murder.

The January 14 article detailed the jury selection process and the murder case, indicating that the appellant allegedly paid for the murder of Good. The appellant contends that this publicity biased the jury panel. Citing Commonwealth v. Romeri, the court noted that while extensive pre-trial publicity exists, it does not automatically preclude a fair trial. The inquiry shifts to the nature of the publicity and its community impact; for a change of venue to be warranted, the publicity must be "inherently prejudicial" and the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice. The court concurred with the trial court that the publicity was not inherently prejudicial, as neither the content nor the voir dire indicated that the jurors were biased. Of the fourteen jurors, eight were unaware of the case details, and the six who had some knowledge did not hold fixed opinions about the defendant's guilt. The presence of jurors with some awareness was not legally significant, as jurors are required to base their verdict solely on evidence presented.

The appellant also argued that the trial court erred by denying a mistrial after the Commonwealth allegedly presented false testimony from Van Scott Peters, who claimed he had no expectation of reward for his testimony against the appellant. Appellant asserted that Peters's omission of a prior agreement not to prosecute if his statement was corroborated constituted false testimony. The court dismissed this claim, stating that informing a witness suspected of a crime about potential non-prosecution if their testimony is truthful does not equate to a deal that must be disclosed to the jury. 

Finally, the appellant claimed error in not granting a mistrial after a Commonwealth witness inadvertently referenced another crime involving the appellant. The court ruled that since the Commonwealth did not intentionally elicit this reference and did not exploit it, a prompt curative instruction was sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice.

In Commonwealth v. Richardson, the court upheld the trial court’s decision not to grant a mistrial despite an improper remark, as the Commonwealth did not elicit or exploit it, and the jury was properly instructed to disregard it. The appellant argued that the trial court erred by excluding testimony from witness Sands regarding his mental state while holding a rifle at the victim, Good. The court found this irrelevant to the appellant's guilt in Good's murder, as it did not establish any material fact regarding the case.

The appellant also contested the admission of testimony from a cashier regarding Weisman’s request to destroy a receipt for items used to bind Good's body, claiming it was hearsay and not admissible under the co-conspirator exception. The court clarified that acts of a co-conspirator aimed at concealing evidence after a crime are admissible if there is evidence of an original agreement to do so. In this case, the conspirators' actions, including submerging Good's body in a river, indicated a continuation of their original plan, justifying the testimony's admission.

Lastly, the appellant challenged a ruling allowing the Commonwealth to impeach his credibility with evidence of his criminal record if he chose to testify. The trial court considered relevant factors and determined that his recent perjury conviction was admissible due to its significance regarding his truthfulness while posing little risk of suggesting a propensity for violence. The court found no error in this reasoning.

Evidence of prior convictions can be used to impeach a witness's credibility if the conviction involved dishonesty and occurred within ten years of the trial date, as established in Commonwealth v. Randall. The appellant’s prior record would have been admissible had he testified. The trial court properly denied a defense request for a jury instruction regarding the burden of proof for the timing of the kidnapping and murder of Good. The defense argued this was necessary due to a witness's testimony suggesting Good was seen alive after the alleged time of death, but the Commonwealth's evidence overwhelmingly supported the specified time in the bill of particulars. A bill of particulars informs the accused of the charges to prevent trial surprises, and in this case, the appellant was not surprised as the evidence aligned with the stated time of death. The time of death is not an element of the murder charge that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, justifying the denial of the jury instruction.

Regarding the death sentence, the appellant's claims about the validity of the sentence were unsubstantiated, including a request for separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases. Pennsylvania law mandates that the same jury presides over both phases, which is supported by U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The jury found the presence of aggravating circumstances, specifically that the appellant conspired to pay for the murder of Good, evidenced by his offer of $5,000 to the co-conspirators to carry out the crime.

Appellant provided Slote with two ounces of cocaine and later claimed he would pay the rest later. In discussions about the murder with Ream, appellant indicated he was responsible for the "financial end." The evidence confirmed the aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, supporting the jury's finding. The jury identified one mitigating circumstance based on appellant's character and the circumstances of his offense, yet the defense presented minimal evidence for mitigation. Testimony from appellant's mother highlighted his asthma and poor associations as an adult, while his accountant described him as "cooperative" and "honest." The record lacked sufficient basis for additional mitigating circumstances. Appellant contended that the trial court improperly limited the presentation of mitigating evidence but failed to specify instances of such restrictions. Although this issue could be dismissed, it was examined due to the death sentence. The sentencing hearing record showed no trial court errors. Appellant's claim regarding the jury not learning about Weisman's acquittal and Slote's life sentence was deemed irrelevant to his own sentencing. Additionally, concerns over potential impeachment of appellant's mother's testimony were addressed; her statement about appellant's lack of legal troubles would have been admissible as mitigating but was not presented due to the fear of impeachment, which the court ruled was appropriate given appellant's criminal history post-offense. Appellant's interpretation of prior convictions for mitigation purposes was rejected, as the law references the defendant's history at the time of sentencing, allowing for the inclusion of post-offense convictions in the sentencing phase.

Under 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(9), a significant history of felony convictions involving violence is an aggravating circumstance, allowing for the admissibility of convictions occurring after the offense in question, as established in Commonwealth v. Beasley. This principle applies equally to mitigating circumstances, ensuring consistency in the interpretation of "convictions" within the sentencing code. The statute does not explicitly limit the timing of convictions for mitigating circumstances, unlike certain aggravating circumstances which specify that related offenses must have occurred before or at the time of the current offense.

The jury's decision to impose the death penalty was based on one aggravating circumstance that outweighed any mitigating factors. Although the appellant argues the death penalty is arbitrary due to differing outcomes for co-defendants (with one acquitted and another receiving life imprisonment), the court emphasizes that sentencing is individualized. Factors such as a defendant's character, criminal record, and specific involvement in the crime contribute to sentencing variability. As established in prior cases, differing sentences among co-defendants do not inherently indicate arbitrariness.

The court conducted a review of the appellant's death sentence for proportionality against similar cases, particularly those involving the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances, in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(3)(iii). The review utilized data from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts to assess the appropriateness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant's death sentence is affirmed as it aligns with penalties in similar cases and lacks evidence of being influenced by "passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" as per 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(3)(i). Chief Justice Nix concurs but critiques the standard from Commonwealth v. Romeri regarding presuming inherent prejudice from news coverage. Nix, J. expresses satisfaction that the case's facts do not warrant such a presumption under a more appropriate test. He argues that an inadvertent reference to a prior crime did not constitute reversible error, as it was not exploited by the Commonwealth and was promptly addressed by the trial court. The defense's witnesses provided minimal impactful testimony, primarily relying on James Pappadakes' account to counter the prosecution’s evidence of the timing of the victim's death. The case does not present pretrial publicity that necessitates a venue change without considering prejudice. The Chief Justice joins the Court's mandate.