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Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital
Citations: 435 N.E.2d 140; 105 Ill. App. 3d 850; 61 Ill. Dec. 651; 1982 Ill. App. LEXIS 1737Docket: 80-503, 80-504 cons.
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 31, 1982; Illinois; State Appellate Court
In the case of Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, the Illinois Appellate Court addressed a consolidated appeal involving allegations of medical malpractice and drug product liability related to the investigational drug discase, administered to plaintiffs at Central DuPage Hospital. The plaintiffs requested medical records of other patients treated with discase, which the hospital initially resisted but were ordered to produce by the trial court, allowing for the redaction of patient identifiers. The hospital's failure to comply resulted in a contempt ruling. The appeal raised several key issues: 1) The hospital’s right to assert physician-patient privilege, 2) Whether the privilege covers the hospital's records, 3) Potential waiver of the privilege by the hospital or patients, 4) Relevance of the records to the plaintiffs' claims, 5) Protection of the records under patients' constitutional and federal privacy rights. While common law did not traditionally protect doctor-patient communications, Illinois law provides statutory protections for certain medical information. The statute specifies circumstances under which a physician may disclose patient information. Plaintiffs argued that the privilege could only be claimed by physicians on behalf of their patients, asserting that the hospital lacked standing to invoke it. The court indicated that hospitals could assert the physician-patient privilege in specific circumstances to protect patient records. The ruling ultimately reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. No Illinois court has directly addressed the issue of physician-patient privilege in the context discussed, but inferential conclusions can be drawn from Cannell v. Medical, Surgical Clinic, S.C. (1974), which established that a medical clinic must disclose a patient's medical history to third parties if requested by the patient. The Cannell court referenced Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary, emphasizing the physician's duty to protect patient confidentiality and disclose information in the patient's best interests. The Arizona case Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles (1974) provides further context, affirming that hospitals can assert physician-patient privilege to protect confidential records when neither the patient nor the physician is present in proceedings. The court determined that Central DuPage Hospital was obligated to assert this privilege on behalf of patients whose records were sought. The appeal also questions whether the Illinois physician-patient privilege applies to the current case. Plaintiffs argue that the records are discoverable under an exception to the privilege related to malpractice actions, claiming it should extend to all patients of the defendant physician, not just the patient initiating the suit. The privilege aims to foster open communication between physicians and patients and to protect patients from privacy invasions. Legislative intent favors confidentiality over disclosure, except where specified exceptions apply. New Jersey courts uphold a statutory physician-patient privilege that restricts physicians from disclosing nonparty patients' identities, ailments, and treatments in civil malpractice cases without consent, emphasizing that revealing such information contravenes public policy designed to protect confidentiality. In Osterman v. Ehrenworth, the court stated that disclosing nonparty patient information undermines legislative intent. Other states, including California, Florida, and Iowa, have similarly prohibited such disclosures. Although Illinois law exempts malpractice actions from the physician-patient privilege, it should be limited to the patient initiating the action, excluding nonparty patients’ information. The plaintiffs’ argument that confidentiality is maintained by excluding names and identifiers was rejected, citing Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Peralta, where similar exclusions were found insufficient to protect privacy. The admit and discharge summaries of nonparty patients contain sensitive medical information that could lead to identification, compromising their privacy rights. Additionally, the issue of whether the physician-patient privilege was waived by the hospital's response to an interrogatory was addressed. The court held that the privilege can only be waived by the patient, not by the hospital, affirming that the hospital could not relinquish the confidentiality rights of nonparty patients. Patients did not waive their physician-patient privilege when they authorized the hospital to release medical information solely for third-party payment purposes. The limited nature of this waiver does not imply intent to disclose information to unknown entities or the public. The court referenced People v. Mileris, which established that confidentiality expectations are not upheld when records are subject to mandatory disclosure under specific laws, such as the Workmen's Compensation Act. Since the physician-patient privilege prevents the discovery of the hospital records requested by the plaintiffs, further discussion of additional issues is deemed unnecessary. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment in Cook County is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Judges White and Rizzi concurred. Additionally, amicus curiae briefs were submitted by relevant medical associations. The plaintiffs claimed the records might include privileged information shared with hospital staff acting as agents of the physician, but the court could not reach a conclusion on this due to incomplete records. They also suggested that a protective order could limit the dissemination of records, but the court maintained that even with such an order, the privilege would still be violated.